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SERIOUS INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
 
I, Mark Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to: 
 the extent and application of existing privacy statutes 
 the rapid growth in capabilities and use of information, surveillance and 
communication technologies 
 community perceptions of privacy 
 relevant international standards and the desirability of consistency in laws 
affecting national and transnational dataflows. 
REFER to the Australian Law Reform Commission for inquiry and report, pursuant to 
s 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the issue of 
prevention of and remedies for serious invasions of privacy in the digital era. 
Scope of the reference 
The ALRC should make recommendations regarding: 
1.  Innovative ways in which law may reduce serious invasions of privacy in the 
digital era. 
2.  The necessity of balancing the value of privacy with other fundamental values 
including freedom of expression and open justice. 
3.  The detailed legal design of a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of 
privacy, including not limited to: 
a.  legal thresholds 
b.  the effect of the implied freedom of political communication 
c.  jurisdiction 
d.  fault elements 
e.  proof of damages 
f.  defences 
g.  exemptions 
h.  whether there should be a maximum award of damages 
i.  whether there should be a limitation period 
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j.  whether the cause of action should be restricted to natural and living 
persons 
k.  whether any common law causes of action should be abolished 
l.  access to justice 
m.  the availability of other court ordered remedies. 
4. The nature and appropriateness of any other legal remedies for redress for serious 
invasions of privacy. 
The Commission should take into account the For Your Information ALRC Report 
(2008), relevant New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commission privacy 
reports, the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 and relevant 
Commonwealth, State, Territory legislation, international law and case law. 
Consultation 
In undertaking this reference, the Commission will identify and consult relevant 
stakeholders including the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, and 
relevant State and Territory bodies. 
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The ALRC will provide its final report to the Attorney-General by June 2014. 
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Proposals and Questions 
 
 
4. A New Tort in a New Commonwealth Act 
Proposal 4–1  A statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy should 
be contained in a new Commonwealth Act (the new Act). 
Proposal 4–2  The cause of action should be described in the new Act as an 
action in tort. 
5. Two Types of Invasion and Fault 
Proposal 5–1  First element of action: The new tort should be confined to 
invasions of privacy by:  
(a)   intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or private affairs (including by unlawful 
surveillance); or 
(b)  misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff (whether true or 
not). 
Proposal 5–2  Second element of action: The new tort should be confined to 
intentional or reckless invasions of privacy. It should not extend to negligent invasions 
of privacy, and should not attract strict liability. 
Proposal 5–3  The new Act should provide that an apology made by or on behalf 
of a person in connection with any invasion of privacy alleged to have been committed 
by the person:  
(a)  does not constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability by the 
person in connection with that matter; and  
(b)  is not relevant to the determination of fault or liability in connection with that 
matter. 
Proposal 5–4  Evidence of an apology made by or on behalf of a person in 
connection with any conduct by the person is not admissible in any civil proceedings as 
evidence of the fault or liability of the person in connection with that matter.  
6. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Proposal 6–1  Third element of action: The new tort should only be actionable 
where a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
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Proposal 6–2  The new Act should provide that, in determining whether a person in 
the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of 
the circumstances, the court may consider, among other things: 
(a)  the nature of the private information, including whether it relates to intimate or 
family matters, health or medical matters, or financial matters; 
(b)  the means used to obtain the private information or to intrude upon seclusion, 
including the use of any device or technology; 
(c)  the place where the intrusion occurred; 
(d)  the purpose of the misuse, disclosure or intrusion; 
(e)  how the private information was held or communicated, such as in private 
correspondence or a personal diary; 
(f)  whether and to what extent the private information was already in the public 
domain; 
(g)  the relevant attributes of the plaintiff, including the plaintiff’s age and 
occupation; 
(h)  whether the plaintiff consented to the conduct of the defendant; and 
(i)  the extent to which the plaintiff had manifested a desire not to have his or her 
privacy invaded 
7. Seriousness and Proof of Damage 
Proposal 7–1  Fourth element of action: The new Act should provide that the 
new cause of action is only available where the court considers that the invasion of 
privacy was ‘serious’. The new Act should also provide that in determining whether 
the invasion of privacy was serious, a court may consider, among other things, whether 
the invasion of privacy was likely to be highly offensive, distressing or harmful to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. 
Proposal 7–2  The plaintiff should not be required to prove actual damage to have 
an action under the new tort. 
8. Balancing Privacy with Other Interests 
Proposal 8–1  Fifth element of action: The new Act should provide that the 
plaintiff only has a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy where the court is 
satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in 
freedom of expression and any broader public interest. A separate public interest 
defence would therefore not be needed. 
Proposal 8–2  The new Act should include the following non-exhaustive list of 
public interest matters which a court may consider: 
(a)   freedom of expression, including political communication; 
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(b)  freedom of the media to investigate, and inform and comment on matters of 
public concern and importance; 
(c)  the proper administration of government; 
(d)  open justice; 
(e)  public health and safety; 
(f) national security; 
(g) the prevention and detection of crime and fraud; and 
(h)  the economic wellbeing of the country. 
9. Forums, Limitations and Other Matters 
Proposal 9–1  Federal, state and territory courts should have jurisdiction to hear 
an action for serious invasion of privacy under the new Act. 
Question 9–1  If state and territory tribunals should also have jurisdiction, which 
tribunals would be appropriate and why? 
Proposal 9–2  The new Act should provide that the new tort be limited to natural 
persons. 
Proposal 9–3  A cause of action for serious invasion of privacy should not 
survive for the benefit of the plaintiff’s estate or against the defendant’s estate. 
Proposal 9–4  A person should not be able to bring an action under the new tort 
after either (a) one year from the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the 
invasion of privacy, or (b) three years from the date on which the invasion of privacy 
occurred, whichever comes earlier. In exceptional circumstances the court may extend 
the limitation period for an appropriate period, expiring no later than three years from 
the date when the invasion occurred.  
Proposal 9–5  The new Act should provide that, in determining any remedy, the 
court may take into account:  
(a)  whether or not a party took reasonable steps to resolve the dispute without 
litigation; and  
(b) the outcome of any alternative dispute resolution process. 
10. Defences and Exemptions 
Proposal 10–1  The new Act should provide a defence of lawful authority. 
Proposal 10–2  The new Act should provide a defence for conduct incidental to the 
exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property where that conduct was 
proportionate, necessary and reasonable. 
Proposal 10–3  The new Act should provide for a defence of absolute privilege for 
publication of private information that is co-extensive with the defence of absolute 
privilege to defamation. 
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Proposal 10–4  The new Act should provide for a defence of qualified privilege to 
the publication of private information where the defendant published matter to a person 
(the recipient) in circumstances where: 
(a)  the defendant had an interest or duty (whether legal, social or moral) to provide 
information on a subject to the recipient; and 
(b)  the recipient had a corresponding interest or duty in having information on that 
subject; and 
(c)  the matter was published to the recipient in the course of giving to the recipient 
information on that subject. 
The defence of qualified privilege should be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the 
conduct of the defendant was actuated by malice. 
Question 10–1  Should the new Act instead provide that the defence of qualified 
privilege is co-extensive to the defence of qualified privilege to defamation at common 
law? 
Proposal 10–5  The new Act should provide for a defence of publication of public 
documents. 
Proposal 10–6  The new Act should provide for a defence of fair report of 
proceedings of public concern. 
Question 10–2 Should the new Act provide for a defence of necessity? 
Proposal 10–7  The new Act should provide a safe harbour scheme to protect 
internet intermediaries from liability for serious invasions of privacy committed by 
third party users of their service. 
Question 10–3  What conditions should internet intermediaries be required to meet 
in order to rely on this safe harbour scheme? 
11. Remedies and Costs 
Proposal 11–1  The new Act should provide that courts may award compensatory 
damages, including damages for the plaintiff’s emotional distress, in an action for 
serious invasion of privacy. 
Proposal 11–2  The new Act should set out the following non-exhaustive list of 
factors that may mitigate damages for serious invasion of privacy: 
(a)  that the defendant has made an appropriate apology to the plaintiff about the 
conduct that invaded the plaintiff’s privacy; 
(b)  that the defendant has published a correction of any untrue information 
disclosed about the plaintiff; 
(c)  that the defendant has made an offer of amends in relation to the defendant’s 
conduct or the harm suffered by the plaintiff; 
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(d)  that the plaintiff has already recovered compensation, or has agreed to receive 
compensation in relation to the conduct of the defendant; 
(e)  that the defendant had taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute with the 
plaintiff in order to avoid the need for litigation; and 
(f)  that the plaintiff had not taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute, prior to 
commencing or continuing proceedings, with the defendant in order to avoid the 
need for litigation. 
Proposal 11–3  The new Act should set out the following non-exhaustive list of 
factors that may aggravate damages for serious invasion of privacy: 
(a)  that the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps, prior to commencing or continuing 
proceedings, to settle the dispute with the defendant in order to avoid the need 
for litigation; 
(b)  that the defendant had not taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute with the 
plaintiff in order to avoid the need for litigation; 
(c)  that the defendant’s unreasonable conduct at the time of the invasion of privacy 
or prior to or during the proceedings had subjected the plaintiff to special or 
additional embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation; 
(d)  that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or committed with the intention to 
cause embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation to the plaintiff; and 
(e)  that the defendant has disclosed information about the plaintiff which the 
defendant knew to be false or did not honestly believe to be true. 
Proposal 11–4  The new Act should provide that the court may not award a 
separate sum as aggravated damages. 
Proposal 11–5  The new Act should provide that, in an action for serious invasion 
of privacy, courts may award exemplary damages in exceptional circumstances and 
where the court considers that other damages awarded would be an insufficient 
deterrent. 
Proposal 11–6  The total of any damages other than damages for economic loss 
should be capped at the same amount as the cap on damages for non-economic loss in 
defamation. 
Proposal 11–7  The new Act should provide that a court may award the remedy of 
an account of profits. 
Proposal 11–8  The new Act should provide that courts may award damages 
assessed on the basis of a notional licence fee in respect of the defendant’s conduct, in 
an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
Proposal 11–9  The new Act should provide that courts may award an injunction, 
in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
Proposal 11–10  The new Act should provide that courts may order the delivery up 
and destruction or removal of material, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
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Proposal 11–11 The new Act should provide that courts may make a correction 
order, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
Proposal 11–12  The new Act should provide that courts may make an order 
requiring the defendant to apologise to the plaintiff, in an action for serious invasion of 
privacy. 
Proposal 11–13   The new Act should provide that courts may make a declaration, in 
an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
Question 11–1  What, if any, provisions should the ALRC propose regarding a 
court’s power to make costs orders? 
12. Breach of Confidence Actions for Misuse of Private 
Information 
Proposal 12–1   If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is not 
enacted, appropriate federal, state, and territory legislation should be amended to 
provide that, in an action for breach of confidence that concerns a serious invasion of 
privacy by the misuse, publication or disclosure of private information, the court may 
award compensation for the claimant’s emotional distress. 
Proposal 12–2   Relevant court acts should be amended to provide that, when 
considering whether to grant injunctive relief before trial to restrain publication of 
private (rather than confidential) information, a court must have particular regard to 
freedom of expression and any other countervailing public interest in the publication of 
the material. 
13. Surveillance Devices 
Proposal 13–1   Surveillance device laws and workplace surveillance laws should 
be made uniform throughout Australia.  
Proposal 13–2   Surveillance device laws should include a technology neutral 
definition of ‘surveillance device’. 
Proposal 13–3   Offences in surveillance device laws should include an offence 
proscribing the surveillance or recording of private conversations or activities without 
the consent of the participants. This offence should apply regardless of whether the 
person carrying out the surveillance is a participant to the conversation or activity, and 
regardless of whether the monitoring or recording takes place on private property. 
Proposal 13–4   Defences in surveillance device laws should include a defence of 
responsible journalism, for surveillance in some limited circumstances by journalists 
investigating matters of public concern and importance, such as corruption. 
Question 13–1   Should the states and territories enact uniform surveillance laws or 
should the Commonwealth legislate to cover the field? 
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Proposal 13–5   Surveillance device laws should provide that a court may make 
orders to compensate or otherwise provide remedial relief to a victim of unlawful 
surveillance. 
Question 13–2   Should local councils be empowered to regulate the installation 
and use of surveillance devices by private individuals? 
14. Harassment 
Proposal 14–1   A Commonwealth harassment Act should be enacted to 
consolidate and clarify existing criminal offences for harassment and, if a new tort for 
serious invasion of privacy is not enacted, provide for a new statutory tort of 
harassment. Alternatively, the states and territories should adopt uniform harassment 
legislation 
15. New Regulatory Mechanisms 
Proposal 15–1   The ACMA should be empowered, where there has been a privacy 
complaint under a broadcasting code of practice and where the ACMA determines that 
a broadcaster’s act or conduct is a serious invasion of the complainant’s privacy, to 
make a declaration that the complainant is entitled to a specified amount of 
compensation. The ACMA should, in making such a determination, have regard to 
freedom of expression and the public interest. 
Proposal 15–2   A new Australian Privacy Principle should be inserted into the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that would: 
(a)   require an APP entity to provide a simple mechanism for an individual to 
request destruction or de-identification of personal information that was 
provided to the entity by the individual; and 
(b)  require an APP entity to take reasonable steps in a reasonable time, to comply 
with such a request, subject to suitable exceptions, or provide the individual with 
reasons for its non-compliance. 
Question 15–1   Should the new APP proposed in Proposal 15–2 also require an 
APP entity to take steps with regard to third parties with which it has shared the 
personal information? If so, what steps should be taken? 
Question 15–2   Should a regulator be empowered to order an organisation to 
remove private information about an individual, whether provided by that individual or 
a third party, from a website or online service controlled by that organisation where: 
(a)  an individual makes a request to the regulator to exercise its power; 
(b)  the individual has made a request to the organisation and the request has been 
rejected or has not been responded to within a reasonable time; and 
(c)  the regulator considers that the posting of the information constitutes a serious 
invasion of privacy, having regard to freedom of expression and other public 
interests? 
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Proposal 15–3   The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) should be amended to confer the 
following additional functions on the Australian Information Commissioner in relation 
to court proceedings relating to interferences with the privacy of an individual: 
(a)  assisting the court as amicus curiae, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court; and 
(b)  intervening in court proceedings, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court. 
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This Inquiry 
1.1 This Inquiry comes at a time of continuing and rapid advances in technology 
with increasing capacities to affect the privacy of individuals. Many of these 
technological advances are beneficial to society and are valued by the individuals and 
organisations that use them or who benefit from their use. However, these technologies 
also raise concerns about privacy that might once have been the stuff of science fiction 
but are now based on reality. 
1.2 The challenge for lawmakers is how to ensure that the law remains relevant, 
appropriate and workable in the light of technological advances. By the 1990s 
technology had already taken a monumental leap with the development and uptake of 
the internet and the worldwide web and with advances in digital technology. 
1.3 Over the last 20 years, governmental, commercial and personal use of digital 
technology has become universal. Data-mining methods, search engines and data 
analytics have revolutionised the processing, recognition, communication, acquisition 
and aggregation of knowledge and information. Mobile technologies and devices have 
become increasingly affordable to all social and economic strata of society. Social 
media have transformed interpersonal communications. Media convergence has made 
today’s media a different phenomenon from even its 1990 counterparts. 
1.4 The scope of this Inquiry is not confined to invasions of privacy brought about 
by digital technology. Significant gaps in data protection regulation, deficiencies or 
inconsistencies in criminal surveillance or harassment laws, and gaps in the existing 
common law protection against physical invasions of an individual’s privacy also 
underpin the need for a review of the existing law. 
1.5 The divergence in the recommendations of previous inquiries into privacy law, 
significant developments in other jurisdictions, concerns expressed in the community, 
continuing gaps in Australian common law and statute law protecting privacy, and new 
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problems raised by the use of rapidly developing technologies
1
 all require detailed 
consideration by the ALRC in this Inquiry. 
1.6 This document commences the second stage in the consultation process in this 
Inquiry into serious invasions of privacy. The first stage included the release of the 
Issues Paper, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC IP 43, 2013), in 
response to which the ALRC received many valuable submissions.
2
 The Final Report 
will be provided to the Attorney-General by the end of June 2014. 
How to make a submission 
1.7 With the release of this Discussion Paper, the ALRC invites individuals and 
organisations to make a submission, particularly in response to the specific proposals 
and questions, but also to any of the background material and analysis. 
1.8 There is no specified format for submissions, although the questions and 
proposals may provide useful guidance. Submissions may be made in writing, by email 
or using the ALRC’s online submission form. Submissions made using the online 
submission form are preferred. 
1.9 Generally, submissions will be published on the ALRC website, unless marked 
confidential. Confidential submissions may still be the subject of a request for access 
under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). In the absence of a clear indication 
that a submission is intended to be confidential, the ALRC will treat the submission as 
public. The ALRC does not publish anonymous submissions. 
Submissions using the ALRC’s online submission form can be made at: 
<www.alrc.gov.au/content/privacy-subs-DP80>. 
In order to ensure consideration for use in the Final Report, submissions must 
reach the ALRC by Monday 12 May 2014. 
The Terms of Reference 
1.10 The Terms of Reference set out and limit the scope of the ALRC’s Inquiry. The 
ALRC is asked to make recommendations on the detailed legal design of a statutory 
civil cause of action for serious invasions of privacy. The ALRC is also asked to make 
recommendations about other legal remedies and innovative ways in which the law 
could prevent or redress serious invasions of privacy. This latter task has required the 
ALRC to consider how a range of existing common law causes of action and remedies 
                                                        
1  M Paterson notes that ‘Surveillance in public places has assumed additional importance in the light of 
technological developments that have taken place since the publication of the VLRC’s report in 2010’, 
citing, for example, increased availability of face and number plate recognition and radio frequency 
identification technologies: M Paterson, Submission 60. 
2  Both the Issues Paper and this Discussion Paper may be downloaded free of charge from the ALRC 
website, <www.alrc.gxjov.au>. Hard copies may be obtained on request by contacting the ALRC on 
(02) 8238 6333. Public submissions are also published on the ALRC website. 
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and statutory provisions might be strengthened or amended, as well as considering 
proposals for new ways in which the law could prevent or redress invasions of privacy. 
1.11 The Terms of Reference also require the ALRC to make recommendations 
which recognise the necessity to balance the value of privacy with other fundamental 
values—including freedom of expression and open justice. The Discussion Paper 
addresses this issue at several stages, both in relation to the elements of a statutory 
cause of action and in relation to existing legal remedies
3
 and elsewhere. 
Emerging threats to privacy 
1.12 Particular attention has been directed recently to the rapidly expanded 
technological capacity of organisations not only to collect, store and use personal 
information, but also to track the physical location of individuals, to keep the activities 
of individuals under surveillance, to collect and use information posted on social 
media, to intercept and interpret the details of telecommunications and emails, and to 
aggregate, analyse and sell data from many sources. 
1.13 Organisations that may collect and process personal information include: 
 national and foreign security organisations; 
 government agencies, such as education or health entities or local councils; 
 law enforcement agencies; 
 media entities; 
 financial institutions and credit reporting agencies; 
 national and international commercial entities; 
 social media platforms; 
 retail, marketing and behavioural advertising companies; and 
 civilian activist groups. 
1.14 Corporate or governmental activities involving the processing of personal 
information are governed by a range of common law obligations or statutes or 
regulatory schemes concerned with the collection, storage or dissemination of data or 
with related matters such as the protection of intellectual, real and personal property,  
financial interests and reputation. 
1.15 Data processing by commercial, government and non-government organisations 
may often be necessary, appropriate and lawful; carried out with relevant consents or 
authority or specifically authorised by statute; justified in the public interest; or within 
the terms and conditions specified by the relevant entity for the provision of a service. 
Most corporations realise the importance of taking privacy concerns seriously: quite 
apart from legal reasons, there are important reputational and business consequences of 
                                                        
3  See Ch 12. 
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data breaches. Many of the organisations described above belong to industry 
associations which endorse the importance of privacy protection. 
1.16 Nonetheless, breaches of privacy do occur as a result of the activities of these 
organisations for a range of reasons. Some breaches of a person’s privacy might be 
unavoidable; others might come about due to systemic weaknesses in a system of data 
protection, or through incompetence or lack of care. Some may be caused by deliberate 
and unpredictable activities of unauthorised third parties, intent on breaking into a data 
system. Some activities may be outside, or exempt from any existing regulation or law. 
Some activities may amount to an indefensible, unlawful and deliberate invasion of the 
privacy of an individual. 
1.17 Modern privacy concerns are not however limited to the use of personal 
information by organisations. Many disputes about invasions of privacy are between 
individuals. Many of the cases in other jurisdictions involve the conduct of individuals. 
The ALRC has received submissions from individuals and representative groups 
concerned about: 
 people installing surveillance cameras which can record their neighbour’s 
activities; 
 surveillance cameras installed by activists trespassing onto private property and 
the subsequent posting of the footage on websites; and 
 harmful, invasive and distressing disclosure of personal information and images 
by an individual’s former partner. 
Previous inquiries and international developments 
1.18 This Inquiry builds on four other recent inquiries into privacy law or related 
issues conducted in Australia, three of which recommended the enactment of a 
statutory cause of action.
4
 
1.19 The ALRC’s report, For Your Information: Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC 
Report 108, 2008) focused on data protection: information collection, access and use. 
The ALRC recommended that Commonwealth legislation should provide for a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy.
5
 
1.20 In 2009, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) 
recommended that a general cause of action for invasion of privacy was required to 
                                                        
4  Privacy was also the subject of earlier reports by the ALRC. In 1979, the ALRC recommended that a 
person be allowed to sue for damages or an injunction if ‘sensitive private facts’ were published in 
circumstances that were likely to cause distress, annoyance or embarrassment to a person in the position 
of the relevant individual: ALRC, Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy, Report No 11 (1979). In 
1983, the ALRC released a report concentrating on information privacy, and the need to implement the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 1983: ALRC, Privacy, Report No 22 (1983). This 
resulted in the enactment of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  
5  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–1. 
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provide a ‘basis for the ongoing development of the law of privacy in a climate of 
dynamic societal and technological change’.
6
 
1.21 In 2010, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) issued the report, 
Surveillance in Public Places, which followed a decade-long inquiry into workplace 
privacy and privacy in public places.
7
 
1.22 In September 2011, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
(DPM&C) released an Issues Paper on a statutory cause of action for invasion of 
privacy,
8
 prompted by a number of ‘high profile privacy breaches’ in Australia and 
overseas.
9
 
1.23 In addition to a continuing debate in Australia on the desirability of a statutory 
cause of action, there have been important developments in privacy protection in other 
countries. Privacy torts have been well-established in the United States for many 
decades, although the protection they provide is limited by the constitutional protection 
of free speech in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. Some states, such as 
California, have also introduced a statutory tort of invasion of privacy.
10
 
1.24 The United Kingdom has developed extensive legal protection of privacy by 
extending the equitable action for breach of confidence, under the influence of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).
11
 This Act requires the courts to give effect to the 
protection of rights and freedoms set out in arts 8 and 10 of the European Covenant on 
Human Rights. 
1.25 The Canadian provinces of British Columbia,
12
 Manitoba,
13
 Newfoundland and 
Labrador,
14
 Quebec
15
 and Saskatchewan
16
 have enacted statutory torts for invasion of 
privacy, and the Ontario Court of Appeal has also recognised common law 
protection.
17
 New Zealand courts have recently recognised common law torts of misuse 
of private information
18
 and of intrusion.
19
 
1.26 The state of development of a country’s common law protection of privacy has a 
significant impact on the question of whether there is a need to legislate for a cause of 
action. Committees in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand have recommended 
                                                        
6  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) [4.14]. 
7  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010). 
8  ‘A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy’ (Issues Paper, Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2011). 
9  This presumably referred to the widespread phone hacking by journalists and their sources that led to the 
Leveson Inquiry in the United Kingdom: Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press, House of Commons Paper 779 (2012). 
10  California Civil Code § 1708.8. 
11  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. See Ch 12. 
12  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373. 
13  Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P125. 
14  Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22. 
15  Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64 ss 3, 35–37. 
16  Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24. 
17  Jones v Tsige (2012) 108 OR (3rd) 241. 
18  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1. 
19  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012). 
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against the introduction of a statutory cause of action, in view of the common law 
developments in those two countries.
20
 
1.27 In contrast, a common law tort for invasion of privacy has not yet developed in 
Australia, despite the High Court leaving open the possibility of such a development, in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd.
21
 While a tort of 
invasion of privacy has been recognised by two lower court decisions,
22
 no appellate 
court has confirmed the existence of this tort. The general consensus is that the likely 
direction of the future development of the common law is uncertain.
23
 
Should a new cause of action be enacted? 
1.28 The ALRC considers that the question of whether a statutory cause of action for 
serious invasion of privacy would be beneficial to the Australian community is best 
answered after considering: 
 the existing legal protections for privacy; 
 the gaps in that legal protection identified; 
 the precise elements of the proposed cause of action; and 
 any alternative ways in which the unacceptable gaps in the law might be filled. 
1.29 Only a very few stakeholders who made submissions to the Inquiry told the 
ALRC that the law did not need to be changed at all, and that there were no gaps in the 
legal protection of privacy in Australia.
24
 Those who opposed the introduction of a new 
cause of action recognised the gaps in the law, but submitted that it would be 
preferable to fill those gaps in other ways.
25
 Many other stakeholders expressed their 
support for a statutory cause of action. Both stakeholders who supported and those who 
opposed the introduction of a new cause of action made submissions as to the desirable 
elements of any such action. 
1.30 The cause of action proposed in this Discussion Paper is more precise than 
similar privacy actions recommended in other law reform reports, and in some respects 
more narrow. The ALRC believes that precision is important so that stakeholder 
groups, individuals and lawmakers can reach a more informed view on the potential 
interpretation and application of the proposed action, on the extent of protection it may 
provide to potential claimants, and on the impact it may have on those who would face 
potential liability. Only when these assessments are made can there be an informed 
                                                        
20  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012); New Zealand Law Commission, Invasion 
of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 3, Report No 113 (2010). 
21  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
22  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003); Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] 
VCC 281.  Both cases were settled before appeals by the respective defendants were heard. 
23  The case law on the issue since Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd is 
discussed in Ch 3. 
24  Free TV, Submission 55; The Newspaper Works, Submission 50. 
25  SBS, Submission 59; AIMIA Digital Policy Group, Submission 56; News Corp Australia, Submission 34. 
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debate on the relative desirability of the proposed statutory cause of action or other 
alternatives. 
1.31 Privacy law must recognise other values and interests, such as freedom of 
expression. This is reflected in the design of the tort proposed in this Discussion Paper. 
While this may mean that one interest is not as protected or as unconstrained to the 
extent some advocates would prefer, the ALRC considers that the law may be able to 
find a middle ground where a balance can be reached and a degree of useful protection 
can be enacted. 
1.32 The statutory cause of action is thus directed at serious invasions of privacy 
committed intentionally or recklessly with no countervailing justification or defence. If 
the statute provides remedies for such invasive conduct, Australia will have made an 
important and clear step in providing greater protection for privacy than is currently 
available. It will give Australians the privacy protections enjoyed by those in other 
countries, including the UK, New Zealand and Canada. 
1.33 The statutory cause of action is not, however, the only way that greater 
protection could be achieved by statutory reform. This Discussion Paper, in Part 3, 
suggests other measures that should be considered to improve the protection in 
Australia of people’s privacy in the digital age, some in addition to and some as an 
alternative to a new statutory cause of action. 
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Summary 
2.1 The Issues Paper identified several principles for guiding the recommendations 
for reform in this Inquiry into serious invasions of privacy. 
2.2 There was wide support by stakeholders for these principles. Some stakeholders 
suggested additional matters that should be incorporated into the principles; some 
argued that certain principles should be given greater emphasis or priority; others 
stressed that there should be no hierarchy or preference for certain interests. 
2.3 The principle which elicited the strongest support was that the protection of 
privacy must be balanced with other fundamental freedoms and matters of public 
interest. 
2.4 The Guiding Principles are not the only considerations that will underpin any 
legislative reforms, but they generally accord with established values and concepts that 
have been set out in discussions about the legal protection of privacy. The discussion of 
the value, importance and role of privacy in various contexts and from various 
perspectives—legal, philosophical, social, political, technical—is extensive. This 
Discussion Paper does not attempt to survey these discussions or the enormous body of 
literature on the topic. Rather, this chapter identifies some key considerations that will 
underpin the recommendations to be made in the Final Report. 
2.5 The Guiding Principles draw on leading cases in Australia and other 
jurisdictions, international conventions, academic commentary on privacy and related 
fields, the Terms of Reference, and similar principles identified in earlier ALRC 
reports and submissions to this Inquiry. 
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Principle 1: Privacy is a fundamental value worthy of legal 
protection 
2.6 Privacy is important to enable individuals to live a dignified, fulfilling, safe and 
autonomous life. It is an important element of the fundamental freedom of individuals 
that underpins their: 
 ability to form and maintain meaningful and satisfying relationships with others, 
including intimate and family relationships; 
 freedom of speech, thought and self-expression; 
 freedom of movement and association; 
 ability to engage in the democratic process; 
 freedom to engage in secure financial transactions; 
 freedom to develop and advance their own intellectual, cultural, artistic, 
property and physical interests; and 
 freedom from undue interference or harm by others. 
2.7 The right to privacy is recognised as a fundamental human right in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and other international instruments and treaties.
1
 Article 17 of the ICCPR, to 
which Australia is a signatory, provides: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.2
 
2.8 Many stakeholders stressed the importance of privacy to a person’s autonomy 
and rights of self-determination.
3
 The Law Institute of Victoria, for example, noted that 
‘the protection of an individual’s privacy is fundamental to their human dignity and is 
central to many other human rights such as the right of freedom of association, 
movement and expression’.
4
 
2.9 Privacy also gives individuals greater freedom to pursue their cultural interests 
free from undue interference from others. This freedom may be particularly important 
for some ethnic, religious and cultural groups, such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
                                                        
1  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 December 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) art 16; Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 July 2003) art 14. 
2  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17. 
3  See, eg, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; A Johnston, Submission 9; I Pieper, Submission 6. 
4  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
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Islander people, who have particular cultural identity, knowledge and customs that bear 
on the privacy interests of individuals within the group.
5
 
2.10 Some representative groups also stressed the importance of a right to privacy for 
protecting vulnerable individuals in the community from undue interference or 
harassment, or the fear of violence and harassment by others.
6
 Privacy plays an 
important role in ensuring personal safety and freedom from harassment. 
2.11 As privacy is about individual freedoms, corporate entities, government 
organisations or agencies, and elected groups would not have a right of action to sue 
for invasion of privacy under the ALRC’s proposals.
7
 This is consistent with the 
common law, which recognises that privacy is a matter of human dignity and 
sensitivity.
8
 This does not deny the possibility of invasions of the privacy of persons 
within a corporate entity or other organisation, nor the right of corporate entities to sue 
at common law for interference with their property rights. 
Principle 2: There is a public interest in protecting privacy 
2.12 This principle reflects the long-held acceptance by the law that the notion of 
public interest does not simply comprise matters in which the public as a whole has a 
communal interest, such as the proper administration of government or the proper 
administration of justice. Rather, there is also a public interest in the protection and 
enforcement of private freedoms and rights of individuals. This is embodied in the 
law’s protection of information imparted under a contractual or equitable obligation of 
confidence.
9
 A similar concept underpins the protection of many property and 
possessory rights.
10
 
2.13 It follows that in many cases involving the protection of privacy, the court will 
not only be concerned to provide a remedy that will protect the individual litigant. 
Courts will also be concerned to provide a remedy that will have a normative effect on 
the behaviour of others in the community, either by way of deterrent or example, so 
providing a measure of protection to a broader class of people. Legal rights can help set 
standards of behaviour, and may be valuable even if those rights are not often enforced. 
2.14 Privacy, like confidentiality, underpins other important individual freedoms. 
Privacy and the ability to speak freely without fear of disclosure is important for social 
order and public health, private wellbeing, and the achievement of many social ideals 
and objectives. Without privacy and confidentiality, a person may feel unsafe or unable 
                                                        
5  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
6  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence 
Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48. 
7  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Blueprint for Free Speech, Submission 26. 
8  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [43] (Gleeson 
CJ). 
9  On the public interest in upholding confidences, see Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 
3 WLR 222, [67]. See further Ch 12. 
10  ‘If the courts of common law do not uphold the rights of individuals by granting effective remedies, they 
invite anarchy, for nothing breeds social disorder as quickly as the sense of injustice which is apt to be 
generated by the unlawful invasion of a person's rights’: Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 655 
(Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
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to speak freely and honestly about an important matter, such as a suspicion about 
criminal activity, a problem about one’s own or another person’s activities, or a health 
concern about a condition, disease or substance addiction. There is also a public 
interest in the security of confidential information about an individual’s financial and 
commercial interests. 
2.15 The public interest in confidentiality and privacy is reflected in many legal 
principles, such as the defence of qualified privilege in defamation law, or in the 
approach of the courts in granting injunctions to constrain the breach of a contractual 
or equitable obligation of confidence.
11
 It is also reflected in legislative provisions 
dealing with the confidentiality of medical records and medical information about a 
person.
12
 
Principle 3: Privacy should be balanced with other important 
interests 
2.16 The privacy of an individual is not an absolute value or right which necessarily 
takes precedence over other values of public interest. As stakeholders noted, it must be 
balanced with a range of other important values, freedoms and matters of public 
interest, including, in no particular order or hierarchy: 
 freedom of speech,
13
 including the freedom of the media and the implied 
constitutional freedom of political communication;
14
 
 freedom of artistic and creative expression and innovation in the digital era;
15
 
 the proper administration of government and matters affecting the public or 
members of the public; 
 the promotion of open justice; 
 national security and safety; 
 the prevention and detection of criminal and fraudulent activity and the 
apprehension of criminals;
16
 
                                                        
11  This point is discussed further in Ch 12. 
12  See, eg, Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) s 130. 
13  In Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3 (27 February 2013) French 
CJ sets out a useful summary of the ways in which freedom of speech as a value underpins much of 
Australian common law and statute law. 
14  RSPCA, Submission 49. The RSPCA submission referred to ABC v Lenah Game Meats, where Kirby J 
suggests that courts should give a wider interpretation than they have done to date on the matters falling 
within the implied freedom: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 
208 CLR 199, 286–287. 
15  Facebook, Submission 65. 
16  For example, in 2012–2013, information obtained under communications interception or stored 
communications warrants was used in 3,083 arrests, 6,898 prosecutions and 2,765 convictions: Attorney-
General’s Department, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979: Annual Report 2012–
2013 (2013) 4. Other submissions referring to the importance of detecting criminal or fraudulent activity 
included Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Google, Submission 54; CV Check, Submission 23; 
Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
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 the effective delivery of essential and emergency services in the community;
17
 
 the protection of vulnerable persons in the community; 
 national economic development and participation in the global digital 
economy;
18
 and 
 the value of individuals being enabled to engage in digital communications and 
electronic financial and commercial transactions.
19
 
2.17 This list is not an exhaustive list of public interest matters. Some stakeholders 
emphasised the need for a holistic approach to the balancing of interests in particular 
circumstances,
20
 while others stressed the need for the balancing process to consider 
the degree to which any interference with one interest was necessary and proportionate 
to the protection of the other. This latter concept is stressed in privacy litigation in the 
United Kingdom since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), and is 
also relied upon in European case law dealing with the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
21
 
2.18 There was widespread support among stakeholders for the articulation of this 
principle, and no stakeholders submitted that privacy should be regarded as an absolute 
right. Stakeholders suggested the following additions to the above list: 
 the public’s right to be informed on matters of public importance, in real time 
rather than after delay,
22
 and to have access to publicly available information 
and accurate historical records;
23
 
 the need for transparency in government, corporate and organisational dealings 
or operations that affect individuals;
24
 and 
 the desirability of Australian businesses being able to compete in the global 
economy and to encourage innovation and business in Australia.
25
 
                                                        
17  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52. 
18  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
19  CV Check, Submission 23. 
20  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 714; B Arnold, Submission 28. 
21  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
22  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
23  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Australian Institute of Professional Photography, 
Submission 31; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. It should be noted that some limitations 
on public access to historical records already exist. For example, under s 33(1)(g) of the Archives Act 
1983 (Cth) the National Archives of Australia is authorised to withhold information from public access if 
the release of that information would unreasonably disclose information relating to the personal affairs of 
an individual. 
24  Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18. 
25  Google, Submission 54; Telstra, Submission 45; Optus, Submission 41. 
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Principle 4: Australian privacy laws should meet 
international standards 
2.19 The protection of privacy in Australia should be consistent with Australia’s 
international obligations, for example, under the ICCPR
26
 and policies of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
27
 It should also take into 
account, as far as appropriate, international standards and legal developments in the 
protection of privacy.
28
 
2.20 Throughout this Discussion Paper, reference is made to developments in the 
legal protection of privacy in other jurisdictions, particularly but not limited to those 
jurisdictions with which Australia shares a common legal heritage. However, the 
Discussion Paper recognises that every jurisdiction’s development of the law on 
privacy will depend on its constitutional framework, particularly its guarantees or 
protections of relevant interests or rights.
29
 The need for statutory reform in a particular 
jurisdiction also depends on its common law at the time. 
Principle 5: Privacy laws should be adaptable to 
technological change 
2.21 The design of legislative protections of privacy should be sufficiently flexible to 
adapt to rapidly changing technologies and capabilities without the need for constant 
amendments. At the same time, they should be drafted with sufficient precision and 
definition to promote certainty as to their application and interpretation. 
2.22 Several stakeholders stressed the need for law reform to be technologically 
neutral to avoid the risk of becoming outdated by rapid developments in technology.
30
 
For example, Google submitted that there is a need for flexible, forward-looking and 
adaptive data policies to ensure that society may benefit from the many beneficial uses 
of data analytics.
31
 
Principle 6: Privacy laws should be clear and certain 
2.23 A key concern in relation to the introduction of a statutory cause of action for 
serious invasion of privacy is uncertainty as to how the various provisions of a statute 
                                                        
26  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
27  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013. 
28  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32. 
29  SBS, Submission 59. 
30  Google, Submission 54; Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52; Women’s 
Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Optus, 
Submission 41; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Submission 32; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; CV Check, Submission 23; Law Institute of Victoria, 
Submission 22. 
31  Google, Submission 54. 
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would be interpreted and applied by courts in the future. Some stakeholders stressed 
the benefits of precision, clarity and certainty.
32
 
2.24 The ALRC agrees that, where possible, the law should be precise and certain, 
but also flexible and able to adapt to changes in social and technological conditions. 
The ALRC is also mindful, however, that Parliament cannot legislate precisely for all 
the different situations that may arise in the future and that certain issues must be left to 
the courts to determine in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. 
Stakeholders pointed out that judges are used to deciding the types of issues that will 
arise in privacy cases, such as the existence and weight of public interest.
33
 Where 
appropriate, the ALRC suggests some guidance on the relevant factors the court might 
or should consider.
34
 
2.25 The ALRC has specifically addressed the desirability of precision and certainty 
in its detailed legal design of the proposed statutory cause of action, but the principle 
underpins all of the ALRC’s recommendations. 
Principle 7: Privacy laws should be coherent and consistent  
2.26 Any recommendation for a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy (or other remedy) should promote coherence in the law and be consistent with 
other Australian laws or regulatory regimes. Recommendations should also promote 
uniformity or consistency in the law throughout Australian jurisdictions. 
2.27 In its consultations and other occasions,
35
 the ALRC has heard of widespread 
concern, uncertainty and confusion caused by notable differences in the law between 
the various states and territories. Two obvious examples relating to privacy are the 
inconsistency of legislation dealing with the use of surveillance devices and with 
harassment and cyber-bullying. 
2.28 Inconsistent laws not only provide poor protection for privacy, but also 
inadequately protect countervailing interests—such as freedom of the media. Victims 
of unauthorised surveillance are poorly protected if they are unable to determine if a 
breach of a statute has occurred. The important activities of others, such as media 
entities, which operate nationally, may be overly restricted if it is unclear when and 
where they might be breaching a law.
36
 The ALRC’s recommendations are directed at 
achieving legal uniformity across Australia in relation to many different types of 
invasions of privacy. 
                                                        
32  Telstra, Submission 45; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24. 
33  For example, B Arnold submitted that ‘Australian jurisprudence regarding confidentiality, defamation and 
national security has demonstrated that courts are fully capable of identifying public interest and of 
dealing with tensions in claims regarding public good’: B Arnold, Submission 28. 
34  See, for example, Ch 8. 
35  Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Roundtable on Drones and Privacy, 28 February 
2014, Parliament House, Canberra. 
36  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46. 
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2.29 The need for coherence and consistency also underlies the desirability of 
avoiding unnecessary overlap between legal regimes. Many stakeholders
37
 expressed 
the view that any proposed remedial regime should not overlap or be inconsistent with 
the various regulatory schemes
38
 and statutory prohibitions that already constrain the 
activities of certain organisations and render them subject to substantial compliance 
requirements, enforceable obligations, civil penalties, and private law remedies. This 
was a particular concern in view of the new compliance requirements imposed on 
entities as a result of amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) that 
came into force in March 2014. 
2.30 However, regulation, the criminal law and the civil law can serve different 
purposes, even if they overlap in some ways. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are many 
different regulatory regimes, criminal laws and civil obligations and remedies 
protecting people from breaches or invasions of privacy either directly or indirectly. 
Any proposal for law reform should be considered in the context of the whole range of 
existing laws. 
2.31 The consequence of a breach of a regulatory scheme or of the criminal law may 
not result in any personal remedy to a person affected by the breach. In some cases, 
this may be appropriate, as the person affected may be one of thousands of people 
affected and the individual may have not have suffered any material or serious harm. In 
this case, a more appropriate response may be a regulatory scheme that ensures that 
such a breach does not happen again. The breach may also lead to a criminal 
prosecution that may punish the perpetrator, and deter such conduct in the future. 
2.32 Finally, legal reforms affecting civil liability for invasions of privacy should be 
consistent with legislative policy as it affects civil liability for wrongs to others 
generally,
39
 and with other common law principles, unless there is an express and clear 
intent to override or distinguish them. 
Principle 8: Justice to protect privacy should be accessible 
2.33 The law should provide a range of means to prevent, reduce or redress serious 
invasions of privacy and it should facilitate appropriate access to justice for those 
affected. 
                                                        
37  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Google, Submission 54; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Optus, Submission 41. 
38  The key existing regulatory schemes include those under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), legislation dealing 
with health information, and state and territory legislation on data protection, outlined in Ch 3. In 
addition, commercial activities are regulated by the Australian Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
and similar state legislation, and banks by various statutes and regimes that govern financial institutions. 
Further, such organisations are often subject to a range of civil obligations to their customers in contract, 
tort law or equitable principles, while tort and equitable obligations also arise where there is no contract 
between the parties. 
39  For example, the policy implicit in the civil liability legislation in most states, and in the common law, 
limiting liability for negligently inflicted mental harm to plaintiffs suffering a recognised psychiatric 
illness. 
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2.34 Many stakeholders submitted that any statutory cause of action or other remedy 
for serious invasions of privacy should be accessible to people with limited means as 
well as to those who can more easily afford the high costs of litigation.
40
 The law 
should also make appropriate provision for people with disability or others who require 
assistance in obtaining access to justice.
41
 
2.35 There is also widespread support for an approach that will encourage or make 
available a range of flexible and accessible alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
42
 
Principle 9: Privacy protection is an issue of shared 
responsibility 
2.36 The notion of shared responsibility is an important consideration informing 
legislative frameworks for the protection of privacy. Provided they have the power and 
means to do so, individuals bear a measure of responsibility for the protection of their 
own privacy and the privacy of others. Organisations that collect, store, process, or 
disclose information have a responsibility to empower individuals to control their own 
personal information as much as practicable and appropriate, but also to take steps to 
protect the privacy of individuals. Legislative and non-legislative mechanisms are 
needed to ensure that individuals can and that organisations do adequately exercise 
their respective responsibilities to protect privacy. 
2.37 The ALRC considers that capable adults should be encouraged to take 
reasonable steps to utilise the privacy tools and frameworks offered by service 
providers. Several stakeholders stressed the importance of personal responsibility. The 
Australian Federal Police, for example, argued that ‘individuals should take ownership 
of their own privacy’.
43
 The National E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) 
advanced the concept of personal control, arguing that individuals can and should 
exercise control over their electronic health records. NEHTA explained that this 
control may be exercised through individuals setting controls over access to their 
health records; authorising others to access their records; and the capacity to make 
enquiries and complaints about the treatment of their online records.
44
 
                                                        
40  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Australian Communications and 
Media Authority, Submission 52; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource 
Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; CV Check, Submission 23; Law Institute of Victoria, 
Submission 22; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. 
41  Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland), Submission 12. Representative actions are discussed in Ch 9. 
42  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Women’s Legal Services NSW, 
Submission 57; ABC, Submission 46; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of 
Australia, Submission 43; Interactive Games and Entertainment Association, Submission 40; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Law Institute of Victoria, 
Submission 22; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; Pirate Party of 
Australia, Submission 18; I Pieper, Submission 6. Alternative dispute resolution is discussed in Ch 9. 
43  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
44  National E-Health Transition Authority, Submission 8. 
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2.38 However, personal responsibility can only be fully exercised when individuals 
are provided with the tools necessary to protect their privacy, and when the choices 
expressed by individuals are respected. Personal responsibility of individuals must 
therefore be balanced with the responsibility of organisations and service providers. 
Service providers should provide transparent and accessible methods to protect the 
privacy of their customers. This includes providing clear privacy policies, information 
about how to protect privacy, and privacy warnings, where relevant. Individuals need 
to be kept properly informed if privacy policies are not followed or are to be 
unilaterally changed. 
2.39 Several stakeholders made submissions stressing the role of education as an 
essential and powerful tool to prevent invasions or breaches of privacy that might arise 
from the use of the internet or digital and mobile technologies.
45
 Many people of all 
ages are unaware of the means available to protect their privacy, of the risks to privacy 
that arise in the digital era, and of the legal ramifications of some conduct.  
2.40 The ALRC considers that education has an important role to play in reducing 
and preventing serious invasions of privacy, particularly in assisting individuals to 
interact safely and effectively in online and electronic relationships—whether they are 
personal or commercial in nature—and to respect the privacy of others. The ALRC 
considers that governments and industry have a responsibility to provide adequate 
education and assistance, particularly for vulnerable members of the Australian 
community, such as people with disability, children and some young people who may 
lack the capacity or knowledge to effectively protect their privacy in the digital era. 
2.41 To that end, the ALRC highlights the responsibility of governments, relevant 
industries and industry groups representing entities that benefit from the advances of 
the digital era, to fund and support education programs which provide assistance and 
advocacy for individuals to manage their privacy. The ALRC has not made any 
proposals regarding education, as the ALRC’s Terms of Reference for this Inquiry are 
limited to consideration of the ways in which the law may redress and reduce serious 
invasions of privacy. 
                                                        
45  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Facebook, Submission 65; Google, Submission 54. Google 
submitted that: ‘The ALRC’s Issues Paper is focused for the most part on what legal reforms are 
appropriate to protect privacy in the digital era. Google believes, however, it would be a missed 
opportunity for the ALRC not to consider the important role of non-legislative measures such as 
education in empowering individuals to protect their own privacy online’. 
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Summary 
3.1 As background to the proposals in this Discussion Paper, this chapter sets out a 
brief survey of the existing legal regulation and remedies that protect people’s privacy 
in Australia. The existing legal protection of privacy in Australia takes many forms. 
Protection of privacy interests of individuals can be found in regulatory schemes, 
criminal laws and civil or private law. 
3.2 This is followed by a brief summary of the main gaps or deficiencies in the way 
that Australian law prevents or redresses serious invasions of privacy. In the ALRC’s 
view, the existing law is a patchwork, with some important pieces missing and 
inconsistencies between others. 
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Information privacy 
3.3 The Privacy Act is Australia’s key information privacy law.
1
 It is concerned 
with the security of personal information held by certain entities, rather than with 
privacy more generally.
2
 
3.4 The Privacy Act provides 13 ‘Australian Privacy Principles’ (APPs) that set out 
the broad requirements on collection, use, disclosure and other handling of personal 
information.
3
 The APPs bind only ‘APP entities’—primarily Australian Government 
agencies and large private sector organisations with a turnover of more than $3 million. 
Certain small businesses are also bound, such as those that provide health services and 
those that disclose personal information to anyone else for a benefit, service or 
advantage.
4
 Generally, individuals are not bound by the Privacy Act.
5
 
3.5 Personal information is defined in s 6(1) of the Act as information or opinion 
about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable, whether 
or not true and whether or not in material form. 
3.6 A breach of an APP in respect of personal information is an ‘interference with 
the privacy of an individual’. Serious or repeated contraventions may give rise to a 
civil penalty order.
6
 
3.7 The Privacy Act provides several complaints paths for individuals where there 
has been (or is suspected to have been) a breach of an APP. The primary complaints 
process is through a complaint to the Australian Information Commissioner, initiating 
an investigation by the Commissioner.
7
 This process typically requires that the 
individual has first complained to the relevant APP entity.
8
 An investigation may result 
in a determination by the Commissioner, containing a declaration that: 
 the respondent’s conduct constituted an interference with the privacy of an 
individual and must not be repeated or continued; 
                                                        
1  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has been the subject of recent reforms following the ALRC’s previous 
Privacy Inquiry. A number of recommendations made in ALRC Report 108 have been implemented by 
the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth), key provisions of which came 
into effect on 14 March 2014. 
2  Confusion about the role and scope of the Privacy Act might be avoided if it were renamed to, for 
example, the Information Privacy Act or the Data Protection Act. These titles are used for similar Acts in 
the UK and Canada, and would more accurately reflect the remit of the Australian Privacy Act. The 
ALRC previously made such a recommendation in ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 5–3.  
3  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1. 
4  ‘APP entity’ is defined in Ibid s 6(1). Small businesses are not, in general, APP entities, with some 
exceptions as set out in s 6D. 
5  There are some exceptions. For example, an individual who is a reporting entity under the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), will be treated as an APP entity under the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
6  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 13G. 
7  Ibid ss 36, 40. 
8  Ibid s 40(1A). 
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 the respondent must take specified steps within a specified period to ensure that 
such conduct is not repeated or continued; 
 the respondent must perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress 
any loss or damage suffered by the complainant; 
 the complainant is entitled to a specified amount by way of compensation for 
any loss or damage suffered by reason of the act or practice the subject of the 
complaint; or 
 that no further action is needed.
9
 
3.8 A complainant may apply to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal 
Circuit Court of Australia to enforce a determination of the Commissioner.
10
 
3.9 An individual may also apply to the Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court for 
an injunction where a person has, is, or is proposing to engage in conduct that was or 
would be a breach of the Privacy Act.
11
 This path appears to have been used relatively 
infrequently.
12
 
3.10 The Privacy Act also grants a range of powers to the Australian Information 
Commissioner, including the power to: 
 investigate complaints made by individuals or on the Commissioner’s own 
motion about APP entities;
13
 
 direct agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments;
14
 and 
 apply for Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court orders for civil penalties for 
serious or repeated breaches of the APPs.
15
 
3.11 State and territory legislation creates information privacy requirements similar 
to those under the Privacy Act, with application to state and territory government 
agencies, as well as (variously) local councils, government-owned corporations and 
universities.
16
 
3.12 The existing Commonwealth, state and territory legislation applies to major 
organisations that collect and store personal information, such as banks, large retailers, 
government departments and utilities providers. There are a large number of 
                                                        
9  Ibid s 52(1). 
10  Ibid s 55A. 
11  Ibid s 98. 
12  The ALRC is aware of only two successful applications: Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance [2004] FCA 637 (21 May 2004); Smallbone v New South Wales Bar 
Association [2011] FCA 1145 (6 October 2011). 
13  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pt V. 
14  Ibid s 33D. 
15  Ibid s 80W. 
16  Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); 
Premier and Cabinet Circular No 12 (SA); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Information 
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic). The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has application to agencies in the Australian Capital 
Territory. 
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organisations that are exempt from the application of all of these Acts and whose 
activities may have an impact on individual privacy. These may include, for example, 
many small businesses.
17
 
3.13 Criminal sanctions currently exist for some specific invasions of privacy. For 
example, under s 62 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 
(NSW) the unauthorised or corrupt use or disclosure by a public official of personal 
information obtained through their official functions is an offence punishable by up to 
100 penalty units or imprisonment for up to two years. 
Health information privacy 
3.14 Health and genetic information is recognised as ‘sensitive information’ under 
the Privacy Act. Sensitive information is given greater protection under the APPs than 
other information.
18
 Separate Commonwealth Acts protect healthcare identifiers
19
 and 
electronic health records.
20
 
3.15 Several state and territory laws also offer protections, including limitations on 
collection, use and disclosure, for health information held by state and territory public 
and private sector organisations.
21
 
Communications privacy 
3.16 The Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (Telecommunications Act) prohibits the 
disclosure of certain information by telecommunications providers.
22
 Contravention of 
these prohibitions is an offence punishable by up to two years imprisonment.
23
 
3.17 There are a number of exceptions, for example, for disclosures to ASIO or the 
Australian Federal Police, under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
1979 (Cth) (TIA Act). Exceptions also exist for disclosure under the authority of an 
‘authorised officer’ of an enforcement agency,
24
 but this does not permit the disclosure 
of the contents or substance of a communication.
25
 An authorised officer must consider 
the privacy of any person before making an authorisation.
26
 
                                                        
17  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6C. 
18  ‘Sensitive information’ is defined in Ibid s 6(1). A number of the APPs make special provisions for 
sensitive information: see, eg, APP 3. 
19  Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth). 
20  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth). 
21  Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Health 
Records Act 2001 (Vic); Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT); Information Act (NT). 
22  Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) pt 13. 
23  Ibid s 276(3). 
24  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) ss 171–182. 
25  Ibid s 172. A disclosure under these provisions is therefore limited to telecommunications data 
(‘metadata’). 
26  Ibid s 180F. 
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3.18 The TIA Act prohibits the unauthorised access of communications, subject to 
various exceptions,
27
 unless a warrant is obtained.
28
 Those who issue warrants must 
consider, among other things, the privacy of persons affected by the access.
29
 
3.19 The TIA Act also prohibits the unauthorised interception of communications 
over a telecommunications system, again, subject to various exceptions,
30
 unless a 
warrant is obtained.
31
 Those who issue an interception warrant must consider, among 
other things, the privacy of persons affected by the interception.
32
 
Surveillance laws and laws affecting photography 
3.20 Legislation exists in each of the states and territories that variously restricts the 
use of listening, optical, data and tracking surveillance devices. These surveillance 
device laws provide criminal offences for using a surveillance device to record or 
monitor private conversations or activities, for tracking a person or for monitoring 
information on a computer system.
33
 The surveillance device laws also place 
restrictions on communicating information obtained through the use of a surveillance 
device. 
3.21 The surveillance device laws of each state and territory differ greatly, both in 
terms of the types of surveillance devices they regulate, and the circumstances in which 
those surveillance devices may or may not be used. For example, the laws of Victoria, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory permit a participant to record a private activity 
in the absence of the consent of other parties, while the remaining surveillance device 
laws do not.
34
 
3.22 Different state and territory workplace surveillance legislation prohibits 
employers monitoring their employees at work through covert surveillance methods 
such as the use of CCTV cameras or computer, internet and email surveillance.
35
 Once 
again there are inconsistencies between these laws, and such laws only exist in three 
jurisdictions (the ACT, NSW and Victoria). 
3.23 Criminal laws in some—but not all—jurisdictions provide for offences relating 
to photography being used for indecent purposes
36
 or indecent filming without 
                                                        
27  Ibid s 108. 
28  Ibid ss 110–132. 
29  Ibid s 116(2). 
30  Ibid s 7. 
31  Ibid ss 9–18, 34–61A. 
32  Ibid ss 46(2), 46A(2). 
33  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 
(NT); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening 
Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). 
34  See Ch 13. 
35  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening 
Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices (Workplace Privacy) Act 2006 (Vic); Surveillance Devices 
Act 1998 (WA); Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT). 
36  Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 4; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 227(1); Police Offences Act 
1935 (Tas) s 13. 
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consent.
37
 Criminal laws also provide protection against indecent photography of 
children in private and public places.
38
 In each case, the laws are restricted to specific 
subject matter, for example, matter of a sexual nature; filming for specific purposes, for 
example, for sexual gratification; or filming of a particular type of person, for example, 
a child. These laws therefore provide limited general privacy protection. 
3.24 The operation of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is restricted to the actions of 
government agencies and big business, not the activities of individuals acting in a 
personal capacity such as freelance or amateur photographers. However the Act does 
regulate the activities of individuals, agencies and companies which ‘disclose personal 
information about another individual to anyone else for a benefit, service or 
advantage’.
39
 This may provide scope to regulate the actions of photographers who 
take unauthorised photographs of individuals.
40
 
Harassment and stalking offences 
3.25 State and territory laws criminalising harassment and stalking vary considerably 
depending on the jurisdiction. Legislation in Queensland and Victoria expressly 
prohibits ‘cyber-harassment’ committed through ‘electronic messages’
41
 or by 
‘otherwise contacting the victim’.
42
 
3.26 The Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 provides offences for conduct 
amounting to harassment that occurs via a communications service (which includes the 
internet). Relevant offences include ‘using a carriage service to menace, harass or 
cause offence’
43
 and ‘using a carriage service to make a threat’.
44
 
3.27 There is a strong framework in family law to protect individuals from 
harassment, including harassment that occurs via electronic communications. However, 
this is limited to the victims of family violence.
45
 
Industry codes and guidelines 
3.28 Various statutory and self-regulatory bodies oversee and enforce industry codes 
and guidelines which protect against invasions of privacy. 
3.29 Commercial television and radio broadcasters are subject to a self-regulatory 
scheme under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). Commercial broadcasting 
                                                        
37  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 91K–91M; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 227A(1); Summary Offences Act 
1953 (SA) s 26D; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 13A; Summary Offences (Upskirting) Act 2007 (Vic) 
s 41A. 
38  See, for example, Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 63B. 
39  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6D(4)(c),(d). 
40  Ibid s 6: The definition of ‘record’ includes ‘a photograph or other pictorial representation of a person’. 
41  Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A(2)(b). 
42  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 359A(7)(b). 
43  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 474.17. 
44  Ibid s 474.15. 
45  For example, stalking is included in the definition of ‘family violence’ in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
s 4AB(2)(c). 
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industry codes of practice include provisions relating to the protection of privacy.
46
 The 
ABC and SBS are each subject to a separate code of practice; each of these codes also 
contains provisions relating to the protection of privacy.
47
 The Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) has oversight of each of these 
codes of practice, however the ACMA has limited enforcement powers where a code is 
breached. 
3.30 The Australian Press Council oversees its members’ compliance with its Charter 
of Press Freedom (2003) and Statement of Privacy Principles (2011). 
3.31 Part IIIB of the Privacy Act makes provision for the development of privacy 
codes (APP codes). APP codes can be developed on the initiative of ‘code developers’, 
or in response to a request from the Privacy Commissioner. The Commissioner may 
also develop an APP code. The codes set out compliance requirements for one or more 
APPs. The code developer may apply to the Commissioner to have the code registered. 
A breach of a registered code constitutes an ‘interference with privacy’ under the Act, 
and if the breach is serious or repeated the Commissioner may apply to the Federal 
Court or Federal Circuit Court for a civil penalty order. 
Existing common law causes of action 
3.32 There are a number of existing causes of action at common law which can, in 
some cases, be used to protect privacy or have the effect of protecting personal 
privacy.
48
 These causes of action protect against physical intrusions upon, and 
surveillance of, a person and against unauthorised disclosure of private information. 
Physical intrusions 
3.33 Trespass to the person and trespass to land provide some protection against 
unauthorised interference with a person’s body or intrusions into property.
49
 Both 
forms of the ancient tort of trespass are actionable per se, meaning that the tort is 
actionable when the interference occurs, without the need for the claimant to establish 
any recognised form of damage such as personal injury, psychiatric illness, property 
damage or economic loss. 
3.34 ‘General’ damages, sometimes substantial, are awarded to compensate the 
claimant for the wrong that has occurred, and for any actual damage sustained, or by 
way of solace or vindication of his or her rights.
50
 Aggravated damages may be 
awarded where there is a special humiliation of the claimant by the defendant. 
Exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted 
intentionally or maliciously and in arrogant or contumelious disregard of the claimant’s 
                                                        
46  Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice 2010 cl 4.3.5; Commercial Radio Codes of Practice and 
Guidelines 2011 cl 2.1(d). 
47  ABC Code of Practice 2011 cl 6.1; SBS Codes of Practice 2014 cl 1.9. 
48  C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) ch 26. 
49  Living in modern society automatically exposes a person to the risk of everyday forms of contact, and 
consent to this contact can be inferred: Collins v Wilcock (1984) 1 WLR 1172. 
50  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, [654]–p655] (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
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rights.
51
 Claimants may seek injunctions to restrain the broadcast of video material 
recorded without authorisation while a defendant was trespassing on land,
52
 although 
damages have been deemed an adequate remedy in cases involving commercial 
enterprises.
53
  
3.35 However, both forms of trespass require a physical interference (or a threat of 
physical interference in the case of trespass to the person) and will therefore not apply 
to a person who merely follows or watches or keeps a person under surveillance 
without any threat, or who remains outside the land to carry out surveillance. 
3.36 Trespass to land also has strict requirements as to the title over the land that the 
claimant must have in order to sue in trespass. Thus, someone who is on the land under 
a mere contractual or other licence, for example, the hire of premises for a wedding
54
 
or the occupation of a hospital bed or room,
55
 will not have a sufficient right to 
exclusive occupation of the land or premises to sue in trespass for an invasion of 
privacy into that space. Finally, trespass to land has no operation where the claimant is 
in a public space and complains that there has been intrusion into his or her private 
activities, affairs or seclusion. 
Surveillance from outside a property 
3.37 A person may be liable in the tort of nuisance for an unreasonable interference 
with an occupier’s use and enjoyment of his or her land,
56
 for example by keeping the 
occupier under surveillance or by positioning cameras or lights in situations where they 
interfere with, record or ‘snoop’ on the occupier’s activities.
57
 Again, only the occupier 
with a right to exclusive possession may sue in nuisance and the cause of action has 
been denied to other lawful occupants of the land who may be there under licence from 
the occupier. This characterisation of other occupants as mere licensees has even been 
applied to family members of the lawful occupier.
58
 
Intrusions into airspace 
3.38 Intrusions into airspace may amount to trespass to land if the intrusion is at a 
height potentially necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the occupier
59
 and, 
in the case of aircraft, if the intrusion does not come within the protection provided by 
legislation dealing with the mere flight of aircraft through airspace. For example, 
s 72(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that ‘no action lies in respect of 
trespass or nuisance by reason only of the flight (or the ordinary incidents of the flight) 
                                                        
51  XI Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448. 
52  Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1988] 2 Qd R 169. 
53  Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457; Brigthen Pty Ltd v Nine Network 
Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 319 (2009). 
54  Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595 (18 May 2005). 
55  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
56  RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) ch 14. 
57  Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14837. The plaintiffs successfully obtained an injunction to prevent the 
use of motion-triggered lights and surveillance cameras aimed at their backyard. 
58  Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter and Others v London Docklands Corporation [1997] AC 
655; Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654. 
59  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490, 495. 
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of an aircraft over any property at a height above the ground that is reasonable (having 
regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case) so long as the Air 
Navigation Regulations are complied with’.
60
 These provisions were originally enacted 
in most jurisdictions in the 1950s to protect the then young commercial airline 
industry. Arguably, they were not directed at the sort of technological intrusions 
possible today, such as by the use of unmanned aerial devices or drones. 
3.39 It is a question of fact in the circumstances as to whether or not a trespass has 
occurred on common law principles. This would depend on whether the potential use 
and enjoyment of the land and the airspace by the occupier has been interfered with 
from within the relevant height limit of the occupier’s interests.
61
 If the interference 
was from outside the occupier’s airspace, the circumstances could amount to a 
nuisance at common law. 
3.40 In the case of aircraft, it would additionally depend on whether or not the height 
of the intrusion is reasonable in all of the circumstances.
62
 Mere compliance with Air 
Navigations Regulations, which are aimed at safety issues,
63
 would not necessarily 
excuse the use of an aircraft to interfere with the occupier’s use or enjoyment of the 
land or the occupier’s privacy or that of the occupier’s guests.
64
 Aerial photography, 
recording and surveillance carried out from a plane or helicopter or drone may 
therefore amount to a trespass to land or a nuisance, but there is a dearth of case 
authority dealing with these types of intrusion. 
3.41 In Bernstein v Skyviews, the defendant photographed the plaintiff’s property 
from a flight many hundreds of feet above the property for the purpose of offering to 
sell the photographs to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unsuccessful in this case. 
However, Griffiths J said: 
I [would not] wish this judgment to be understood as deciding that in no 
circumstances could a successful action be brought against an aerial photographer to 
restrain his activities. The present action is not founded in nuisance for no court would 
regard the taking of a single photograph as an actionable nuisance. But if the 
circumstances were such that a plaintiff was subjected to the harassment of constant 
surveillance of his house from the air, accompanied by the photographing of his every 
activity, I am far from saying that the court would not regard such a monstrous 
invasion of his privacy as an actionable nuisance for which they would give relief.65 
Defamatory publications 
3.42 The tort of defamation provides redress for a person whose reputation is 
damaged by a publication to a third party. Until the enactment of uniform Defamation 
                                                        
60  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 72(1). 
61  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490, 495; Lord 
Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479, 489. See also Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK 
Onshore Ltd [2010] 3 ER 975, [984]–[993]. 
62   See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 72(1). A similar provision applies in the United Kingdom: 
Lord Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479. 
63  Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Submission 2. 
64  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1, 8. 
65  Lord Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479, 489. 
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Acts in 2005 in Australian states and territories,
66
 defamation law provided 
considerable indirect
67
 protection of private information because in some states 
defendants could only justify a defamatory publication by showing not only its truth 
but also that it was published in the public interest or for the public benefit.
68
 However, 
the truth of the defamatory statement is now a complete defence, so that the action 
provides much more limited protection of privacy.
69
 
Disclosures of confidential information 
3.43 The equitable action for breach of confidence has long been a key source of 
protection against the misuse or disclosure of confidential information. Confidential 
information is information which is not generally or publicly known but is only known 
to a deliberately restricted number of individuals. 
3.44 The action was originally confined to information that had been imparted in 
circumstances expressly or impliedly imposing an obligation of confidence. Sometimes 
this obligation arises under contract, with normal contractual remedies flowing from 
the breach, including, in limited cases, damages for mental distress. But the courts of 
equity also recognised the obligation outside contract—for example, as to personal 
details imparted in a close personal relationship,
70
 although they might refuse relief 
where the parties had already been very public about their relationship. 
3.45 It is now well accepted in the United Kingdom
71
 and Australia
72
 that an 
obligation of confidence may arise where a party comes into possession of information 
which he or she knows, or ought to know, is confidential. This extension of the law 
makes the equitable action for breach of confidence a powerful legal weapon to protect 
individuals from the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information. 
3.46 However, as discussed in Chapter 12, there is still some uncertainty in Australia 
as to what compensation is available in an equitable action for breach of confidence. 
Unauthorised photography 
3.47 Generally speaking, there is no common law right not to be photographed that 
can be exercised to prevent photography or filming of someone in a public place 
without his or her consent.
73
 There is also no prohibition on taking photographs of 
private property from public land, unless the conduct amounts to stalking or the intent 
                                                        
66  Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 9; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) 
2006; Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) 2005; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); 
Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 2005 (WA). 
67  Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen [1993] NSWCA (13 October, 1993). 
68  John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock [2007] NSWCA 364 (14 December 2007) [124]. 
69  Sappideen and Vines, above n 48, ch 25. 
70  Argyll v Argyll (1965) 1 ER 611. 
71  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109. 
72  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224, Gleeson 
CJ. 
73  ‘[A] person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed’: R v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 
204 (16 March 2001) [25] (Dowd J). 
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is to ‘peep or pry’ on an individual.
74
 Private property owners or public entities such as 
local councils, educational institutions or museums may regulate photography on 
private property or places they control, by the express terms on which entry is 
authorised. In other cases, a lack of authority to enter for the purpose of taking 
photographs or recordings may be inferred.
75
 
Gaps in existing law 
3.48 Although the existing law provides protection against some invasions of 
privacy, there are significant gaps or uncertainties. These include the following: 
 The tort actions of trespass to the person, trespass to land and nuisance do not 
provide protection from unauthorised and serious intrusions into a person’s 
private activities in many situations.
76
 The statutory cause of action for serious, 
unjustified invasions of privacy committed intentionally or recklessly, detailed 
in Chapters 4–11, or the proposals in Chapter 14 relating to harassment, would 
supplement the common law. 
 Outside actions of trespass, malicious prosecution or defamation, tort law does 
not provide a remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress which does 
not amount to psychiatric illness.
77
 The proposed statutory cause of action would 
allow recovery of damages for emotional distress caused by a serious invasion 
of privacy. In Chapter 12, the ALRC has proposed that, if a statutory cause of 
action for serious invasion of privacy is not enacted, legislation should be 
enacted that would provide for the recovery of damages for emotional distress in 
breach of confidence cases. 
 While the equitable action for breach of confidence can provide effective legal 
protection to prevent the disclosure of private information (and especially if the 
Australian common law develops as it has in the UK), it is currently less 
effective after a wrongful disclosure, because it is unclear or uncertain whether a 
plaintiff may recover compensation for emotional distress. Proposal 12–1 in 
Chapter 12 aims to remove this uncertainty. 
 There is further uncertainty, or at least some debate, as to the relevant principles 
to be applied when a court is considering whether to grant an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain the publication of true, private information.
78
 Chapter 12 
includes Proposal 12–2 that would require courts to give consideration to 
freedom of expression and matters of public interest when considering such an 
injunction. 
                                                        
74  See, for example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 547C. 
75  Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1, 8; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333. 
76  Trespass to the person requires bodily contact or a threat of such contract to be actionable. Both trespass 
to land and nuisance protect only the occupier of the relevant land, and the former requires an intrusion 
onto the land.  
77  Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417. 
78  The guidance provided by defamation cases such as Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill 
(2006) 227 CLR 57 and by cases on protection of confidential information is of uncertain application in 
view of the potentially different interests in privacy actions.  
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 Legislation dealing with surveillance and with workplace surveillance is not 
uniform throughout Australia, and is outdated in some states. The ALRC has 
proposed in Chapter 13 that these surveillance device laws should be made 
uniform. 
 There is no tort or civil action for harassment, nor is there sufficient deterrence 
against ‘cyber-harassment’ in Australian law, compared with overseas 
jurisdictions.
79
 The ALRC has made proposals in Chapter 14 for civil remedies 
and criminal penalties for harassment if a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy is not enacted.
80
 
 Legislation and common law protection against aerial and other surveillance 
may not provide sufficient protection against advances in technology that 
facilitate new types of invasion into personal privacy.
81
 This limitation would be 
addressed by the statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy. In 
addition, the proposals in Chapter 13 for the reform of state and territory 
surveillance devices Acts would regulate new means of surveillance. 
 The Privacy Act and state and territory equivalents deal only with information 
privacy. Further, the Privacy Act provides for only limited civil redress, that is, 
only by way of a complaints procedure to the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner (OAIC). While important, this legislation by no 
means covers the field of invasions of privacy. For example, it does not deal 
with intrusions into personal privacy or with the behaviour of most individuals 
or with most activities of media entities. 
 The ACMA cannot provide any monetary redress to those who complain about 
invasions of privacy by media or communications entities. There is a proposal in 
Chapter 15 for the ACMA to be given limited powers to redress complaints of 
serious unjustified invasions of privacy, similar to those of the OAIC. 
 Many small businesses, those with an annual turnover of less than $3 million, 
are exempt from the regulatory regime of existing privacy legislation. The small 
business exemption is discussed in Chapter 15. 
3.49 The ALRC is not able, in the time allocated to this Inquiry, to consider and 
make recommendations about all of the concerns that have been raised by the 
community in relation to privacy in the digital era. This Discussion Paper sets out the 
key proposals to which, in the light of its Terms of Reference, the ALRC has given 
priority for consideration. 
                                                        
79  A number of US states have enacted cyber-stalking or cyber-harassment legislation or have laws that 
explicitly include electronic forms of communication within more traditional stalking or harassment 
laws. Most of these constitute amendments to State Criminal Codes, updating the meaning of harassment 
and/or stalking to include electronic communications. In Nova Scotia in Canada, the Cyber-Safety Act 
2013 (SNS), c2 criminalises cyber-bullying. 
80  See Ch 14 and in particular Proposal 14–1.  
81  An example is the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicle (drones) to carry out unauthorised aerial 
surveillance.  
 3. Overview of Current Law 49 
3.50 Some of the concerns that are raised in the community are more properly dealt 
with by existing regulatory bodies. Some of the concerns have been the subject of 
recent, carefully considered enactment by Parliament, for example, the recent 
amendments to the Privacy Act by the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Act 2012 (Cth), many of which came into effect only in March 2014. 
3.51 Further, there have been a number of targeted reviews for existing legislation 
which is the subject of community debate. The privacy protections of 
Telecommunications Act and the TIA Act were the subject of a 2013 Parliamentary 
Inquiry.
82
 At the time of writing, a further Parliamentary Inquiry is underway.
83
 The 
ALRC does not consider these provisions in this Inquiry. 
A common law action for breach of privacy in Australia? 
3.52 A common law tort for invasion of privacy has not yet developed in Australia, 
despite the High Court leaving open the possibility of such a development in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd in 2001.
84
 A tort of 
invasion of privacy has been recognised by two lower court decisions: Grosse v Purvis 
in the District Court of Queensland
85
 and Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
86
 
in the Country Court of Victoria. Both cases were settled before appeals by the 
respective defendants were heard. No appellate court has confirmed the existence of 
this tort. 
3.53 Commenting on Grosse v Purvis, Heerey J in Kalaba v Commonwealth of 
Australia held that the weight of authority was against the proposition that the tort is 
recognised at common law.
87
 In Chan v Sellwood; Chan v Calvert, Davies J described 
the position on the existence of the tort at common law as ‘a little unclear’.
88
 In Gee v 
Burger, McLaughlin AsJ considered the matter ‘arguable’.
89
 
3.54 In Giller v Procopets,
90
 the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to consider whether the tort of invasion of privacy exists at common law, 
having upheld the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of the equitable action for breach of 
confidence.  
                                                        
82  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Report of the 
Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation 2013. 
83  Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Comprehensive Revision of Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (referred by Senate on 12 December 2012; Reporting Date 10 June 
2014). 
84  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
85  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003). See also, Des A Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 352. 
86  Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281 (2007). 
87  Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763 (8 June 2004) 6. 
88  Chan v Sellwood; Chan v Calvert [2009] NSWSC 1335 (9 December 2009) [34]. 
89  Gee v Burger [2009] NSWSC 149 (13 March 2009) [53]. 
90  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
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3.55 In Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd, Katzmann J noted ‘that it would be 
inappropriate to deny someone the opportunity to sue for breach of privacy on the basis 
of the current state of the common law’.
91
 
3.56 In Maynes v Casey, Basten J, with whom Allsop P agreed, referring to 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats and Giller v Procopets, 
said that ‘These cases may well lay the basis for development of liability for unjustified 
intrusion on personal privacy, whether or not involving breach of confidence’, but held 
that the facts as found were against the plaintiff.
92
 The trial judge had concluded that he 
did not consider the defendant’s conduct ‘to be an undue or serious invasion of any 
right to privacy possessed by the plaintiffs or to be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibility’.
93
 
3.57 In Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd, Hall J in the NSW Supreme Court 
considered a claim brought by the plaintiff against her employer and the security firm 
engaged to monitor the workplace, after CCTV images of the plaintiff at work were 
posted on a Facebook site, probably by an employee or former employee of the 
security firm. Ball J refused to strike out a claim for breach of confidence, holding ‘I 
do not consider that, at this stage of the proceedings, it is open to conclude that the 
cause of action for breach of confidence based on invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy 
would be futile or bad law’.
94
 
3.58 In Sands v State of South Australia, Kelly J stated that ‘the ratio decidendi of the 
decision in Lenah is that it would require a further development in the law to 
acknowledge the existence of a tort of privacy in Australia’.
95
  
3.59 Recently in Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd, Smith DCJ said, ‘it seems to me there is an 
arguable case of invasion of privacy. … I would be very hesitant to strike out a cause 
of action where the law is developing and is unclear’.
96
 
3.60 The general consensus then is that the likely direction of the future development 
of the common law is uncertain.  
                                                        
91  Dye v Commonwealth [2010] FCA 720 [290]. However, Katzmann J refused leave to the plaintiff to 
amend her pleadings to include such a claim, on various grounds. 
92  Maynes v Casey [2011] NSWCA 156 (14 June 2011) [35]. 
93  Maynes v Casey [2010] NSWDC 285 (23 December 2010) [195]. 
94  Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1183 [183].  
95  Sands v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 44 (5 April 2013) [614]. 
96  Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 181 (9 August 2013) [310]–[311]. 
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Summary 
4.1 This chapter sets out the ALRC’s proposals for how a statutory cause of action 
for serious invasion of privacy should be set in the context of existing laws. 
4.2 The ALRC proposes that the statutory cause of action be contained in a new, 
stand-alone Commonwealth Act. Including the new action in a Commonwealth Act 
would ensure consistency in the operation of the cause of action throughout Australia. 
4.3 The new cause of action should be set out in a new Act, rather than the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth). The Privacy Act largely concerns information privacy, while the new 
cause of action is designed to remedy a number of different types of invasions of 
privacy, including physical invasions of privacy. 
4.4 The ALRC proposes that a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy should be a tort. If the statutory cause of action were a tort, there would be 
increased certainty around various ancillary matters, such as vicarious liability. There 
would also be the benefit of more consistency, since the statutory cause of action 
would operate in concert with existing tort law. 
4.5 Finally, this chapter provides an overview of the elements of the statutory cause 
of action that are set out in Chapters 5–8. In discussing the elements of the statutory 
cause of action, it is important to consider these elements together. There are 
significant interactions between the elements, and the ALRC’s reasons for proposing 
the content of one proposal will therefore often depend on the ALRC’s proposals for 
the other elements. 
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A new stand-alone Commonwealth Act 
Proposal 4–1 A statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy 
should be contained in a new Commonwealth Act (the new Act). 
4.6 The ALRC considers that if a statutory cause of action were to be introduced, it 
should be in Commonwealth legislation, as this is the best way to ensure the action is 
available and consistent throughout Australia. It is often difficult to achieve 
consistency across state and territory legislation. Inconsistent statutory provisions in 
state and territory legislation would be highly confusing and create unnecessary 
complexity in the law. This would also provide poor protection of privacy generally 
and have a damaging effect on many other activities that are of significant public 
interest. Inconsistency and complexity of legislation would increase costs for 
businesses, particularly those operating across state and international boundaries. 
Difficult questions of jurisdiction and applicable law would arise. There would also be 
a risk of ‘forum shopping’ if the details of the cause of action differed between 
Australian jurisdictions. 
4.7 The ALRC considers that the cause of action should be in a stand-alone Act to 
avoid confusion and to enhance clarity.
1
 The remedial response to invasions of privacy 
under the statutory cause of action would be distinct from the regulatory regime which 
is the essence of the Privacy Act. 
4.8 The essential purposes and scope of the two regimes are different. The Privacy 
Act sets up a regime for the security and privacy of personal information which is 
collected, stored or used by certain entities (often known as ‘data protection’ 
regulation). The cause of action relates not only to the privacy of information but also 
to other types of privacy, such as physical privacy. 
4.9 The Privacy Act sets up a regime to ensure compliance with a number of 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). There is a complaints mechanism which may 
lead to compensation being paid for an interference with privacy by an act or practice 
relating to personal information in a manner set out in the Act.
2
 However, breaches of 
the requirements of the Privacy Act generally lead to regulatory responses by the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), including the possible 
imposition of civil penalties on the relevant entity.
3
 An invasion of privacy that is 
actionable under the new Act would lead only to a range of civil remedies sought by 
and for the benefit of the plaintiff. 
                                                        
1  This was also the view in ALRC Report 108, which stated that ‘there may be significant confusion arising 
from the placement of the cause of action in that Act [the Privacy Act]. For example, whether the 
exemptions under the Privacy Act applied to the cause of action, and the interaction between the cause of 
action and other complaint mechanisms, may be unclear if the Privacy Act were amended to include the 
cause of action’: ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) 
[74.195]. 
2  The complaints mechanism is discussed in Ch 15. 
3  These responses are outlined in Ch 3. 
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4.10 Lastly, the Privacy Act is limited in its application to certain entities across 
Australia. It does not apply to most individuals,
4
 or to state agencies. It also includes a 
number of exemptions, such as for small businesses and media organisations, which 
would have no application to the new statutory cause of action. The new statutory 
cause of action would apply, subject to jurisdictional limitations and any defences, to 
any person or entity that seriously invades the privacy of a person in the circumstances 
set out in the Act. 
4.11 Therefore, the ALRC considers that the new tort should be located in a new 
stand-alone Commonwealth Act. This new Act might be called the Serious Invasions of 
Privacy Act. 
4.12 The location of a statutory cause of action in a separate Commonwealth Act 
would not prevent power being given to the OAIC to determine complaints concerning 
conduct that fell within the cause of action by relevant entities. The current complaints 
regime under the Privacy Act 1988 could be broadened to encompass such conduct by 
relevant entities, to provide complainants with an alternative to court proceedings in 
respect of the conduct.  
Constitutional issues 
Head of power 
4.13 This section examines the scope of the Commonwealth’s power to legislate with 
respect to privacy under the Constitution. This issue was previously discussed in the 
ALRC’s report, For Your Information: Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC Report 108, 
2008).
5
  
4.14 The Commonwealth has the power to make laws with respect to ‘external 
affairs’.
6
 This power enables the Commonwealth to implement obligations under a 
bona fide treaty.
7
 It is open to the legislature to decide the means by which it gives 
effect to those obligations, but those means must be ‘reasonably capable of being 
considered appropriate and adapted to that end’.
8
 
4.15 Australia is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). Australia ratified the ICCPR on 13 November 1980. Article 17 of the 
ICCPR provides: 
(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. 
                                                        
4  As noted in Ch 3, the Privacy Act does apply to some individuals, such as individuals who operate certain 
types of businesses, such as businesses that trade in personal information: see ss 6C–6EA of the Privacy 
Act. Section 16 of the Privacy Act provides that the APPs do not apply to personal information that is 
collected, used, held or disclosed by an individual in connection with the individual’s family or household 
affairs. 
5  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [3.17]–[3.28]. 
6  Constitution s 51(xxix). 
7  Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
8  Victoria v Commonwealth (’The Industrial Relations Act case’) (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 (Brennan CJ, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
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(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
4.16 In light of the Commonwealth’s power to implement treaty obligations under s 
51(xxix), it is likely that a law which created a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy would be valid as a means of giving effect to Australia’s obligation 
under art 17 of the ICCPR.  
4.17 The ALRC considers that the enactment of a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy satisfies the requirement of proportionality. It is ‘reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted’ to implementing art 17 of the 
ICCPR. The courts grant latitude to Parliament in selecting the means by which to give 
effect to a treaty obligation.
9
 Moreover, art 17(2) of the ICCPR explicitly provides that 
the protection of law should be afforded to those subject to interference with or attacks 
on their privacy. Therefore, the law conforms to the treaty and carries its provisions 
into effect.
10
 
4.18 The ALRC noted in 2008 that the current Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is purportedly 
enacted on the basis of the external affairs power.
11
 In addition, the ALRC canvassed 
other heads of power, which may also support aspects of the statutory cause of action.
12
 
One of these was the Commonwealth’s power to legislate with respect to ‘postal, 
telegraphic, telephonic and other like services’.
13
 This head of power has been 
interpreted broadly.
14
 The technology-neutral phrase ‘other like services’ demonstrates 
that the possibility of developments in technology was contemplated by drafters when 
framing section 51(v).
15
 Radio and television broadcasting have been held to be within 
the Commonwealth’s power under s 51(v).
16
 Although the Commonwealth’s power to 
regulate the internet under this head of power is yet to be considered by the High 
Court, it is likely that it would be a ‘like service’.
17
  
4.19 If the Commonwealth does enact a statutory cause of action, it may expressly or 
impliedly ‘cover the field’ on the subject matter. Any State Act which was inconsistent 
with the Commonwealth Act would be inoperative.
18
 
Constitutional limits 
4.20 The Commonwealth’s power to legislate is subject to both express and implied 
constitutional limitations.  
                                                        
9  Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1997) 288. 
10  Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261, 345 (Gaudron J). 
11  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Preamble. 
12  Constitution s 51(i), (v), (xiii), (xiv), (xx).  
13  Constitution s 51(v).  
14  Jones v Commonwealth (No 2) [1965] HCA 6 (3 February 1965). 
15  Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 493. 
16  R v Brislan; Ex parte Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262; Jones v Commonwealth (No 2) (1965) 112 CLR 206.  
17  Helen Roberts, ‘Can the Internet be Regulated?’ (Research Paper No 35, Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of Australia, 1996) 25. 
18  Constitution s 109.  
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Implied freedom of political communication 
4.21 The legislative power of the Commonwealth is subject to the implied freedom of 
political communication. In assessing whether a law infringes the freedom, there are 
two questions: 
1. Does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or 
political matters in its terms, operation or effect? 
2. If the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and 
adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is compatible with the 
maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and 
responsible government and the procedure prescribed by s 128 of the Constitution for 
submitting a proposed amendment to the Constitution to the informed decision of the 
people?19   
A law will only infringe the implied freedom if the answer to the first question is ‘yes’ 
and the answer to the second question is ‘no’.  
4.22 The ALRC considers that the proposed statutory cause of action would not 
infringe the implied freedom of political communication. The proposed cause of action 
requires that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in 
freedom of expression and any broader public interest. The freedom of expression 
includes the freedom to discuss governmental matters.  It is likely that the cause of 
action is ‘reasonably appropriate and adapted’ to serve a legitimate end, that is, the 
protection of privacy, in a manner compatible with the maintenance of representative 
and responsible government.  
Impact on States 
4.23 The ALRC’s 2008 report discussed the Melbourne Corporation principle, as an 
implied limitation on the Commonwealth’s power to legislate. Most recently, the High 
Court expressed the Melbourne Corporation principle as concerned with 
whether impugned legislation is directed at States, imposing some special disability or 
burden on the exercise of powers and fulfilment of functions of the States which 
curtails their capacity to function as governments.20   
4.24 The ALRC considers that a statutory cause of action, while imposing a burden 
on State agencies, would not curtail the States’ capacity to function as governments.  
An action in tort 
Proposal 4–2 The cause of action should be described in the new Act as 
an action in tort. 
                                                        
19  Monis v The Queen (2013) 87 ALJR 340; [2013] HCA 4, [61] (French CJ).  
20  Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Commonwealth (2012) 247 CLR 486, [130] (Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ). 
French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ agreed with the joint reasons on this issue in separate judgments: [6], 
[145], [229]. See also Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
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4.25 There are a number of reasons for the proposal that the new cause of action 
should be an action in tort. 
4.26  First, and most importantly, describing the statutory cause of action as a tort 
action will provide certainty, and prevent disputes arising, about a number of ancillary 
issues that will inevitably arise. Courts frequently have to decide whether a particular 
statute gives rise to an action in tort for the purposes of determining whether other 
consequences follow at common law or under other statutes.
21
 This will also be the 
case if a new statutory cause of action is enacted. For example: 
 At common law, an employer is vicariously liable where an employee has 
injured a third party by a tort committed in the course of employment.
22
 It may 
be relevant to decide whether an employer is vicariously liable to the claimant, 
in addition to an employee, where the employee is liable under the statutory 
cause of action. 
 At common law, the applicable law for intra-Australian  and international torts 
depends on the place where the tort was committed.
23
  
 Many legislative provisions refer to liability in tort. For example, some 
Australian jurisdictions impose an obligation on an employer to indemnify an 
employee in respect of ‘liability incurred by the employee for the tort’ to a third 
party where the tort occurred in the course of employment.
24
 Statutory 
contribution rights may apply only to ‘tortfeasors’.
25
 
4.27 Describing the action as a tort action will thus avoid many consequential 
questions arising once primary liability is established. The cause of action will be more 
fully integrated into existing laws than if it were simply described as a cause of action. 
This will also avoid the need for numerous specific provisions dealing with these 
ancillary issues, adding undesirable length to the legislation.
26
 
4.28 Secondly, classifying a civil action for redress which leads to monetary 
compensation as a tort, is consistent with accepted legal classifications. Defining what 
is a tort precisely, exhaustively and exclusively is a surprisingly difficult task. Leading 
                                                        
21  Commissioner of Police v Estate of John Edward Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232, [62]–[78] (Spigelman 
CJ); Hampic Pty Ltd v Adams [1999] NSWCA 455 [61]. See also Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 
13 (QB) (16 January 2014); cf Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125 [96]. 
22  Lewis Klar, ‘Vicarious Liability’ in Caroline Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) ch 19. 
23  John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang 
(2002) 210 CLR 491. It is not always an easy task to determine the place of the tort: M Davies, AS Bell 
and PLG Brereton, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 425.  
24  Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW) s 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of 
Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s 6(9)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) s 22A. 
25  See, for example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) s 5. 
26  However, as seen below, special provision is made with respect to the limitation period and defences. It 
may also be preferable to make specific provision for vicarious liability to avoid the kind of dispute that 
arose in New South Wales v Bryant [2005] NSWCA 393 and Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League 
Football Club Ltd v Rogers (1993) Aust Torts Reps 81-246, deriving in part from the conflicting views of 
Kitto J and Fullagar J in Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 as 
to whether the employer is vicariously liable for the acts or the torts of an employee. 
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texts tend to answer the question in relatively general terms. Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts, for example, defines a tort as ‘an injury other than a breach of contract, which 
the law will redress with damages’, but then goes on that ‘this definition is far from 
informative’.
27
 Torts may be created by common law or statute.
28
 
4.29 Definitions of ‘tort’ often contain two key features. First, a tort is a civil (as 
opposed to a criminal) wrong, which the law redresses by an award of damages. 
Secondly, the wrong consists of a breach of an obligation, often in negative terms such 
as not to harm or interfere with the claimant, imposed by law (rather than by 
agreement). But neither of those factors is exclusive to tort law and neither is always 
borne out, as most texts go on to discuss. 
4.30 Nevertheless, liability for conduct invading the privacy of another is analogous 
to, and will often co-exist with, other torts protecting people from interferences with 
fundamental rights. Situating the cause of action within tort law will allow the 
application of common law principles settled in analogous tort claims, particularly in 
relation to fault, defences and the award of damages and assessment of remedies, 
where these matters are not set out in the new Act. This will enhance the coherence and 
consistency of the law. 
4.31 Thirdly, the nomenclature of tort is consistent with developments in comparable 
jurisdictions and would allow Australian courts to draw on analogous case law from 
other jurisdictions, thus reducing uncertainty and complexity. The four Canadian 
provinces which have enacted legislation for invasions of privacy describe the relevant 
conduct as ‘a tort’.
29
 The New Zealand courts have recognised new causes of action in 
tort to protect privacy.
30
 Developments in the United Kingdom derive from the 
extension of the equitable action for breach of confidence under the influence of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). However, the misuse of private information giving rise 
to the extended or new cause of action in the United Kingdom is increasingly referred 
to as a ‘tort’.
31
 While Australian courts may not be prepared to take the same leap in 
classification as may have occurred there, the legislature is not so constrained. 
                                                        
27  Prue Vines, ‘Introduction’ in Caroline Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts 
(Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) 3. 
28  KM Stanton et al, Statutory Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 6: ‘Indeed, the only answer [to the question 
“What is a Tort?”] may be to say that a compensation right is of a tortious character if it is generally 
regarded as tortious … the phrasing of the statute is likely to play a large part in the classification of 
rights’.    
29  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia); Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba); 
Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador). 
30  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1; C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012). 
31  Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) (16 January 2014) [50]–[75]. Many commentators now 
use this nomenclature: eg, Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, ‘The Human Rights Act and Its Impact 
on the Law of Tort’ in TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, 
Statute, and the Dynamics of Change (Hart Publishing, 2012) 466–467. However, precisely when and 
how this change from an extended equitable action for breach of confidence to a tort of misuse of private 
information happened has not been pinpointed. Some judicial statements simply ignore the difference: eg, 
Lord Neuberger, MR, in Tchenguiz v Imerman (Rev 4) [2010] EWCA Civ 908 [65]: ‘following … 
Campbell, there is now a tort of misuse of private information: as Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR 
put it in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125. Cf Coogan v News Group Newspapers Ltd  [2012] 
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4.32 Fourthly, describing the action as a tort action will clarify and highlight the 
distinctions between the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy and 
existing regulatory regimes, such as those under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). 
4.33 Fifthly, describing the statutory cause of action as a tort action will clearly 
differentiate it from the equitable and contractual actions for breach of confidence. 
These will continue to exist and develop to protect confidential information, against the 
contracting party or confidant and against a third party who has the requisite 
knowledge that the material is confidential.
32
 Lastly, there is no reason why the tort 
nomenclature should constrain the legislature from making specific provision for 
remedies not generally available in tort at common law, for example, ordering an 
apology or an account of profits; limiting remedies usually available in tort; or capping 
the amounts of certain types of damages. 
4.34 In 2009, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) 
recommended against identifying the statutory cause of action as an action in tort, or 
leaving the courts to construe the action as one in tort. It gave two reasons. First, tort 
actions do not generally require courts to engage in the sort of overt balancing of 
interests involved in the statutory cause of action.
33
 However, in the ALRC’s view this 
point seems to overlook or downplay the balancing that is required in some existing 
tort actions. Tort actions in private nuisance frequently require the courts to balance the 
interests of the plaintiff with those of the defendant in their respective use of their 
land.
34
 Nuisance law famously rests on ‘a rule of give and take, live and let live’, 
according to the well-known aphorism of Baron Bramwell in Bamford v Turner in 
1860.
35
 In Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan, Lord Wright made a point that would be 
apt in many cases involving alleged invasions of privacy and the balancing of 
individuals’ rights: 
A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes 
with his own, and the right of his neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible 
to give any precise or universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is 
                                                                                                                                             
EWCA Civ 48; [2012] 2 WLR 848 [48] where he said: ‘it is probably fair to say that the extent to which 
privacy is to be accommodated within the law of confidence as opposed to the law of tort is still in the 
process of being worked out.’ Possibly, such detail is of less concern to English courts than it would be to 
Australian courts, where a stricter approach to the classification of legal wrongs is evident: Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 
CLR 269. 
32  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109; Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224–225; Vestergaard Frandsen A/S and 
Ors v Bestnet Europe Ltd and Ors [2013] 1 WLR 1556; AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v John Fairfax 
Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1395.  
33  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [5.55]. 
34  Compare ‘Equitable principles are best developed by reference to what conscionable behaviour demands 
of the defendant not by “balancing” and then overriding those demands by reference to matters of social 
or political opinion’: Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health [1990] FCA 151 [130] (Gummow J).  
35  Bamford v Turner (1860) 3 B & S 62; 122 ER 25 [83]–[84]. 
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perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in 
society.36 
4.35 Secondly, the NSWLRC said that describing the cause of action as a tort would 
require the legislation to specify whether the cause of action requires fault on the 
defendant’s part. Further, if it did require fault, what kind of fault, and whether it 
requires proof of harm or is actionable per se. The NSWLRC considered that the issue 
of fault was ‘appropriately left to development in case law’ and that it was unnecessary 
to specify whether the action is maintainable only on proof of damage.
37
 The VLRC 
agreed with this approach, adding that ‘there is little to be gained—and many complex 
rules of law to be navigated—if any new cause of action is characterised as a tort’.
38
 
Examples given were rules as to fault, damage, remedies and vicarious liability. 
4.36 The ALRC considers that it is highly desirable, if not essential, that the 
legislator should determine whether or not the cause of action requires proof of a 
certain type of fault and harm. To leave such key elements of a statutory cause of 
action to be decided by the courts would be highly problematic. An absence of 
specificity would increase uncertainty as to the statute’s application. This has been a 
key concern of stakeholders in relation to previous proposals for a statutory cause of 
action.
39
 People need to have some guidance in advance as to when their activities 
might be judged to be an actionable invasion of privacy leading to civil liability. 
Similarly, potential claimants need guidance as to whether they could prove an 
actionable invasion of their privacy. The comments by the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1966 on the law of the United Kingdom in a different context are apposite: 
The relevant national law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
persons concerned—if need be with appropriate legal advice—to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.40 
4.37 If no element of fault is included, it would be open for a court to determine that 
strict liability was intended or imposed, as for example under ss 18 and 237 of the 
Australian Consumer Law.
41
 The ALRC considers that strict liability, or negligence 
based liability, would be oppressive or undesirable. Certainty is also desirable in 
relation to the issue of damage or actionability per se. Questions will undoubtedly arise 
as to other ancillary issues on liability. The ALRC proposes the integration of the 
statutory action into the existing legislative and common law framework of tort law. 
                                                        
36  Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903. See also, RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [14.19]. 
37  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [5.56]–[5.57]. 
38  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) 7.134. 
39  Free TV, Submission 55; The Newspaper Works, Submission 50; Australian Subscription Television and 
Radio Association, Submission 47; Telstra, Submission 45; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 
27. 
40  Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, 140. See David Eady, ‘Injunctions and the Protection 
of Privacy’ (2010) 29 Civil Justice Quarterly 411, 418. 
41  Neither of which includes any fault requirements for liability: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
sch 2. 
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This approach is preferable to the establishment of an entirely separate legislative 
framework,
42
 or to leaving these issues open and therefore uncertain in key respects. 
Abolition of common law actions 
4.38 The Terms of Reference ask whether, in the event that the statutory action is 
enacted, any common law actions should be abolished. Such a provision may be 
unnecessary, depending on common law developments at the time of enactment.  
However, such a provision would create certainty. 
4.39 There is no case for abolishing the equitable action for breach of confidence in 
its entirety, as it protects ‘confidential’ information whether or not it is also private in 
nature.  
4.40 The NSWLRC recommended the enactment of the following provision: 
To the extent that the general law recognises a specific tort for the invasion or 
violation of a person’s privacy, that tort is abolished.43  
4.41  To capture possible tort and equitable developments at common law, the Act 
might provide that to the extent that the general law recognises a specific cause of 
action for the invasion of a person’s privacy, that cause of action is abolished.  
Overview of the elements of the new tort 
4.42 In the following chapters, the ALRC proposes the elements of a new tort for 
serious invasion of privacy. There are five elements, and each of them must be satisfied 
for the plaintiff to have a cause of action. There are significant interactions between the 
elements, and the ALRC’s reasons for proposing the content of one proposal will often 
depend on the proposals for the other elements. It is therefore important to consider 
these elements together. 
First element:  The invasion of privacy must occur by: 
 (a)  intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion or private affairs (including by 
unlawful surveillance); or 
 (b)  misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff. 
Second element:  The invasion of privacy must be either intentional or reckless. 
Third element:   A person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances. 
                                                        
42  This is the approach in, for example, the Australian Consumer Law, in respect of liability for misleading 
or deceptive conduct. 
43  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWLRC Draft Bill, cl 80(1). 
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Fourth element:  The court must consider that the invasion of privacy was ‘serious’, 
in all the circumstances, having regard to, among other things, whether the invasion 
was likely to be highly offensive, distressing or harmful to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. 
Fifth element:  The court must be satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy 
outweighs the defendant’s interest in freedom of expression and any broader public 
interest in the defendant’s conduct. 
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Summary 
5.1 In this chapter, the ALRC proposes two of the five elements of a new tort for 
serious invasion of privacy.  
5.2 Firstly, the ALRC proposes that the new tort be confined to two types of 
invasion of privacy. The plaintiff must prove that the invasion of privacy occurred 
either by:  
 (a)  intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion or private affairs (including by 
unlawful surveillance); or  
 (b)  misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff. 
5.3 These two types of invasion of privacy are widely considered to be the core of a 
right to privacy—and the chief mischief that needs to be addressed by a new action. 
Confining the tort to these two types of invasion of privacy will also make the scope of 
the tort more certain and predictable.  
5.4 Secondly, this chapter considers the fault element of the new tort. The ALRC 
proposes that, for an action under the tort to succeed, the invasion of privacy must be 
either intentional or reckless. These fault elements are common to existing torts of 
trespass, such as assault and battery. The ALRC considers that other possible fault 
elements (such as negligence or strict liability) may make the scope of the new tort too 
broad. 
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A cause of action for two types of invasion of privacy 
Proposal 5–1 First element of action: The new tort should be confined to 
invasions of privacy by:  
(a) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or private affairs (including by 
unlawful surveillance); or 
(b) misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff (whether 
true or not). 
5.5 Misuse of private information and intrusion upon seclusion have been said to lie 
at the heart of any legal protection of privacy. Unwanted access to private information 
and unwanted access to one’s body or personal space have been called the ‘two core 
components of the right to privacy’.
1
 Most examples of invasions of privacy given to 
support the introduction of a new cause of action, and most cases in other jurisdictions 
relating to invasions of privacy, fall into one of these two categories. To provide 
clarity, certainty and guidance about the purpose and scope of the new action, the 
ALRC proposes that the action be explicitly confined to these two types of invasion of 
privacy.
2
 This means that invasions of privacy that do not fall into one of these two 
categories will not be actionable under the new tort.
3
 
5.6 Although, as discussed below, many stakeholders said the Act should contain a 
non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct which may be an invasion of privacy, 
others noted the benefits of confining the action. Telstra submitted that a non-
exhaustive list of examples would allow for the possibility of other types of invasion of 
privacy to be actionable, and that this would give rise to undesirable uncertainty:  
Categories of conduct caught by any cause of action should be listed exhaustively, 
using unambiguous and objective terms, in order to reduce the uncertainty and impact 
that the introduction of such a cause of action would cause to businesses and service 
providers.4 
5.7 The two categories of invasion of privacy proposed above draw on the well-
known categorisation of privacy torts in the United States, first set out by William 
Prosser in 1960, and followed in the US Restatement of the Law Second, Torts.
5
 
Prosser wrote that the law of privacy 
comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, 
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in 
                                                        
1  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [2.07], 
cited with approval in Goodwin v NGN [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB) (09 June 2011) [85]. 
2  This is similar to the approach recommended by the VLRC. As discussed further below, the VLRC 
recommended two separate causes of action, though with very similar elements: one for intrusion upon 
seclusion and the other for misuse of private information. 
3  As discussed below, such conduct may be actionable under other causes of action, such as defamation. 
4  Telstra, Submission 45. 
5  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652A. Professor Prosser was one 
of the reporters. 
 5. Two Types of Invasion and Fault 67 
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in 
the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone’. Without any attempt to exact 
definition, these four torts may be described as follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.6 
5.8 The ALRC considers that, in Australia, a new privacy tort should be confined to 
the first two of these four categories. In ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, Gummow 
and Hayne JJ said that ‘the disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion upon 
seclusion, perhaps come closest to reflecting a concern for privacy “as a legal principle 
drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy”’.
7
 These two types of 
invasion of privacy are discussed further below. 
Intrusion upon seclusion or private affairs 
5.9 Intrusion upon seclusion is one of the two most commonly recognised categories 
of invasion of privacy. The ALRC considers it essential that the new tort capture this 
type of conduct. 
5.10 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, Prosser wrote in 1960, ‘has been useful 
chiefly to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental 
distress, and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights’.
8
 
These gaps remain in Australian protection of privacy from intrusion today. 
5.11 Prosser cited a number of US cases involving intrusion upon seclusion, 
including cases in which the defendant intruded into someone’s home, hotel room and 
‘stateroom on a steamboat’, and upon a woman in childbirth. The principle was ‘soon 
carried beyond such physical intrusion’ and ‘extended to eavesdropping upon private 
conversations by means of wire tapping and microphones’ and to ‘peering into the 
windows of a home’.
9
 Prosser cited a case in which a creditor ‘hounded the debtor for a 
considerable length of time with telephone calls at his home and his place of 
employment’ and another case of ‘unauthorized prying into the plaintiff’s bank 
account’.
10
 
                                                        
6  William L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389. 
7  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 251 (Gummow 
and Hayne JJ), quoting Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! [2001] 2 WLR 992, 1025.  
8  Prosser, above n 6, 392. 
9  Ibid 389–92; Jones v Tsige (2012) 108 OR (3rd) 241. 
10  Prosser, above n 6, 389–92. 
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5.12 Section 652B of the US Restatement of the Law Second, Torts concerns 
intrusion upon seclusion, and states: 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
5.13 The accompanying commentary in the Restatement reads: 
a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any 
publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. It consists 
solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as 
to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable man. 
b. The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has 
secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a 
hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be by 
the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or 
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with 
binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of 
investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and 
personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or 
compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal 
documents. The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though 
there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or information 
outlined.11 
5.14 The US tort of intrusion has been said to focus on ‘the means of obtaining 
private information rather than on the publication of the information so gained. The 
core of the tort is the offensive prying into the private domain of another’.
12
 
5.15 In the United Kingdom, there is no comparable tort for invasions of privacy by 
intrusion upon seclusion, falling short of trespass and nuisance.
13
 The House of Lords 
in Wainwright v Home Office
14
 ‘expressly declined to recognize a general right to 
privacy which would extend to physical privacy interferences not involving the 
dissemination of information’.
15
 
5.16 This apparent gap in the UK law may not be so concerning as it is in Australia, 
because the UK has a Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK), which provides 
some legislative protection against invasions of privacy by intrusion into seclusion. In 
Chapter 14, the ALRC proposes the introduction of a statutory cause of action for 
harassment, in the event that the proposed privacy tort is not introduced. 
                                                        
11  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652B. 
12  Warby et al, above n 1, [3.68]. 
13  ‘Unlike US law, there is, as yet, no general tort of intrusion recognised by English law’: Raymond Wacks, 
Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2013) 186. 
14  Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
15  Warby et al, above n 1, [10.04]. 
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5.17 Although there is no tort for intrusion upon seclusion in the UK, courts have 
recognised the potential for intrusions to invade privacy and cause harm. The majority 
of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd emphasised that the covert way in 
which private information about the model Naomi Campbell, later published, was 
obtained in that case, heightened the invasion of Campbell’s privacy. Lord Hoffman 
said: ‘the publication of a photograph taken by intrusion into a private place (for 
example, by a long distance lens) may in itself be such an infringement [of the privacy 
of the personal information], even if there is nothing embarrassing about the picture 
itself’.
16
 Similarly, in Murray v Express Newspapers, Sir Anthony Clarke MR said that, 
‘“the nature and purpose of the intrusion” is one of the factors which will determine 
whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy’.
17
 
5.18 Further, in a number of recent cases, the English and European courts have 
begun to emphasise the intrusive aspects of the conduct under consideration, not only 
in the way the private information was collected,
18
 but also in the effect the publication 
will have on the claimant’s and related parties’ lives after publication.
19
 Intrusive 
behaviour by the UK media led to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and 
Ethics of the Press.
20
  
5.19 Discussing the ‘curious’ resistance of the English courts to recognise a cause of 
action for intrusion, Raymond Wacks writes that nevertheless 
there are a number of obiter dicta that imply that the clandestine recordings of private 
matters does ‘engage’ Article 8, that the mere taking of a photograph of a child or an 
adult in a public place might fall within the category of ‘misuse’. These 
pronouncements are either (uncharacteristic) judicial lapses or subtle, possibly even 
subconscious, acknowledgements of the present anomaly!21 
5.20 It remains to be seen whether a separate cause of action for intrusion upon 
seclusion will be recognised at common law in the UK.
22
 The authors of Gurry on 
Breach of Confidence note that the case for recognising a separate tort of privacy, as 
opposed to an extended equitable action for disclosure of private information, will be 
stronger if the courts seek to protect against intrusions into private life as well.
23
 
5.21 A New Zealand court has recognised a tort of intrusion upon seclusion, in a case 
about a man who installed a recording device in a bathroom and recorded his female 
flatmate showering. In this case, C v Holland, Whata J said that the ‘critical issue I 
must determine is whether an invasion of privacy of this type, without publicity or the 
                                                        
16  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [75]. 
17  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. See also Warby et al, above n 1, [10.06]. 
18  See further NA Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: The Protection of Physical Privacy in English Law’ 
(2014) 73(2) Cambridge Law Journal (forthcoming). See also, Tsinguiz v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 
908 [66] in which it was held that misuse of confidential information for the equitable cause of action 
may include intentional observation and acquisition of the information. 
19  Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB); Mosley v United Kingdom – 
48009/08 [2011] ECHR 774; A v United Kingdom – 35373/97 [2002] ECHR 811; [2003] EHRR 51. 
20  See further The Leveson Inquiry <www.levesoninquiry.org.uk>.  
21  Wacks, above n 13, 247 (citations omitted). 
22  See further Moreham, above n 18. 
23  Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) [7.102]. 
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prospect of publicity, is an actionable tort in New Zealand’.
24
 The court concluded that 
it was: 
the similarity to the Hosking tort [discussed below] is sufficiently proximate to enable 
an intrusion tort to be seen as a logical extension or adjunct to it. This Court can 
apply, develop and modify the tort to meet the exigencies of the time.25  
5.22 In defining the ingredients of the tort, Whata J drew guidance from the decision 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige,
26
 which had recognised a tort of 
intrusion into seclusion. Whata J stated: 
I consider that the most appropriate course is to maintain as much consistency as 
possible with the North American tort given the guidance afforded from existing 
authority. I also consider that the content of the tort must be consistent with domestic 
privacy law and principles. On that basis, in order to establish a claim based on the 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion a plaintiff must show: 
(a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs);  
(c) Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person.27 
5.23 Including intrusion as one of the categories of an actionable invasion of privacy 
in the new statutory action would remedy one of the key deficiencies in the Australian 
protection of privacy law identified in Chapter 3. It would enable people to take steps 
to prevent unjustifiable conduct or obtain some redress where they have been the target 
of deliberate and unjustifiable intrusions but where, often for historical or technical 
reasons, the circumstances do not fall within the protection of existing tort and other 
laws. 
Misuse or disclosure of private information 
5.24 The second type of invasion of privacy that the ALRC proposes should be 
covered by the new privacy tort is misuse or disclosure of private information about the 
plaintiff. It will be neither surprising nor contentious that a cause of action for invasion 
of privacy will in part concern the disclosure of private information. Lord Hoffmann 
has identified ‘the right to control the dissemination of information about one’s private 
life’ as central to a person’s privacy and autonomy.
28
 
5.25 This is a widely recognised type of invasion of privacy, already actionable in the 
UK, the US, New Zealand, Canada and elsewhere. Most cases involving private 
information are concerned with unauthorised disclosure. 
                                                        
24  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012) [1]. 
25  Ibid [86]. 
26  Jones v Tsige (2012) 108 OR (3rd) 241. There the defendant, who was in a relationship with the 
claimant’s former husband, and who worked for the same bank as the claimant in different branches, used 
her workplace computer to gain access to the claimant’s private banking records 174 times. Again there 
was no publication. 
27  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012) [94]–[95] (Whata J). 
28  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [51]. 
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5.26 The elements of the US tort, set out in the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, 
are that publicity is given to a matter concerning the private life of another, and ‘the 
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public’.
29
 Publicity, the commentary to the 
Restatement says, ‘means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the 
public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially 
certain to become one of public knowledge’.
30
 
5.27 The disclosure of private information is now also a settled basis for action in the 
UK. The new or extended cause of action has developed out of the equitable cause of 
action for breach of confidence, as formulated in Campbell v MGN Ltd, since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which incorporates elements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
31
 Article 8 of the ECHR provides, in 
part, that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence’. Although Article 8 is not confined to private information, the 
focus of the UK action on disclosure of private information may be partly attributed to 
its roots in the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, which protects confidential 
information. 
5.28 The New Zealand courts have recognised a new tort of invasion of privacy by 
giving publicity to private facts. Gault P and Blanchard J stated in Hosking v Runting: 
The elements of the tort as it relates to publicising private information set down by 
Nicholson J in P v D provide a starting point, and are a logical development of the 
attributes identified in the United States jurisprudence and adverted to in judgments in 
the British cases. In this jurisdiction it can be said that there are two fundamental 
requirements for a successful claim for interference with privacy: 
1. The existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy; and 
2. Publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to 
an objective reasonable person.32 
Whether true or not 
5.29 The ALRC proposes that the new Australian tort refer to private ‘information’, 
rather than ‘facts’. The use of the word ‘fact’ in this statutory tort may imply that the 
relevant private information must be true, for it to be the subject of the cause of action. 
The ALRC considers that a person’s privacy can be invaded by the disclosure of untrue 
information, if it would be an invasion of privacy if the information were true.  
                                                        
29  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652D. 
30  Ibid (commentary on § 652D). 
31  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
32  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [117].  
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5.30 This is consistent with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), in which personal 
information is defined in section 6 to include information or an opinion ‘whether true 
or not’.
33
 It is also the position in UK law, and is supported by the ALRC. Former 
judge of the UK High Court, David Eady has written that 
a claimant is not now expected to go through an article about (say) his or her sex life, 
or state of health, in order to reveal that some aspects are true and others false. That 
would defeat the object of the exercise and involve even greater intrusion. Any 
speculation or factual assertions on private matters, whether true or false, can give rise 
to a cause of action.34 
5.31 This should be made clear in the new Act by adding the words ‘whether true or 
not’ after ‘misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff’, as proposed 
above. 
5.32 For the plaintiff to have an action, the untrue information must of course also be 
matters about which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy and, as 
proposed below, the misuse or disclosure must be serious. This is not a proposal for an 
action for the publication of untrue information. 
Misuse or disclosure  
5.33 Daniel Solove has argued that privacy ‘involves more than avoiding disclosure; 
it also involves the individual’s ability to ensure that personal information is used for 
the purposes she desires’.
35
 
5.34 Disclosure of personal information is perhaps the most common type of misuse 
of personal information that will invade a person’s privacy. Wacks writes that the ‘tort 
of misuse of private information obviously requires evidence of misuse which, in 
practice, signifies publication of such information’.
36
  
5.35 It is important to note that many invasions of privacy that seem to involve 
misuse, but not publication, of private information, may better be considered intrusions 
into private affairs. For example, an employee of a company who, without 
authorisation, accesses private information of a customer may have intruded into the 
private affairs of that customer. Such an intrusion would be covered by the first 
category of invasion proposed by the ALRC. Nevertheless, the ALRC considers that it 
is reasonable not to confine this second type of invasion to disclosure as some other 
type of misuse of private information may invade a person’s privacy. 
Public disclosure 
5.36 The ALRC proposes that a disclosure of private information need not be public, 
in the sense of wide publicity, to satisfy this element of the cause of action. The fact 
                                                        
33  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
34  David Eady, ‘Injunctions and the Protection of Privacy’ (2010) 29 Civil Justice Quarterly 411, 422: ‘It 
soon became established in McKennitt v Ash [2006] and in Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007], 
also in the Court of Appeal, that a remedy will lie in respect of intrusive information irrespective of 
whether it happens to be true or false’. 
35  Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1108. 
36  Wacks, above n 13, 247, paraphrasing Lord Hoffmann in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [51].  
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that the disclosure of personal information was to only one other person should not, in 
some circumstances, prevent the conduct being held to be actionable, if the 
circumstances are adjudged to be serious. 
5.37 The US tort, on the other hand, is confined to public disclosures. The 
Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, states that publicity means ‘the matter is made 
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter 
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge’.
37
  
5.38 The New Zealand Court of Appeal seemed also to have in mind public 
disclosures when discussing the tort, in Hosking v Runting. In that case, Gault P and 
Blanchard J said: ‘I see no reason why our courts should not develop the action for 
breach of confidence to protect personal privacy through the public disclosure of 
private information where it is warranted’.
38
  
5.39 However, the ALRC proposes not to confine the action to public disclosures. 
The fact that a disclosure of personal information was not public may make it more 
difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy other elements of the action. For example, it may 
suggest the invasion of privacy was less serious than it might otherwise have been. 
Also, the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy may not always extend to non-public 
disclosures of personal information. However, there may be some instances in which a 
plaintiff does have a reasonable expectation not to have personal information disclosed 
even within a small circle, and the disclosure will be adjudged serious.
39
  
False light and appropriation 
5.40 The ALRC considers that the third and fourth torts identified by Prosser should 
not be included in a new Australian tort for serious invasion of privacy. Discussing the 
four US torts, the Australian High Court has said that, in Australia, one or more of the 
four types of invasion of privacy would often ‘be actionable at general law under 
recognised causes of action’: 
Injurious falsehood, defamation (particularly in those jurisdictions where, by statute, 
truth of itself is not a complete defence), confidential information and trade secrets (in 
particular, as extended to information respecting the personal affairs and private life 
of the plaintiff, and the activities of eavesdroppers and the like), passing-off (as 
extended to include false representations of sponsorship or endorsement), the tort of 
conspiracy, the intentional infliction of harm to the individual based in Wilkinson v 
Downton and what may be a developing tort of harassment, and the action on the case 
for nuisance constituted by watching or besetting the plaintiff’s premises, come to 
mind.40 
5.41 The disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion 
concern the key privacy interests, such as personal dignity and autonomy, whereas the 
                                                        
37  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977). 
38  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1. 
39  See, for example, Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
40  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 255 (Gummow 
and Hayne JJ).  
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other US torts arguably protect others’ interests. Gummow and Hayne JJ stated in ABC 
v Lenah Game Meats: 
Whilst objection possibly may be taken on non-commercial grounds to the 
appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, the plaintiff’s complaint is likely to 
be that the defendant has taken the steps complained of for a commercial gain, thereby 
depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity of commercial exploitation of that name or 
likeness for the benefit of the plaintiff. To place the plaintiff in a false light may be 
objectionable because it lowers the reputation of the plaintiff or causes financial loss 
or both.41 
5.42 Wacks has written that the ‘false light’ category ‘seems to be both redundant 
(for almost all such cases might equally have been brought for defamation) and only 
tenuously related to the protection of the plaintiff against aspects of his or her private 
life being exposed’.
42
 The ALRC has proposed some protection, if the falsity relates to 
matters as to which the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
5.43 Professor Michael Tilbury has written that, for the most part, the interests 
protected by the US torts of appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness and false 
light, ‘can or ought to be restated as, respectively, the commercial interest (or property) 
that plaintiffs have in their identity and the interest that plaintiffs have in their 
reputation’.
43
 However, although privacy may have a wider reach, at the ‘heart of 
privacy law’, Tilbury writes, are the torts of public disclosure of private facts and 
intrusion on seclusion.
44
 
5.44 As Gummow and Hayne JJ foreshadowed, there could be some objection taken 
to appropriation of image or name on non-commercial grounds, thus outside the law of 
passing off and the like, and this risk has been heightened in the digital era. The ALRC 
considers that the two categories set out in the proposal should be sufficient to protect 
the privacy of the individual. Any further reform to the law relating to image rights 
would need to be considered in the context of Australia’s existing intellectual property 
law. 
Examples of invasions of privacy 
5.45 Confining the new tort to these two broad and widely recognised categories of 
invasion of privacy is preferable to two other options that have been considered. The 
first option is to provide no statutory guidance on the meaning of invasion of privacy, 
and to leave this to be developed by the courts. A second option would be to include 
examples of invasion of privacy.  
5.46 The ALRC considers that the new Act should provide as much certainty as 
possible on what may amount to an invasion of privacy. This will make the scope of 
the action more predictable, particularly as privacy itself is not defined in the new Act. 
                                                        
41  Ibid, 256 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
42  Wacks, above n 13, 181. 
43  Michael Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-Pecuniary Loss and the Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman 
and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 
127, 136. 
44  Ibid 137. 
 5. Two Types of Invasion and Fault 75 
As discussed above, the ALRC proposes that some certainty be provided by having the 
new Act describe, in general terms, the two categories of invasion of privacy to which 
the action would be confined.  
5.47 However, another way to provide guidance might be to include in the new Act 
broad examples of invasions of privacy. This approach would make the cause of action 
more flexible, but at the cost of certainty. This was the approach favoured by the 
ALRC in its 2008 report, in which it recommended that the relevant Act contain the 
following non-exhaustive list of types of invasion that fall within the cause of action: 
 there has been an interference with an individual’s home or family life; 
 an individual has been subjected to unauthorised surveillance; 
 an individual’s correspondence or private written, oral or electronic 
communication has been interfered with, misused or disclosed; or 
 sensitive facts relating to an individual’s private life have been disclosed.
45
 
5.48 A number of stakeholders in the current Inquiry said a non-exhaustive list of 
examples should be included in the new provision,
46
 stressing that this would provide 
courts, parties and business with some guidance and certainty.
47
 Some of these 
stakeholders may prefer the greater certainty that confining the action in the way the 
ALRC proposes will provide. Some stakeholders said the examples should be general 
and flexible, so that that the action can ‘evolve with social and technological 
developments’.
48
 
5.49 Jansz-Richardson said the examples should be ‘relatively general in nature to 
ensure their ability to translate over time’.
49
 Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) 
submitted that examples should be ‘open-ended and inclusive, which would build 
sufficient flexibility into the proposed cause of action for it to be appropriately adapted 
to changing social and technological circumstances’.
50
 The Australian Privacy 
Foundation said ‘the list should be clearly identified as non-exclusive and non-
exhaustive, ie courts should be able to deal with serious invasions of privacy that fall 
outside the list’.
51
 
                                                        
45  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–1. 
46  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 
58; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; 
Telstra, Submission 45; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Optus, Submission 41; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, 
Submission 29; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Office of the Information Commissioner, 
Queensland, Submission 20; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
47  Telstra, Submission 45; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. Examples ‘may be useful in guiding 
courts and more broadly in addressing unfounded anxieties about the purpose of the legislation or its 
scope’: Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. A ‘list of examples should be included in the Act 
to provide guidance to business’: Telstra, Submission 45. 
48  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
49  C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24. 
50  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
51  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
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5.50 Other stakeholders said that the cause of action should not include a list of 
examples.
52
 Some were concerned the list would narrow the scope of the action, by 
implying that invasions of privacy not covered by an example would not be 
actionable.
53
 It was also suggested that the examples in the list might become 
outdated.
54
 Other stakeholders suggested that examples were unhelpful because privacy 
was ‘contextual and depends on facts and circumstances’.
55
 The ABC said there needs 
to be ‘an intense focus on how the various interests at stake are implicated in the 
particular circumstances of each case’.
56
 SBS submitted that ‘the key for any statutory 
cause of action is flexibility’: 
The more activities or matters that are included to ‘assist’ with the formulation of a 
breach of privacy action, the more likely it is that these tests will become rigid and 
inflexible. It is vital that courts consider each case on its facts.57 
5.51 Some stakeholders suggested that more specific examples of invasion of privacy 
might be included in the Act. For example, Electronic Frontiers Australia submitted 
that there should be examples for data breaches, aggregated collections of data, and 
‘posting of photographs, audio-recordings, and video-recordings of personal spaces, 
activities, and bodies for which consent to post has not been expressly provided by the 
participant’.
58
  
5.52 However, the ALRC considers that the application of the tort to more specific 
and particular circumstances is best left to the courts to consider on a case by case 
basis, but within the confines of the two categories specified. Specific examples may 
provide additional guidance, but they also carry a greater risk of distracting the court 
from the consideration of the distinct facts and circumstances of a particular case. 
One cause of action, not two 
5.53 The ALRC proposes that there be one cause of action covering the two broad 
types of invasion of privacy. A similar approach, recommended by the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (VLRC), would be to enact two separate but ‘overlapping’ causes 
of action. However, enacting separate causes of action should only be necessary if the 
elements of each would be substantially different, which the ALRC considers is not the 
case. Separate actions should therefore not be necessary. 
                                                        
52  SBS, Submission 59; Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; ABC, 
Submission 46; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; P 
Wragg, Submission 4. 
53  P Wragg, Submission 4; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. Wragg submitted that this ‘may be 
harmful to the longevity of the act to be too specific on the scope of its ambit since it may be read 
narrowly in order to prevent application to novel and unexpected technological developments as they 
arise.’ The Law Institute of Victoria submitted that this ‘might give would-be defendants the impression 
that conduct outside the parameters of the list does not constitute an invasion of privacy’. 
54  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. For example, the Law Institute of Victoria stated that: ‘In the 
current technological age, it is likely that any examples in a list could be quickly superseded by other 
types of privacy invasions that might evolve in the future’. 
55  Ibid. 
56  ABC, Submission 46. 
57  SBS, Submission 59. 
58  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
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5.54 The VLRC’s reasons for recommending two causes of action largely relate to 
the widely recognised difficulty of defining privacy:  
Legislating to protect these broadly recognised sub-categories of privacy is likely to 
promote greater clarity about the precise nature of the legal rights and obligations that 
have been created than by creating a broad civilly enforceable right to privacy.59 
5.55 The ALRC has come to a similar conclusion, which is one reason it proposes 
that the action be confined to two more precisely defined sub-categories of invasion of 
privacy. The categories proposed by the ALRC are broadly the same as the categories 
identified by the VLRC. 
5.56 Although the ALRC and VLRC approaches are broadly consistent, the ALRC 
considers it important that there be only one cause of action. The availability of two 
causes of actions may cause unnecessary overlap and duplication in many cases in 
which both types of invasion arise. Dr Ian Turnbull submitted that one reason for 
having only one cause of action is that ‘in most cases intrusion upon seclusion will be 
followed by misuse of the private information obtained by the intrusion’.
60
  
5.57 The availability of two torts would increase the length and cost of proceedings 
and risk duplication in monetary damages. There will already be cases where the cause 
of action may overlap with other causes of action such as trespass or breach of contract 
or breach of confidence. It would be undesirable to risk inviting further duplication. 
5.58 Many stakeholders favoured a single cause of action,
61
 however, often because 
this was thought to make the action more flexible—that is, open to invasions other than 
by misuse of personal information or intrusion upon seclusion. Dr Normann Witzleb 
for example said the action should be formulated broadly, to leave its further 
development to the courts.
62
 The Australian Privacy Foundation likewise said that 
introducing two torts may result in some privacy breaches not being covered.
63
 
However, the ALRC proposes that the new tort should not be broadly drafted to 
capture all invasions of privacy, but rather should be confined to the two more 
precisely defined types of invasion of privacy that are the key mischief that the cause 
of action is designed to remedy. 
Fault—intentional or reckless  
Proposal 5–2 Second element of action: The new tort should be confined 
to intentional or reckless invasions of privacy. It should not extend to negligent 
invasions of privacy, and should not attract strict liability. 
                                                        
59  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010) [7.126]. 
60  I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
61  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59; Electronic 
Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; 
N Witzleb, Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
62  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
63  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
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5.59 The ALRC proposes that the cause of action be confined to intentional or 
reckless invasions of privacy, even though this will mean that a person whose privacy 
has been invaded may in some cases have no remedy under the new tort. If the new tort 
attracted strict liability, or extended to negligent invasions of privacy, this might 
expose a wide range of people to liability for common human errors. It might also 
inhibit expression in those who fear incurring liability for unintentionally invading 
someone’s privacy.  
5.60 Fault is a key element in any cause of action leading to personal liability to pay 
compensation for loss or damage caused to another person. Legislating to protect these 
broadly recognised sub-categories of privacy is likely to promote greater clarity about 
the precise nature of the legal rights and obligations that have been created than by 
creating a broad enforceable right to privacy. 
5.61 The term ‘fault’ in a civil cause of action refers to either the state of mind of the 
relevant actor or the culpability of the actor’s conduct on an objective measure. Torts, 
or other bases of liability, such as statutory liabilities or liabilities for breaches of 
equitable duties, tend to be divided into actions imposing fault-based liability or actions 
imposing strict liability. 
5.62 There are essentially three types of fault to consider when designing a statutory 
cause of action for serious invasion of privacy: 
 Intentional or reckless: The defendant must be shown to have intended to 
invade the privacy of the plaintiff. Intent may also be inferred if the defendant’s 
actions were reckless.
64
 
 Negligent: Negligence depends on whether the actor’s conduct measured up to 
an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the position of the 
defendant would or would not do in the circumstances. This is an objective test, 
in which the intentions of the defendant are not relevant.
65
 
 Strict liability: If the cause of action is one of strict liability, then the defendant 
may be liable even though the defendant’s actions were not intentional, reckless 
or negligent. 
5.63 Strict liability is now relatively rare in Australian common law outside 
contractual obligations and fiduciary obligations, both of which rest on relationships 
that, ordinarily, have been voluntarily entered into by the parties. In Northern Territory 
v Mengel, a majority of the High Court remarked that  
the recent trend of legal development, here and in other common law countries, has 
been to the effect that liability in tort depends on either the intentional or the negligent 
                                                        
64  Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417, [80] 
(Spigelman CJ).  
65  Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781; Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 
(CP).  
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infliction of harm. That is not a statement of law but a description of the general 
trend.66 
5.64 Defamation is one of the rare examples of a common law tort liability that is 
strict, and is complete on proof of publication of defamatory material. It is the fact of 
defamation, not the intention of the defendant, that generates liability. Fleming’s The 
Law of Torts states that the  
justification for this stringent liability is presumably that it is more equitable to protect 
the innocent defamed rather than the innocent defamer (who, after all, chose to 
publish); another is that the publication, not the composition of the libel, is the 
actionable wrong, making the state of mind of the publisher, not the writer, relevant. 
On the other hand, since one does not as a rule act at one’s peril, why should the law 
demand that one publish at one’s peril, especially when what one says is not 
defamatory on its face? Does reputation deserve a higher level of protection than 
personal safety?67 
5.65 However, the uniform Defamation Acts that came into force in the Australian 
states and territories in 2006 provide for a defence of innocent dissemination,
68
 which 
makes liability for defamation somewhat less strict. This defence is available where the 
defendant proves, among other things, that he or she ‘neither knew, nor ought 
reasonably to have known, that the matter was defamatory’.
69
 
5.66 Another example is the action in tort for breach of a statutory duty where the 
duty imposed by the statute is strict. Most strict liabilities now arise by statute. 
Important examples in Australian law are: 
 the statutory liability for losses caused by breach of the prohibition of 
misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce imposed by the 
Australian Consumer Law and state and territory Fair Trading Acts;
70
  
 statutory liabilities for damage caused by defective products;
71
 and  
 statutory liability for damage caused by aircraft.
72
  
5.67 Previous law reform reports have diverged on the issue of fault. In 2008, the 
ALRC recommended that liability should be limited to intentional or reckless conduct, 
with ‘intentional’ defined as being where the defendant ‘deliberately or wilfully 
invades the plaintiff’s privacy’ and ‘reckless’ having the same meaning as in s 5.4 of 
                                                        
66  Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, [341]-[342] (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ).  
67  C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) 630. 
68  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 32. 
69  Ibid s 32(1)(b). 
70  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 236. Each state and territory Fair Trading Act applies 
the Australian Consumer Law as a law of its jurisdiction: see, for example, Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) 
s 28.  
71  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, ss 138-141. 
72  See, for example, Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cth) s 10. 
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the Criminal Code (Cth).
73
 The ALRC said that ‘including liability for negligent or 
accidental acts in relation to all invasions of privacy would, arguably, go too far’.
74
  
5.68 Neither the NSWLRC nor the VLRC recommended a fault element as part of 
the recommended cause or causes of action, but the NSWLRC recommended a defence 
of innocent dissemination similar to that found in the Defamation Acts.
75
  
5.69 In a New Zealand case about intrusion upon seclusion, C v Holland, Whata J 
said that the plaintiff must show an intentional intrusion, where intentional ‘connotes 
an affirmative act, not an unwitting or simply careless intrusion’.
76
 
Negligent invasions 
5.70 A number of stakeholders argue that liability for breach of privacy should be 
imposed either without proof of fault (strict liability), or at least for negligent invasions 
of privacy, in addition to reckless and intentional invasions of privacy.
77
 Some argue 
that fault should be relevant only to damages, or that reasonable care should be a 
defence.
78
 
5.71 Many stakeholders who called for strict liability or negligence stressed the harm 
that may be caused by unintentional invasions of privacy.
79
 For example, Electronic 
Frontiers Australia submitted that negligent invasions ‘are likely to be as damaging to 
the affected persons as intentional or reckless invasions, and in many cases may be 
more damaging’.
80
 
5.72 The ALRC points out however, that if actual damage is suffered beyond 
emotional distress, it may well be the case that the plaintiff would have a tort action in 
negligence. Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff the necessary legal duty of care 
would depend on a range of factors, particularly the type of damage suffered by the 
plaintiff. It is much more straightforward to succeed in a negligence claim where a 
plaintiff has suffered physical injury or property damage due to another’s negligence 
than where the harm is in the form of psychiatric illness or pure economic loss. 
However, Australian courts do recognise claims for negligently caused economic loss. 
Much will depend on whether the defendant knew of the plaintiff and the risk of loss, 
                                                        
73  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) 2576. 
74  ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper No 72 (2007) 2577. See also NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 171. 
75  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 55. 
76  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012) [94]–[95] (Whata J). 
77  See, eg, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; B Arnold, Submission 28; 
T Gardner, Submission 3. 
78  Eg, Office of the Privacy Commissioner NSW, Submission No 79 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; 
Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Submission No 45 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
79  Eg, Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Office of the Information 
Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. ‘In many cases, regardless of the intent of the invasion, the 
resultant consequences are the same, and the revelation that the circumstances were caused by negligence 
or a failure to act is likely to be cold comfort to the individual or group whose privacy has been 
breached’: C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24. 
80  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
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whether the defendant had made a representation to the plaintiff and whether the 
plaintiff was able to protect him or herself from the effects of the defendant’s 
negligence.
81
 
5.73 The plaintiff who has suffered as a result of a negligent data breach may also 
have a claim for breach of contract in which liability will be strict or negligence based, 
a claim under the Australian Consumer Law or a claim for breach of confidence. 
5.74 Some argue that data breaches are often the result of negligence, and if the cause 
of action included negligence it would encourage companies to take steps to prevent 
such breaches.
82
 Arnold submitted that action for negligence ‘provides a necessary and 
appropriate incentive for Australian organisations to move towards best practice in 
information management’.
83
 PIAC submitted: 
Many systemic breaches of privacy may be due to negligence, rather than to reckless 
or intentional acts. ... Restricting liability to reckless or intentional acts may also 
discourage organisations from taking steps to ensure that their privacy management 
systems are adequate, and may encourage indifference to privacy protection.84 
5.75 However, under the Privacy Act (and to some extent the Telecommunications 
Act) organisations are required to take such steps. Although it could be argued that 
these Acts have weaknesses, the cause of action should not be designed as a remedy for 
existing legislation where it would be better for that legislation to be amended or 
strengthened. 
5.76 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted: 
Intentional privacy breaches, such as those alleged against News of the World in the 
United Kingdom, are not the norm. The larger threat comes from unintentional 
breaches caused by: a lack of understanding of privacy obligations; technological 
malfunction and human error; or systemic failures. … Furthermore, requiring 
intention, rather than negligence, may be difficult to prove against companies.85  
5.77 If, on the other hand, the new tort were to provide both that the damage for the 
new tort should include emotional distress and that fault should include negligence, the 
coherence of the law would be undermined. The proposal would conflict with a clear 
legislative policy. As outlined above, the primary and most common form of harm 
suffered from an invasion of privacy is emotional distress. The well-entrenched policy 
of the common law, reflected in legislation across most Australian states and 
territories, is that liability for negligence should not extend to emotional distress.
86
 If 
                                                        
81  Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180.  
82  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44: ‘Indeed, data breaches … are often the result of 
negligence. The cause of action should therefore be available for intentional, reckless and negligent 
invasions of privacy’. 
83  B Arnold, Submission 28. See also Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22: ‘In the absence of a cause of 
action, there is little to no benefit or incentive for holders of private information in taking privacy 
obligations seriously’. 
84  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
85  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
86  Eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31. 
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the key type of harm that the new tort aims to avoid or redress is emotional distress, the 
new tort should be restricted to intentional or reckless conduct.  
5.78 Further, entities subject to the Privacy Act whose activities result in data 
breaches, whether caused negligently, accidentally or by systemic problems, will be 
subject to a range of remedial responses by the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner. From March 2014, this includes the possibility of substantial civil 
penalties.
87
 The ALRC considers that regulatory responses are a better way to deal with 
data breaches than a civil action for invasion of privacy, but as noted above, in any 
event many entities may be subject to a range of other civil legal liabilities. 
Strict liability  
5.79 Some have argued that one reason why liability for invasions of privacy should 
be strict is that this would be consistent with actions in defamation and breach of 
confidence.
88
 Witzleb has written that the ‘majority of torts intended to protect 
personality interests do not set the bar at reckless or intentional conduct’.
89
 
5.80 However, the analogy between these causes of action is imperfect. Breach of 
confidence arises where there was a pre-existing obligation which informs and binds 
the defendant’s conscience, or knowledge that the information was imparted under that 
obligation.
90
 Defamation is about a narrower range of conduct than the new tort of 
invasion of privacy and has a wide range of defences including, by statute, the defence 
of innocent dissemination.  
5.81 The OAIC also noted that ‘no fault element is required for complaints made to 
the OAIC for an interference with privacy under the Privacy Act. A finding of an 
interference with privacy can be made in relation to negligent and accidental acts, as 
well as those which are intentional or reckless’.
91
 However, the Privacy Act regulates 
government agencies and corporations which have the resources to take precautions to 
avoid negligent data breaches; an action under the new tort, on the other hand, could be 
taken against natural persons, who will usually not have such resources. Further, 
liability and costs may potentially be greater under the new tort than as a result of the 
complaints process under the Privacy Act. The statutory cause of action potentially 
applies to a wider range of activities than the Privacy Act. 
                                                        
87  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
88  ‘The majority of torts intended to protect personality interests do not set the bar at reckless or intentional 
conduct. Defamation is a strict liability tort but provides faultless defendants with a defence in some cases 
... Likewise, liability under the principles in Wilkinson v Downton is now more commonly understood as 
requiring merely negligence, not intention or recklessness, in relation to the consequence of causing 
psychiatric harm. Lastly, the proposed Australian Privacy Principles ... impose objective obligations that 
are akin to a negligence standard, such as conduct must be ‘reasonable’, ‘reasonably necessary’, or based 
on a ‘reasonable belief’’: Normann Witzleb, ‘A Statutory Cause of Action for Privacy? A Critical 
Appraisal of Three Recent Australian Law Reform Proposals’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104, 118–
119. 
89  Ibid 118. 
90  Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 1556. 
91  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
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Intentional and reckless only 
5.82 Other stakeholders, however, argued that the cause of action should be confined 
to intentional or reckless invasions of privacy.
92
 The Australian Bankers Association, 
for example, submitted, the ‘the trend in legislation to more strict liability provisions 
associated with the imposition of civil penalties continues to be a major concern for the 
private sector...’ 
The cause of action given its likely scope and imprecision should not be cast in the 
tortious framework of negligence. Rather it should apply only to an intent to seriously 
interfere with a person’s privacy or to do so with reckless indifference to that result 
and this has occurred. 93 
5.83 Other stakeholders suggested that some invasions of privacy should not attract 
liability because the conduct is not blameworthy. The Arts Law Centre of Australia 
submitted the example of a documentary maker ‘filming in a public place which looks 
onto a private apartment where someone is getting undressed’ and so accidentally 
invading someone’s privacy.
94
 Similarly, SBS submitted: 
There are many ways in which footage, images or other material may breach 
someone’s privacy in a way which is unintentional. A common example would be the 
kind of footage filmed for use in news broadcasts, often wide angle shots of crowds, 
or footage of incidental comings and goings out of buildings relevant to a news story. 
It is very possible that in such a story, a person or incident might be captured that the 
person considered a breach of their privacy.95 
5.84 Extending liability to include negligence might lead people to be ‘unduly careful 
about disclosing information’.
96
 It may lead to excessive self-censorship or too great a 
chilling effect on everyday activities that carry even a remote risk of invading privacy. 
Intending the act, or intending to invade privacy?  
5.85 An intention to invade a person’s privacy may be distinguished from an 
intention to do an act that has the perhaps unintended consequence of invading a 
person’s privacy. In some cases, the consequences of an act will be so inextricably 
linked to the act, or so substantially certain to follow,
97
 that an intention to do the act 
will strongly suggest an intention to bring about the consequences of the act. But this 
will not always be the case. Furthermore, it may be quite common to intend an action 
that will have the consequence of invading someone’s privacy, without intending to 
invade their privacy. 
5.86 For example, if an absent-minded person walks into a neighbour’s home, 
thinking it is his or her own home, then the person may have invaded the neighbour’s 
                                                        
92  SBS, Submission 59; Google, Submission 54; Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, 
Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 
43; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27.  
93  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
94  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
95  SBS, Submission 59. 
96  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
97  Sappideen and Vines, above n 67, 34. 
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privacy. The action in walking through the front door may have been intended,
98
 but 
the invasion of his neighbour’s privacy was not. 
5.87 To take a more common example, a media entity may publish a story that in fact 
invades a person’s privacy, but without any knowledge of the facts which would make 
it an invasion of that person’s privacy. The publishing of the story may have been 
intended, but not the consequences of the publication, namely, the invasion of the 
person’s privacy.  
5.88 Some stakeholders said the relevant intent should be an intent to invade the 
privacy of the plaintiff and not merely an intent to do an act which invades the privacy 
of the plaintiff.
99
 Telstra submitted that, given it considers current privacy protections 
sufficient, if there were a cause of action, 
intent should be determined by reference to the invasion of privacy and the harm to 
the complainant, rather than the conduct of the defendant, in order to be as specific 
and targeted in its application as possible.100 
5.89 In the ALRC’s view, the new tort should only be actionable where the defendant 
intended to invade the plaintiff’s privacy. Some will argue that this will too often 
remove liability for serious breaches of privacy. However, if it were sufficient merely 
to intend the act, and not the consequences of the act in the sense of the invasion of 
privacy, then this would effectively impose a negligence or strict liability standard as in 
defamation. For reasons discussed above, the ALRC considers that negligence should 
not be sufficient fault for an action for breach of privacy, and strict liability would be 
unduly burdensome and discouraging to other worthwhile competing interests. 
5.90 If the defendant intended the invasion of privacy, it would not be necessary, in 
addition, to show that the defendant intended to offend, distress or harm the plaintiff, 
for the plaintiff to have a cause of action. The question then becomes one of whether or 
not the particular damage claimed is too remote from the defendant’s tort. In 
intentional torts, the test is whether the damage claimed was a natural and probable 
consequence of the tort.
101
 If the defendant had an intent to inflict harm, this would 
amount to malice in law and would aggravate the damages that could be claimed. 
Many invasions of privacy will not be motivated by malice towards the victim. If a 
media organisation invades a person’s privacy, presumably this will be largely 
motivated by a desire to attract more viewers or increase the sale of newspapers, rather 
than to harm the victim. 
                                                        
98  This would still be a trespass because mistake is no defence to a trespass action: Sappideen and Vines, 
above n 66, 88.  
99  Eg, SBS, Submission 59; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission No 15 to 
DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
100  Telstra, Submission 45. 
101  Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388.  
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5.91 It would not necessarily be the case that the plaintiff would have to prove that 
the defendant had a subjective intent to invade his or her privacy. Such an intent may 
be imputed.
102
 If an invasion of privacy is substantially or obviously certain to follow 
from certain conduct, then the defendant may be taken to have intended the invasion of 
privacy, even if the defendant in fact did not put his or her mind to invading the 
plaintiff’s privacy. This may also amount to recklessness.
103
 
Effect of apology on liability  
Proposal 5–3 The new Act should provide that an apology made by or on 
behalf of a person in connection with any invasion of privacy alleged to have 
been committed by the person:  
(a)  does not constitute an express or implied admission of fault or liability by 
the person in connection with that matter; and  
(b)  is not relevant to the determination of fault or liability in connection with 
that matter.  
Proposal 5–4 Evidence of an apology made by or on behalf of a person in 
connection with any conduct by the person should not be admissible in any civil 
proceedings under the new Act as evidence of the fault or liability of the person 
in connection with that matter.  
5.92 Any apology or correction of published material by a defendant should not be 
treated in evidence as an admission of fault.
104
 This proposal is not intended to limit the 
operation of the proposals in Chapter 11 on the consideration of mitigating and 
aggravating factors in a court’s assessment of damages. 
5.93 This proposal is intended to encourage the early resolution of disputes without 
recourse to litigation. In many circumstances, an apology that something has occurred 
may provide a sufficient response to appease someone whose privacy has been invaded 
and people should feel free to make an apology without it affecting their ultimate or 
potential liability. 
                                                        
102  Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57. 
103  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417. 
104  This is similar to the following provision: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69. See also: Prue Vines, ‘The 
Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 
Public Space 1; Prue Vines, ‘The Apology in Civil Liability: Underused and Undervalued?’ (2013) 115 
Precedent 28; Robyn Carroll, ‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 317; 
‘Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report’ (2002). 
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Summary 
6.1 This chapter concerns the third element of the new tort. The ALRC proposes 
that, to have an action, a plaintiff must prove that a person in the position of the 
plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of the 
circumstances. 
6.2 This is an objective test. The subjective expectation of the plaintiff may be a 
relevant consideration, but it is not the focus of the inquiry. 
6.3 The ALRC also proposes that the new Act include a non-exhaustive list of 
factors which a court may consider when determining whether a person would have 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is designed to provide guidance and 
assistance to the parties and the court. 
6.4 The proposed factors include, among other factors, the nature of any information 
disclosed; the means used to obtain private information or intrude upon the plaintiff's 
seclusion; whether private information was already in the public domain; and the place 
where an intrusion occurred. 
6.5 Two related issues—the defendant’s interest in freedom of expression, and the 
public interest in the defendant’s conduct—are considered together in Chapter 8. 
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Reasonable expectation of privacy 
Proposal 6–1 Third element of action: The new tort should only be 
actionable where a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
6.6 Whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a useful and 
widely adopted test of what is private, for the purpose of a civil cause of action for 
invasions of privacy. The ALRC proposes that, to have an action under the new tort, 
the plaintiff should be required to establish that a person in the plaintiff’s position 
would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
6.7 This is preferable to attempting to define ‘privacy’ in the Act. It is notoriously 
difficult to define what is private and the courts have therefore developed a test rather 
than a definition. In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ said: 
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not. 
Use of the term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of contrast, but there is a large 
area in between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily private.1 
6.8 The use of the ‘reasonable expectation’ test was supported by a number of 
stakeholders.
2
 It is flexible and adaptable to new circumstances. Matters which an 
individual or community may reasonably expect will remain private will change 
between cultures and over time. The Office of the Information Commissioner, 
Queensland, submitted that the reasonable expectation of privacy test ‘would reflect 
both community standards and provide sufficient flexibility for the modern range of 
social discourses’.
3
 
6.9 Similar tests have been recommended in reports of the ALRC, the NSWLRC 
and the VLRC.
4
 This test is also used in a number of other jurisdictions.
5
 It has been 
adopted in the UK, New Zealand, and several Canadian provinces. In Campbell v 
                                                        
1  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
2  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59; NSW Young 
Lawyers, Submission 58; Free TV, Submission 55; Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 51; 
Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Optus, Submission 41; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; B Arnold, Submission 28; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Law 
Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 
20; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15; Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc., 
Submission 19; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
3  Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. 
4  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010) Recs 25, 26; 
NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 20–26. 
5  For example, the UK, Canada, and in New Zealand: ‘A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for 
Serious Invasion of Privacy’ (Issues Paper, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2011) 17–21. 
In the United Kingdom, Lord Hope in the majority in Campbell v MGN Ltd stated that ‘[t]he question is 
what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same position as the 
claimant and faced with the same publicity’: [2004] 2 AC 457, [99]. 
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MGM, Lord Nicholls said that ‘the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of 
the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy’.
6
 
6.10 The test proposed by the ALRC is an objective test. The court must consider 
whether it would be reasonable for a person in the position of the defendant to have 
expected privacy. The subjective expectation of the plaintiff may be a relevant 
consideration if that has been made manifest, but it is not the focus of the test, nor an 
essential element that must be satisfied. 
6.11 A similar test is used in the US when considering possible violations of Fourth 
Amendment rights.
7
 In Katz v United States, Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court 
said: 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a 
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes 
to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them 
to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not 
be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the 
circumstances would be unreasonable.8  
6.12 Some stakeholders opposed the use of a reasonable expectation test,
9
 with some 
saying that the test was too vague.
10
 However, courts are used to determining issues of 
reasonableness or even reasonable expectation in other contexts.
11
 There are notable 
benefits of using a test that has been used for some time in other jurisdictions: in 
applying the test, Australian courts will be able to draw on jurisprudence from the UK, 
New Zealand and the US. 
6.13 In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ proposed a different test for what is 
private, where the information was not obviously private. He said that the ‘requirement 
that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical 
test of what is private’.
12
 Lord Nicholls in Campbell said this test should be used with 
care, for two reasons: 
First, the ‘highly offensive’ phrase is suggestive of a stricter test of private 
information than a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the ‘highly offensive’ 
formulation can all too easily bring into account, when deciding whether the disclosed 
information was private, considerations which go more properly to issues of 
proportionality; for instance, the degree of intrusion into private life, and the extent to 
                                                        
6  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [21]. 
7  The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution concerns the ‘right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures’. 
8  Katz v United States (1967) 389 US 347, 360–361 (emphasis added). 
9  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; P Wragg, Submission 4. 
10  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
11  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. See also B Arnold, Submission 28. 
12  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
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which publication was a matter of proper public concern. This could be a recipe for 
confusion.13 
6.14 Baroness Hale also preferred an objective reasonable expectation test, saying 
that it was ‘much simpler and clearer’ than an offensiveness test of privacy.
14
 Further, 
Baroness Hale said that it was apparent that Gleeson CJ did not intend for the ‘highly 
offensive’ test to be the only test, 
… particularly in respect of information which is obviously private, including 
information about health, personal relationships or finance. It is also apparent that he 
was referring to the sensibilities of a reasonable person placed in the situation of the 
subject of the disclosure rather than to its recipient.15 
6.15 The ALRC considers that the offensiveness of a disclosure or intrusion may be 
one matter considered by a court in determining whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. However, as proposed further below, ‘offence’ may also be 
used to distinguish serious invasions of privacy from non-serious invasions of privacy. 
6.16 Although there is a separate element of the tort, proposed further below, that 
explicitly confines the tort to ‘serious’ invasions of privacy, the ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ test should also help ensure that non-serious privacy interests 
are not actionable under the tort. 
Considerations 
Proposal 6–2 The new Act should provide that, in determining whether a 
person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in all of the circumstances, the court may consider, among other 
things: 
(a) the nature of the private information, including whether it relates to 
intimate or family matters, health or medical matters, or financial matters; 
(b) the means used to obtain the private information or to intrude upon 
seclusion, including the use of any device or technology; 
(c) the place where the intrusion occurred; 
(d) the purpose of the misuse, disclosure or intrusion; 
(e) how the private information was held or communicated, such as in private 
correspondence or a personal diary; 
(f) whether and to what extent the private information was already in the 
public domain; 
                                                        
13  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [22]. 
14  Ibid [135]. 
15  Ibid [136]. 
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(g) the relevant attributes of the plaintiff, including the plaintiff’s age and 
occupation; 
(h) whether the plaintiff consented to the conduct of the defendant; and 
(i) the extent to which the plaintiff had manifested a desire not to have his or 
her privacy invaded. 
6.17 The ALRC proposes that this non-exhaustive list of considerations should be set 
out in the Act. It is designed to assist rather than confine the court, when the court 
assesses whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Not all matters 
can be listed, but the ALRC has listed some of the more common or important matters. 
Submissions on what matters should be listed are welcome.
16
 
6.18 The NSWLRC recommended the inclusion of a comparable list of matters that 
would help a court determine whether a person’s privacy has been invaded.
17
 
6.19 In Murray v Big Pictures, which concerned photographs taken of a child in the 
street for commercial publication, the UK Court of Appeal set out a non-exhaustive list 
of matters a court should consider when determining whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy: 
They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the 
claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of 
the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, 
the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purpose for which 
the information came into the hands of the publisher.18 
6.20 Other matters will be relevant in other cases, particularly in cases concerning 
intrusion upon seclusion. Wacks has suggested that, in an action for intrusion upon 
seclusion, a court should take into account the following factors when determining 
whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
(a)  the place where the intrusion occurred (for example, whether the claimant is at 
home, in office premises or in a public place, and whether or not the place is 
open to public view from a place accessible to the public, or whether or not the 
conversation is audible to passers-by); 
(b)   the object and occasion of the intrusion (for example, whether it interferes with 
the intimate or private life of the claimant); and 
                                                        
16  D Butler, Submission 10: Professor Butler submitted a list of matters that should be considered. Many of 
these matters are included in the list proposed by the ALRC, but others include ‘[i]f a sexual liaison is 
involved, the intimacy of the sexual relationship’; ‘[w]hether there is a risk of serious injury to the 
plaintiff if there is disclosure’; ‘[w]hether the information is contained in a public record which is part of 
the public consciousness’; and ‘[a]ny other circumstances’. 
17  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a). 
18  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. 
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(c)   the means of intrusion employed and the nature of any device used (for 
example, whether the intrusion is effected by means of a high-technology sense-
enhancing device, or by mere observation or natural hearing).19 
Nature of the information 
6.21 The nature of the information will often suggest whether or not it is private. 
Information concerning the plaintiff’s intimate or family matters, health or medical 
matters, and financial matters are all likely to be private. 
6.22 Gleeson CJ said in Lenah that certain kinds of information about a person may 
be easy to identify as private, ‘such as information relating to health, personal 
relationships, or finances’.
20
 
6.23 ‘The nature of the subject matter’ was included in a list of matters the NSWLRC 
recommended should be considered in determining whether there has been an invasion 
of privacy.
21
 
6.24 The definition of sensitive information in the Privacy Act may also be of 
assistance to the courts. ‘Sensitive information’ is defined to mean: 
(a)  information or an opinion about an individual’s: 
  i)  racial or ethnic origin; or 
  ii)  political opinions; or 
 iii)  membership of a political association; or 
  iv)  religious beliefs or affiliations; or 
  v)  philosophical beliefs; or 
  vi)  membership of a professional or trade association; or 
 vii)  membership of a trade union; or 
 viii)  sexual preferences or practices; or 
  ix)      criminal record; 
that is also personal information; or 
(b)  health information about an individual; or 
(c)  genetic information about an individual that is not otherwise health information. 
(d)   biometric information that is to be used for the purpose of automated biometric 
verification or biometric identification; or 
(e)   biometric templates.22 
                                                        
19  Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2013) Appendix, Draft Bill, cl 
2(2). 
20  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
21  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a)(i). 
22  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6. 
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6.25 In the UK, it has been said, the nature of the information itself ‘is plainly of 
considerable if not prime importance. It may even be decisive in the question of 
whether the claimant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of it’.
23
 
6.26 Intimate matters will often be sexual matters, widely considered to be private. 
‘There are numerous general statements from English courts to the effect that sexual 
behaviour is an aspect of private life.’
24
 
6.27 However, intimate and family matters can extend beyond sexual matters. Butler 
submitted that people are ‘entitled to expect privacy for anything non-criminal taking 
place in the home environment, including any conversations or disagreements 
occurring therein’.
25
 Butler also notes that, ‘[e]ven where the plaintiff has courted 
publicity, it would normally be expected that his or her family would nevertheless be 
entitled to their privacy, especially when there are children of a vulnerable age who are 
involved’.
26
 
6.28 Health, medical and financial information is also widely recognised as private.
27
 
Means used 
6.29 The means used to obtain private information or to intrude upon seclusion will 
sometimes be relevant to whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
For example, the fact that the defendant hacked into the plaintiff’s personal computer 
to take personal information, or used a long distance camera lens to peer into the 
plaintiff’s home, may both suggest the plaintiff’s privacy has been invaded (regardless 
of what personal information or photograph is taken). Butler submitted that ‘[t]he fact 
that the information could only be obtained through surreptitious means should 
normally be an indication that in the circumstances there was a high expectation of 
privacy’.
28
 
6.30 Similarly, it may not be reasonable to expect privacy when standing naked at 
one’s front door, in full view of the street. It may however be reasonable to expect 
privacy in one’s bathroom
29
 even if a long distance camera lens could, in theory, take a 
photo through an open window. 
                                                        
23  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [5.28] 
(citation omitted). 
24 Ibid [5.40]. A distinction is sometimes made between the details of a person’s sexual life, and the mere 
fact of a sexual relationship or sexual orientation, with the latter being sometimes considered less private 
than the former. 
25  D Butler, Submission 10, citing McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) (21 December 2005) [137]; 
Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] NIQB 106 [32], [43]; Green Corns Ltd v Claverley Group Ltd 
[2005] EWHC 958, [53]. 
26  D Butler, Submission 10. 
27  Personal information taken from medical records, reports, or interviews are also generally considered 
private in English courts: Warby et al, above n 23, [5.35]. 
28  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler’s submission cited Shelley Films v R Features [1994] EMLR 134; 
Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 1. 
29  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012). 
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Place of intrusion 
6.31 The physical place in which a person’s seclusion is intruded upon may have a 
bearing on whether they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
circumstances. 
6.32 A person will have a greater expectation of privacy in the home than in a public 
place. More privacy may be expected in a restaurant than when on the street. Privacy 
may of course be expected in public places in some circumstances,
30
 but a person 
would generally have a lower expectation of privacy when in public. 
Purpose of intrusion 
6.33 An intrusion into a person’s seclusion for a particular purpose may invade that 
person’s privacy, while the same intrusion for a different purpose would not. For 
example, a patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy has not been invaded when a 
nurse enters the patient’s hospital room to take his or her temperature, but may be 
invaded by a journalist entering the room to take photos of the patient for publication in 
a newspaper. 
6.34 In Murray v Big Pictures, the UK Court of Appeal included, in a list of matters a 
court should consider when determining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, ‘the nature and purpose of the intrusion’ and ‘the circumstances 
in which and the purpose for which the information came into the hands of the 
publisher’.
31
 In that case, the court held that pictures had been 
taken deliberately, in secret and with a view to their subsequent publication. They 
were taken for the purpose of publication for profit, no doubt in the knowledge that 
the parents would have objected to them.32 
6.35 Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy and the Media states, concerning 
the UK law, that this aspect of the law is ‘relatively undeveloped’ and it may be ‘open 
to debate how the “purpose of the intrusion” is to be determined (including whether the 
“purpose” is objective or subjective), and what weight should be accorded to what 
purposes’.
33
 
How information was held or communicated 
6.36 This matter relates to the form in which information is held, stored or 
communicated. Information held in some forms—such as a personal diary—may more 
clearly suggest that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
information than to the same information held in another form. 
                                                        
30  It is ‘not possible to draw a rigid line between what is private and that which is capable of being 
witnessed in a public place by other persons’: D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cited Andrews v Television 
New Zealand Ltd [2009] 1 NZLR 220. 
31  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. 
32  Ibid [50], quoted in Warby et al, above n 23, [5.124]. 
33  Warby et al, above n 23, [5.123]. 
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6.37 The authors of Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy and the Media 
have written that in some cases, ‘the principal focus of the court has been on the 
repository of the information as one likely to contain confidential or private 
information’: 
Personal diaries, private correspondence, together with similarly private written 
communications, and conversations on the telephone have all been recognized as 
likely repositories of such information. More recently it has been held that 
information stored on a personal computer is prima facie confidential.34 
6.38 New digital technologies will raise other questions. Many emails are treated like 
private correspondence, but not all information sent by email will be private in nature. 
6.39 That a password or some other form of personal identification is required to gain 
access to a digital location containing personal information should, in the ALRC’s 
view, strongly suggests the information is likely to be subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
6.40 Similar reasoning may apply to intrusions upon seclusion. A locked solid door 
suggests that those in the room behind the door expect complete privacy, but a glass 
door involves different expectations. 
Public domain 
6.41 Whether and to what extent the information was in the public domain should be 
considered when determining if the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. In 
the context of confidential information, the public domain has been said to mean ‘no 
more than that the information in question is so generally accessible that, in all the 
circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential’.
35
 It will be seen from this 
definition that there may be no clear line between what is in the public domain and 
what is not. 
6.42 Private information differs from confidential information in that the former is 
often private because of its nature, whereas the latter is often confidential only because 
of the obligation under which it was imparted. Private information will not 
automatically cease to be private once it is in the public domain. A person’s medical 
records, for example, do not cease to be private when someone wrongly publishes them 
on a website. Not only will the original publication to the internet be an invasion of 
privacy, but other subsequent uses of the records may also, in some cases, amount to an 
invasion of privacy. Eady J said in McKennitt v Ash: 
there are grounds for supposing that the protection of the law will not be withdrawn 
unless and until it is clear that a stage has been reached where there is no longer 
anything left to be protected. For example, it does not necessarily follow that because 
personal information has been revealed impermissibly to one set of newspapers, or to 
readers within one jurisdiction, that there can be no further intrusion upon a 
claimant’s privacy by further revelations. Fresh revelations to different groups of 
                                                        
34  Ibid [5.80] (citations omitted). 
35  Lord Goff in Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109, 282. Compare 
Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd 2007 3 WLR 222. 
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people can still cause distress and damage to an individual’s emotional or mental 
well-being.36 
6.43 However, an expectation of privacy will usually decrease, the more widely a 
piece of information has been published by someone. 
Attributes of the plaintiff 
6.44 Some attributes of a plaintiff, such as age, may affect whether the person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. A young person may have an expectation of privacy 
in some circumstances where an older person does not. Butler submitted that where 
‘the plaintiff is a child of vulnerable age there would normally be a high expectation 
that he or she is entitled to a measure of privacy’.
37
 
6.45 The occupation of the plaintiff may also be relevant, particularly if the plaintiff 
is a ‘public figure’. Persons in some occupations necessarily or traditionally invite or 
receive considerable attention from the public. A professional sportsperson or a 
politician, for example, cannot reasonably expect the same level of privacy as other 
members of the public, although they can reasonably expect some privacy. 
6.46 ‘The extent to which the individual has a public profile’ was included in a list of 
matters the NSWLRC recommended should be considered in determining whether 
there has been an invasion of privacy.
38
 People who are reluctantly or involuntarily put 
in the public spotlight, as for example, the victim of a crime or the family of a victim of 
crime, are a different category to those who seek the limelight.
39
 
6.47 The NSWLRC also included in this list the ‘extent to which the individual is or 
was in a position of vulnerability’.
40
 Being in a position of vulnerability may not 
always be an attribute of the plaintiff, but the ALRC agrees that vulnerability may not 
only make an invasion of privacy more offensive and harmful, but it will sometimes 
suggest information is private, or that a person should not be intruded upon. A patient 
in a hospital would seem to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, for instance.
41
 
6.48 The culture and background of a plaintiff may also be relevant to whether he or 
she has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Some information may be considered to be 
more private in some cultures than in others. These expectations may be well-known in 
the community.  
6.49 For example, the cultural expectations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples and other cultural or ethnic groups may also be relevant in some cases to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. The Arts Law Centre of 
                                                        
36  McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) (21 December 2005) [81]. 
37  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cites Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481; Hosking v Runting 
(2005) 1 NZLR 1, [147]; Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] NIQB 106, [44]. 
38  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a)(iv). 
39  In re S [2003] 3 WLR 1425; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [142]. 
40  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill cl 74(3)(a)(v). 
41  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62.  
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Australia stressed the importance of considering the ‘confidential or culturally sensitive 
nature of cultural knowledge, stories, images of indigenous Australians’.
42
 
Consent 
6.50 A plaintiff cannot generally expect privacy where they have freely consented to 
the conduct that compromises their privacy.
43
 Whether or not a plaintiff consented to 
particular conduct is a matter of fact. Consent may be express or implied. Consent may 
also be revoked expressly or impliedly. 
6.51 Consent is a defence to many torts, including battery and trespass to land, but for 
a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, the ALRC considers that consent 
should be one of a number of factors relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
44
 
6.52 There are degrees of consent. A person may consent to disclosing personal 
information to a small group of people, but not to a large group.
45
 Consent may vary in 
quality and extent: some have questioned whether clicking ‘I agree’ to a 40,000-word 
term of a contract is, in fact, consent and there are calls for the whole issue of consent 
in the context of online services to be reviewed.
46
 This is part of a much larger debate 
which is best discussed in the overall context of consumer protection. 
6.53  For the purposes of the new tort, the ALRC considers that the extent and quality 
of any consent given by the plaintiff will be relevant matters to consider when 
determining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
circumstances. 
Manifested desire for privacy 
6.54 The extent to which the plaintiff had manifested a desire not to have his or her 
privacy invaded should also be a relevant consideration. The author of a document 
marked ‘private’ obviously thereby manifests some desire for the document to be 
treated as private. Similarly, a person who asks to sit in a private room of a restaurant 
may more reasonably expect privacy than a person who does not. 
                                                        
42  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
43  ‘There is one basic principle which can be seen to underlie all the variously named versions of the 
defence of consent: it is “good sense and justice [that] one who has … assented to an act being done 
towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong’: Warby et al, above n 23, [12.08], 
quoting Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325, 360 (Lord Herschell). 
44  In battery, there is ‘some debate as to whether the absence of consent is an element of the cause of action 
that must be established by [the plaintiff], or whether the presence of consent is a defence that must be 
pleaded and proved by the defendant. The view taken in this chapter is that it is a defence …’: K Barker 
et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2012) 36. 
45  In the UK, ‘In a publication case, there must be consent to the extent of publication which occurs’: Warby 
et al, above n 23, [12.15]. ‘Media publication will be to a wide audience and the defendant will have to 
show that the claimant consented to the extent of the publication’: Ibid [12.07]. 
46  Daniel J Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
1880.  
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6.55 Conversely, a court might ask whether the plaintiff had ‘courted publicity on the 
relevant occasion’.
47
 A person who has courted publicity cannot expect the same level 
of privacy as people who have not. 
6.56 However, care must be taken here, because it does not follow that such persons 
forego any right to privacy, just as a person does not, by manifesting a desire for 
privacy, automatically become entitled to it. 
                                                        
47  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cites Hickey v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2010] IEHC 349. 
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Summary 
7.1 This chapter is concerned with the fourth element of the new tort—the threshold 
of seriousness. Two distinct but related questions are considered. The first question is 
whether the new tort should only be actionable where the invasion of privacy was 
serious, and if so, how this threshold of seriousness should be set out in the new Act. 
7.2 The ALRC proposes that there should be a threshold, and that it be set in the 
new Act using the word ‘serious’.  
7.3 The new Act should also provide that, in determining whether an invasion of 
privacy is ‘serious’, a court may consider whether the invasion was likely to be highly 
offensive, distressing or harmful to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of 
the plaintiff. These factors would provide a greater degree of certainty about the 
meaning of ‘serious’, while also establishing the ways in which a serious invasion of 
privacy may affect the plaintiff. 
7.4 The second question is whether the plaintiff should be required to prove that he 
or she suffered ‘actual damage’ due to the defendant’s act or conduct. The ALRC 
proposes that the plaintiff should not be required to prove ‘actual damage’; that is, the 
tort should be actionable per se.  
7.5 This second proposal recognises that in most cases, a serious invasion of privacy 
will cause emotional distress, rather than a type of harm traditionally treated by the law 
as ‘actual damage’.   Making the tort actionable per se, like an action in trespass, will 
enable the plaintiff to be compensated for emotional distress caused by the defendant’s 
intentional or reckless conduct. 
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Seriousness 
Proposal 7–1 Fourth element of action: The new Act should provide that 
the new cause of action is only available where the court considers that the 
invasion of privacy was ‘serious’. The new Act should also provide that in 
determining whether the invasion of privacy was serious, a court may consider, 
among other things, whether the invasion of privacy was likely to be highly 
offensive, distressing or harmful to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the 
position of the plaintiff. 
The need for a threshold 
7.6 Some invasions of privacy should not be actionable because they are not 
sufficiently serious. The ALRC proposes that the new Act provide for a threshold test 
of seriousness that would ensure that trivial and other non-serious breaches of privacy 
are not actionable. The threshold the ALRC proposes is that the defendant’s conduct is 
‘serious’, having regard to whether it would be likely to be highly offensive, distressing 
or harmful to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. 
7.7 Some threshold is arguably required by the ALRC’s Terms of Reference, which 
ask the ALRC to design a cause of action for serious—not all—invasions of privacy. 
7.8 Many privacy advocates argue that there should not be an additional threshold, 
and that invasions of privacy should be actionable whether or not the invasion is 
serious. If a person has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ then, subject to public 
interest matters, some argue that the person should have an action.
1
 
7.9 The NSWLRC considered that there should be no additional threshold beyond 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The nature and offensiveness of the relevant 
conduct were instead matters to be taken into account when determining whether an 
actionable invasion of privacy had occurred.
2
 There is also no threshold for seriousness 
in the statutes of the four Canadian provinces which have a statutory cause of action for 
invasions of privacy.
3
 
7.10 However, the ALRC considers that a threshold is a useful way to prevent people 
from bringing actions for non-serious invasions of privacy. The risk of non-serious 
actions or a proliferation of claims was raised by a number of stakeholders.
4
 It is also 
the ALRC’s view that a threshold would avoid an undue imposition on competing 
interests such as freedom of speech. 
                                                        
1  Eg N Witzleb, Submission 29; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; 
Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc., Submission 19; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; P 
Wragg, Submission 4.  
2  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) [23]–[33]. 
3  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373; Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24; Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22; 
Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba). 
4  Eg  SBS, Submission 59; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; Free TV Australia, Submission 
No 10 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; SBS, Submission No 8 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
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What should the threshold be? 
7.11 If there is a threshold, where should the threshold be set, and how? One option, 
favoured by the ALRC, would be to set the threshold at ‘serious’ invasions of privacy, 
and invite the courts to consider a number of matters when determining whether the 
invasion was serious. This is a flexible option, giving the court considerable discretion. 
This option was favoured by the Law Institute of Victoria. 
7.12 To give the courts appropriate discretion, the word ‘serious’ should not be 
defined in the new Act. However, the new Act should provide some guidance on its 
meaning. The word ‘serious’ is not a particularly precise term, and may even be 
interpreted to mean ‘not trivial’. The ALRC considers that the threshold for this cause 
of action should be set higher than ‘not trivial’. 
7.13 Rather than define ‘serious’, the ALRC proposes that the new Act set out a 
number of factors for the court to consider when determining whether the invasion of 
privacy was serious. The court should consider whether the invasion was likely to be 
highly offensive, distressing, or harmful to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the 
position of the accused. 
7.14 The Law Institute of Victoria suggested other factors a court may take into 
account when determining seriousness: the nature of the breach; the consequences of 
the invasion for an individual; and the extent of the invasion in terms of the numbers of 
individuals affected.
5
 The ALRC agrees that these factors might also be relevant, but 
prefers the more general factors proposed above. 
Objective test 
7.15 The test of seriousness proposed here is an objective test. It is not about whether 
the plaintiff considered the invasion of privacy was serious, or about whether the effect 
of the invasion on the plaintiff was in fact serious.
6
 Rather, it is about whether the court 
views the invasion as serious. One way to measure this is to ask whether the invasion 
of privacy was likely to have a serious effect on a person of ordinary sensibilities in the 
position of the plaintiff. 
7.16 In this context, the ALRC suggests that ‘likely’ does not mean ‘probable’, that 
is, more likely than not. Rather, ‘likely’ means ‘a real possibility, a possibility that 
cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm 
in the particular case’.
7
 
7.17 The likely effect of the conduct should also be distinguished from the actual 
effect of the conduct. Whether the cause of action should require proof of damage is a 
related question, discussed separately below. 
                                                        
5  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
6  Later in this chapter, the ALRC proposes that the plaintiff should not be required to prove actual damage. 
7  These are the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead speaking in a different context in Re H and R (Child 
Sexual Abuse) [1996] 1 FLR 80 [69] (Lord Nicholls). This definition was referred to in Venables & Anor 
v News Group News Papers Ltd & Ors [2001] EWHC QB 32 (8 January 2001) (Dame Elizabeth Butler–
Sloss P). Cf Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee (2004) 1 AC 253. 
102 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
Subjective element 
7.18 Although usually the test of seriousness will be an objective one, in some cases, 
the fact that the defendant knew that the particular plaintiff was likely to be highly 
offended, distressed or harmed by the invasion of privacy, will also be a factor to be 
considered. In such circumstances, the invasion may be adjudged to be serious, even if 
a person of ordinary sensibilities might not have been likely to suffer such offence, 
distress or harm. 
7.19 Section 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides: 
(1) A person (the defendant) does not owe a duty of care to another person (the 
plaintiff) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm unless the defendant ought 
to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the circumstances of the 
case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care were not taken. 
(4) This section does not require the court to disregard what the defendant knew or 
ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff. 
7.20 The statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy should contain a 
provision similar to subsection 32(4) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). This 
provision would also be relevant to the question of the reasonable expectation of the 
plaintiff in their particular circumstances. 
In the position of the plaintiff 
7.21 It is important to ask whether the conduct was likely to highly offend, distress or 
harm a person in the position of the plaintiff. In some cases, particular attributes or 
circumstances of the plaintiff will mean that an invasion of their privacy will be more 
offensive, distressing or harmful than it might have been to another person. 
7.22 In discussing whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, Lord 
Hope, in Campbell v MGN, said that 
it is unrealistic to look through the eyes of a reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities at the degree of confidentiality that is to be attached to a therapy for drug 
addiction without relating this objective test to the particular circumstances.8 
7.23 Lord Hope later went on to say that the Court of Appeal erred 
when they were asking themselves whether the disclosure would have offended the 
reasonable man of ordinary susceptibilities. The mind that they examined was the 
mind of the reader...This is wrong. It greatly reduces the level of protection that is 
afforded to the right of privacy. The mind that has to be examined is that, not of the 
reader in general, but of the person who is affected by the publicity. The question is 
what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the 
same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity.9 
                                                        
8  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [97] (Lord Hope). 
9  Ibid [99]. 
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7.24 Although this was said in the context of whether the plaintiff in Campbell had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the ALRC considers that the same reasoning should 
apply to the question of whether the invasion of privacy was serious. The two tests 
overlap, but it is clear that when applying each test, both of which are objective, it is 
important to consider a person in the position of the plaintiff. 
Offence, distress or harm 
7.25 A high likelihood or degree of offence, distress or harm is not the only indicator 
of the seriousness of an invasion of privacy, but it seems to be the most common. 
7.26 The ALRC in 2008 and the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) in 
2010 recommended that a plaintiff be required to show that the act or conduct 
complained of was highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
10
 
The ‘highly offensive’ test was supported by some stakeholders.
11
 A ‘highly offensive’ 
threshold is also favoured in New Zealand.
12
 
7.27 Some stakeholders to this Inquiry submitted that whether the conduct was 
offensive is not the right test, because offence concerns emotional insult or distress, 
whereas the action for invasion of privacy should be concerned with affront to dignity. 
Offence is directed at moral outrage or wounded feeling, but seriousness should be 
measured by the extent of the invasion or the harm done.
13
 
7.28 The ALRC is of the view that a high degree of offence is one factor to consider 
when assessing the seriousness of an invasion of privacy. The level of distress and 
harm likely to be caused by the invasion are also suitable matters to consider.
14
 
7.29 Some invasions of privacy will be ‘serious’, despite the fact that they did not—
and were not likely—to cause serious offence, distress or harm to the plaintiff. The 
dignitary interests of a person may be seriously infringed without the person’s 
knowledge. For example, it may in some circumstances be a serious invasion of 
privacy to take or publish a photo of a person who is in a coma or a state of dementia, 
                                                        
10  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, 
Report No 18 (2010) Recs 25, 26. It is worth noting that the ‘highly offensive’ test is at times 
conceptualised as going to the seriousness of an invasion and, at others, as a test of what may be 
considered private. An example of the latter is Gleeson CJ’s statement in ABC v Lenah Game Meats that 
‘the requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is 
private’: (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42].  
11  SBS, Submission 59; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 15. This threshold was supported by some stakeholders who oppose the introduction of the 
cause of action, perhaps because the threshold is high. 
12  The New Zealand Court of Appeal has said that one of the two fundamental requirements for a successful 
claim for interference with privacy was publicity given to private facts ‘that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person’: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [117]. See also C v 
Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012) [94] (Whata J). 
13  Eg N Witzleb, Submission 29; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
14  Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2003 (UK) 2013 provides that a statement is not defamatory unless its 
publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant. It should be 
noted, however, that liability in defamation is strict. 
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despite the fact that a person in such a state is unlikely to be offended, distressed or 
harmed by the incident or the publication. Such invasions of privacy may be serious, 
even though harm to the plaintiff was unlikely or minimal. 
7.30 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) provides for civil penalties in cases of ‘serious’ or 
‘repeated’ interferences with privacy.
15
 However, the Act does not define ‘serious’; the 
ordinary meaning of the word applies. 
7.31 A seriousness threshold is also recognised in the UK. Toulson and Phipps write 
that unauthorised ‘disclosure or use of information about a person’s private life will be 
a violation of Art 8 only if …it is sufficiently serious to cause substantial offence to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities’.
16
 However, this may be a low bar, intended mainly to 
exclude only limited or trivial disclosures. Lord Neuberger MR in Ambrosiadou v 
Coward, said that 
Just because information relates to a person's family and private life, it will not 
automatically be protected by the courts: for instance, the information may be of 
slight significance, generally expressed, or anodyne in nature. While respect for 
family and private life is of fundamental importance, it seems to me that the courts 
should, in the absence of special facts, generally expect people to adopt a reasonably 
robust and realistic approach to living in the 21st century.17 
7.32 In relation to actionability for defamation, ‘substantially’ has been described by 
Tugendhat J as the lowest threshold of seriousness.
18
 The ALRC proposes that the 
serious threshold be set higher than this. 
Highly, seriously or substantially? 
7.33 The ALRC proposes that an invasion of privacy should generally not be 
considered serious if it were only likely to cause less substantial offence, distress or 
harm. The relevant consideration proposed is whether the invasion of privacy was 
likely to be highly offensive, distressing or harmful. 
7.34 Some stakeholders may argue that this may make the cause of action largely 
unattainable. Possible alternatives include that the invasion ‘caused substantial 
offence’,
19
 or was ‘sufficiently serious to cause substantial offence’
20
 to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities. 
                                                        
15  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 13G. 
16  RG Toulson and CM Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [7–033]. Toulson and Phipps 
write that the other condition is that ‘there is no good and sufficient reason for it—‘good’ meaning a 
reason capable of justifying the interference, and ‘sufficient’ meaning sufficient to outweigh the person’s 
Art 8 rights on a balance of the legitimate competing interests’. 
17  Ambrosadou v Coward (Rev 1) [2011] [2011] EWCA Civ 409 (12 April 2011) [30] (Lord Neuberger 
MR). 
18  Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
19  Liberty Victoria, Submission No 34 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
20  Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper No 72 (2007) 
Prop 5–2. 
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7.35 However, the ALRC considers these alternatives might set the bar too low. Less 
serious invasions of privacy may be morally blameworthy, but the ALRC proposes that 
a higher bar be set for the purpose of imposing liability under the new tort. 
Proof of damage not required 
Proposal 7–2 The plaintiff should not be required to prove actual damage 
to have an action under the new tort. 
7.36 The new tort should not require the plaintiff to prove—as an element of the tort, 
rather than for the purpose of awarding compensation—that he or she suffered actual 
damage. 
7.37 The plaintiff having proved that he or she had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, that the invasion of privacy was intentional or recklessly committed by the 
defendant and that it was serious, and the court having been satisfied that there was no 
countervailing interest justifying the defendant’s conduct, should not then be required 
to prove actual damage. As discussed above, a bar must be set in part to ensure that 
trivial actions are not brought, but this has already been done by the earlier 
requirements. 
7.38 In this respect, the privacy tort would be similar to other analogous intentional 
torts such as trespass to the person and trespass to land. In a sense, the wrong itself is 
the harm. The issue is then what remedy should flow from it. Some stakeholders 
advocated this approach to make the new privacy tort consistent with ‘comparable 
interests such as defamation or trespass to the person’.
21
 Defamation, while sometimes 
described as actionable per se, is however different in that damage to reputation is 
presumed to follow the defamatory publication.
22
 There would be no presumption of 
damage in the new tort. 
7.39 In Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, the authors state 
that because one of the principal aims of the torts of battery, assault and false 
imprisonment is to ‘vindicate the indignity inherent in unwanted touching, threatening, 
and confinement, they are actionable per se. Harm to the plaintiff is assumed.’ The 
authors go on to state that, if 
one of the principal aims of the protection of privacy is the preservation of dignity, 
then consistency with trespass to the person might suggest that breaches of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy should also be actionable per se.23 
                                                        
21  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
22  On trespass, see RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) 40. 
Section 7(2) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) provides that the ‘publication of defamatory matter of 
any kind is actionable without proof of special damage’: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 7(2). Note, 
however, that there is a defence to defamation of triviality. 
23  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [8.48]. 
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7.40 In practice, serious invasions of privacy will usually cause emotional distress to 
the plaintiff. Emotional distress is not generally recognised by the common law as 
‘actual damage’, which rather refers to personal injury, property damage, financial loss, 
or a recognised psychiatric illness. As a number of stakeholders submitted, the damage 
often caused by invasions of privacy—such as distress, humiliation and insult—may be 
intangible and difficult to prove.
24
 PIAC submitted that a person’s ‘dignity is vitally 
important but its intrinsic nature makes it difficult to quantify in monetary terms the 
impact of any damage to it’.
25
 Many stakeholders submitted that the action should not 
require proof of damage.
26
 
7.41 The ALRC agrees that invasions of privacy may often cause ‘only’ emotional 
distress. If proof of actual damage as recognised by the common law were required, 
this would deny redress to some victims of serious invasions of privacy, and 
significantly undermine the value and purpose of introducing the new tort. If the goal 
then is to allow plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress, the issue is how 
best should the law achieve this. 
7.42 One option would be to require proof of damage but define damage for the 
purposes of the action as including emotional distress. This would be consistent with s 
52(1) of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This section provides that the loss or damage 
resulting from an interference with the privacy of an individual, as to which the Privacy 
Commissioner may make a determination of an entitlement to compensation or other 
remedy, includes injury to the complainant’s feelings and humiliation suffered by the 
complainant. 
7.43 However this approach would be inconsistent with both the well-established 
common law definition of actual damage and with the civil liability legislation in most 
states and territories (dealing with negligently inflicted mental harm).
27
 The ALRC 
considers that the preferable approach is to make the new tort actionable per se. The 
threshold of seriousness will bar trivial or minor claims, and it will be rare that a 
plaintiff will suffer no distress from a serious invasion of privacy. In practice, if no 
emotional distress or actual damage has been suffered by a plaintiff, there would only 
be an award of damages if the circumstances of the invasion were such that there was a 
strong need for vindicatory damages. 
                                                        
24  N Witzleb, Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; NSW Council for Civil Liberties, 
Submission No 62 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission No 59 to 
DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
25  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
26  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 
58; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 
51; ABC, Submission 46; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
Submission 44; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; B Arnold, 
Submission 28; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; I Pieper, Submission 6; I Turnbull, Submission 
5. 
27  Eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31. 
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7.44 Some stakeholders also argued that invasions of privacy were ‘abhorrent’ and 
that it was important that the cause of action ‘establish a clear deterrent’.
 28
 Others 
submitted that requiring proof of damage would burden or deter potential litigants.
29
 
7.45 However, a number of stakeholders insisted that damage should need to be 
proved.
30
 If proof of damage is not required, these stakeholders argued, there will be a 
proliferation of claims, many without merit, and this may lead to significant extra costs 
to industry.
31
 For example, the Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association (ASTRA) submitted that not requiring proof of damage may ‘encourage 
serial litigants and dubious proceedings’.
32
 The Arts Law Centre of Australia also 
submitted that if the new tort were actionable per se, the arts and media industries 
would bear much of the cost of ‘determining these potentially unfounded or 
unmeritorious claims’.
33
 However, as set out above, the significant other elements of 
the cause of action should ensure that frivolous and unmeritorious claims are not made 
or successful— the action would only be available for ‘serious’, unjustified, invasions 
of privacy and only where the defendant intended to or recklessly invades the 
plaintiff’s privacy. 
7.46 The ALRC previously recommended that plaintiffs should not be required to 
prove damage.
34
 The ALRC’s proposal is also consistent with Canadian statutory 
causes of action.
35
 It also appears that there is no requirement to prove damage in 
claims for disclosure of personal information under UK law, which is consistent with 
equitable claims for breach of an obligation of confidence. In practice this issue is not 
significant as most, if not all, privacy claims in the UK have been either for an 
injunction to prevent an invasive publication or for damages for emotional distress. 
                                                        
28  B Arnold, Submission 28. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts 
Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Bankers’ Association, 
Submission 27; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; Insurance Council 
of Australia, Submission 15; D Butler, Submission 10. 
31  Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 15; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No 46 to DPM&C Issues 
Paper, 2011 4688; SBS, Submission No 8 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Australian Direct Marketing 
Association, Submission No 57 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
32  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
33  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
34  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–3. 
35  In British Columbia, for example, ‘[i]t is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully 
and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another’: Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 s 1(1). See 
also Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 s 2; Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba) s 2(2); Privacy Act, 
RSNL 1990, c P-22 s 3(1).  
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Summary 
8.1 This chapter considers the fifth element of the new tort. The ALRC proposes 
that in order for a plaintiff to have a cause of action, the court must be satisfied that the 
plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in freedom of 
expression and any broader public interest. 
8.2 This proposal recognises that privacy is not an absolute right, and that other 
interests may, in some cases, outweigh a plaintiff’s interest in privacy. 
8.3 The ALRC also proposes that the new Act should provide guidance on the 
meaning of ‘public interest’, through the inclusion of a list of public interest matters 
including, but not limited to, freedom of expression, freedom of the media, public 
health and safety, and national security. 
8.4 Since the weighing of privacy interests against other interests is an element of 
the cause of action, a separate public interest defence is not required. 
Balancing with freedom of expression and the public interest 
Proposal 8–1 Fifth element of action: The new Act should provide that 
the plaintiff only has a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy where the 
court is satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s 
interest in freedom of expression and any broader public interest. A separate 
public interest defence would therefore not be needed. 
8.5 As set out in Chapter 2, privacy is an important public interest, but of course it is 
not the only public interest. Sometimes, other interests should prevail over a person’s 
interest in privacy. It is particularly important to give proper weight to competing 
public interests, given that Australia does not have a statutory human rights framework 
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or express constitutional protection of freedom of speech. Without a clear process for 
balancing competing interests, the new action might privilege privacy over other 
important interests. 
8.6 Two related categories of interest are likely to compete with the plaintiff’s 
privacy: the defendant’s interest in free expression and the broader public interest.
1
 
8.7 It is widely accepted that the public interest must be considered at some stage in 
an action for breach of privacy. What this public interest is, and how it should be 
considered, is discussed below. However, it is also important to note that people have a 
personal interest in free expression, and that this is not always less important than other 
people’s interest in privacy. Toulson and Phipps wrote: 
Freedom of expression includes the right of people not only to express their own 
views but to talk about their own experiences (regardless of any general public 
interest), provided that it does not involve breaking a trust or confidence.2 
8.8 The interest in free expression is a personal interest, as well as a public interest. 
It may have value independent of any benefit the public might have in hearing the 
speech. For example, a person speaking on television about their experience of being 
raised as an adopted child may breach the privacy of his or her parents. In such a case, 
it is not clear that the privacy interests of the parents necessarily outweigh the interests 
of the child in speaking freely about his or her life.
3
 
8.9 The ALRC proposes that these competing interests be considered as part of a 
balancing exercise, when determining whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. The 
defendant’s interest in freedom of expression and the broader public interest would 
therefore be considered at an early stage in a cause of action. Where the court considers 
that these interests outweigh the plaintiff’s interest in privacy, the cause of action will 
fail.  
8.10 In contrast, having a public interest as a defence would prolong the length of 
time an unmeritorious claim is heard. Some stakeholders noted the advantage of courts 
hearing the public interest issues early in proceedings. The Australian Subscription 
Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) submitted: 
having public interest go towards a defence is likely to prolong the length of time 
during which an unmeritorious claim is heard.4 
8.11 Further, leaving public interest to be dealt with as a defence would give rise to 
the risk that a plaintiff could more easily use the court proceedings to stifle legitimate 
exposure of matters of public concern on the basis that they had a prima facie case of 
invasion of privacy without any consideration of the public interest at that point. 
                                                        
1  ‘An individual’s interest in not having information about his private life published has to be set against 
the freedoms of others, particularly the right to freedom of expression under Art. 10, and the interests of 
the general public’: RG Toulson and CM Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [7–045]. 
2  Ibid [7-047]. 
3  Although of course it will also not necessarily be the case that the freedom of a person to tell his or her 
own story will necessarily outweigh the plaintiff’s privacy interest. See McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73.  
4  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
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8.12 This was the approach recommended by the ALRC in 2008 and is similar to the 
approach recommended by the NSWLRC in 2009.
5
 
8.13 A similar balancing exercise is carried out in the UK, where rights to privacy 
and to freedom of expression, in Arts 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, have been incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
Both must be considered when determining whether a cause of action for misuse of 
private information has been established. In making this determination, two questions 
are asked: 
First, is the information private in the sense that it is in principle protected by 
article 8? If “no”, that is the end of the case. If “yes”, the second question arises: in all 
the circumstances, must the interest of the owner of the private information yield to 
the right of freedom of expression conferred on the publisher by article 10?6 
8.14 Toulson and Phipps wrote that in Re S, Lord Steyn ‘reiterated that neither Art 8 
nor Art 10 as such has priority over the other’: 
When both are engaged, ‘an intense focus on the comparative importance of the 
specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary’. The justifications for 
interfering with each right must be taken into account and an ultimate balancing 
exercise carried out.7 
8.15 The balancing exercise proposed by the ALRC above is also similar to the UK 
approach. However, the ALRC considers that, rather than focus only on freedom of 
expression, a range of public interests should be considered when carrying out this 
balancing exercise. As proposed below, examples of these many public interests should 
be set out in the new Act. No one interest should have automatic priority over the 
privacy interest of the plaintiff. 
Onus of proof 
8.16 A number of stakeholders submitted that a balancing exercise should be carried 
out when determining actionability.
8
 Others said there should instead be a public 
interest defence, considered later in proceedings.
9
 Under the proposal above, with a 
balancing exercise when determining actionability, a plaintiff will have the onus of 
proving that their interest in privacy outweighs any competing public interests that are 
raised. On the other hand, if there were a public interest defence, a defendant would 
have the onus to prove that the defence was made out. 
                                                        
5  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; 
NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 26–29.  
6  McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, [11]. 
7  Toulson and Phipps, above n 1, [7–062], quoting Re S (a child) (2005) 1 AC 593, [17] (Lord Steyn). 
8  Google, Submission 54; Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; ABC, 
Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45. 
9  In favour of a public interest defence: NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Electronic Frontiers 
Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; Australian 
Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; D Butler, Submission 10; 
Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
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8.17 The question of who should bear the onus of proof was often the main reason 
given by stakeholders for either supporting a public interest test in the cause of action, 
or a public interest defence. Many stakeholders said it was more appropriate for the 
defendant to bear the burden of proof, and that therefore there should be a public 
interest defence.
10
 For example, Professor Moira Paterson submitted: 
the plaintiff already has the onus of establishing that he or she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy which was breached in a serious way. The requirement that a 
privacy breach needs to be serious to justify litigation itself acknowledges that there is 
a competing interest in transparency that should always trump where the privacy 
breach is trivial in nature. In those circumstances it is not unreasonable to require the 
defendant to prove that a serious breach was nevertheless in the public interest 
because of the strong public interest in freedom of expression (or some other 
competing interest).11 
8.18 Similarly, Peter Clarke has written that requiring consideration of the public 
interest when determining actionability presupposes that there must always be a public 
interest at stake. He writes that this is not logical and puts the cart before the horse: 
The protection of one’s privacy should be separate and independent of such concerns 
whereas a defence may have regard to the public interest justifying such a breach. The 
burden should be upon the Defendant/Respondent to show there is a public interest in 
the intrusion. The benefit of the Victorian [Law Reform Commission’s] approach is 
that the defence is a matter that can be considered discretely and for the defendant to 
crystallise what public interest is in issue.12 
8.19 The VLRC based its recommendation that public interest should be a defence to 
an invasion of privacy largely upon its assessment that the burden of proving the 
existence of a countervailing public interest should lie with the defendant. The VLRC 
argued that a plaintiff ‘should not have to prove a negative, such as the lack of a 
countervailing public interest’.
13
 
8.20 There is a public interest defence in New Zealand and Canada. New Zealand has 
a defence of ‘legitimate public concern’ to invasions of privacy.
14
 The Court of Appeal 
of New Zealand stated, in Hosking v Runting: 
There should be available in cases of interference with privacy a defence enabling 
publication to be justified by a legitimate public concern in the information. In P v D, 
absence of legitimate public interest was treated as an element of the tort itself. But it 
is more conceptually sound for this to constitute a defence, particularly given the 
parallels with breach of confidence claims, where public interest is an established 
defence. Moreover, it would be for the defendant to provide the evidence of the 
                                                        
10  Eg, Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; 
B Arnold, Submission 28; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
11  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
12  Peter A Clarke, Submission No 69 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011.  
13  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010) 157, Recs 27, 
28. 
14  In relation to the publication of private information, see: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [129]. In 
relation to intrusion upon seclusion, see: C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155 (24 August 2012) [96].  
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concern, which is the appropriate burden of proof if the plaintiff has shown that there 
has been an interference with his or her privacy of the kind we have described.15 
8.21 Where the act of invasion was a publication, the four Canadian provinces that 
have enacted statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy provide a defence where 
the publication was in the public interest.
16
  
8.22 In supporting a public interest defence, the law firm Maurice Blackburn has 
noted that a similar approach has been used for other statutory causes of action in 
Australia. Under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), ‘it is for the defendant to 
show that their conduct should be exempted because it has been done reasonably and in 
good faith for particular specified purposes’; and ‘under the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) the defendant must demonstrate that conduct which would 
otherwise be racial or religious vilification was justified because it was in the public 
interest’.
17
 
8.23 The defendant may be in a better position to provide evidence that the invasion 
of privacy was in the public interest. A newspaper, for example, would seem better 
placed to bring evidence of its own interest in free expression and the public’s interest 
in free speech, than an individual may be to provide evidence that these interests do not 
outweigh the plaintiff’s privacy. 
8.24 However, the ALRC considers that it is preferable to consider the public interest 
when determining actionability, and that the plaintiff should bear the legal onus of 
proof on matters going to actionability. This should better ensure that privacy interests 
are not unduly privileged over other important rights and interests. Privacy is an 
interest that is relative, and the context and circumstances of the conduct are critical 
factors: the balancing at this stage of the action reflects this. As noted above, this 
approach was supported by some stakeholders. For example, Telstra submitted that 
given the seriousness of the cause of action and the potentially chilling effect it may 
have on business and service providers, the onus of proof should be on the plaintiff to 
ensure that their claim is sufficiently serious to outweigh public interest concerns at 
the outset.18 
8.25 Under Proposal 8-1, the plaintiff will have the onus to prove that their privacy 
interest outweighs any competing public interest and the interest of the defendant in 
free speech. This is consistent with the general principle of law that ‘a plaintiff bears 
                                                        
15  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [129]. See also [130]: ‘Furthermore, the scope of privacy protection 
should not exceed such limits on the freedom of expression as is justified in a free and democratic society. 
A defence of legitimate public concern will ensure this. The significant value to be accorded freedom of 
expression requires that the tort of privacy must necessarily be tightly confined. In Douglas v Hello! 
Brooke LJ formulated the matter in the following way (at para [49]): “[A]lthough the right to freedom of 
expression is not in every case the ace of trumps, it is a powerful card to which the courts of this country 
must always pay appropriate respect.”’ 
16  Eg  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373, s 2(3)(a). 
17  Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Submission No 45 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011 (citations omitted). 
18  Telstra, Submission 45. See also, SBS, Submission 59; Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association, Submission 47. 
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the burden of proving the ingredients of the cause of action’, while the ‘defendant bears 
the burden of proving the requisite elements of the defence’.
19
 
8.26 The ALRC agrees with the NSWLRC when it stated in its report: 
Legal principle requires that plaintiffs bear the onus of establishing their case. It is 
appropriate, in our view, that, as part of establishing an invasion of privacy, plaintiffs 
should demonstrate at the outset that their claim to privacy is not outweighed by a 
competing public interest. Quite simply, privacy only needs protection if it is not 
outweighed, in the circumstances, by such a competing interest.20 
8.27 However, the importance of the question of who bears the onus of proof should 
not be overstated and Witzleb has suggested that the question of who bears the onus of 
proof may not have significant practical implications. Where public interest 
considerations are considered as part of establishing the cause of action, Witzleb 
considers that this 
will, in many cases, prompt the plaintiff to provide evidence that is relevant to the 
public interest considerations in the balancing process. In practice, however, the 
defendant will often be in a better position, and have the greater interest, to adduce the 
evidence necessary for establishing the weight of the public interest in his or her 
conduct.21 
8.28 In practice, facts as pleaded by the plaintiff may raise no public interest issues.  
It is not the case that the plaintiff would have to separately and exhaustively plead and 
prove the non-existence of each and every possible matter of public interest that may 
arise in any case involving privacy. 
8.29 There is also the well-known distinction between the legal onus of proof and the 
evidentiary or strategic onus of proof.
22
 While in general a plaintiff bears the onus of 
proof as to the elements of the cause of action asserted, a strategic or evidentiary onus 
may pass to a defendant to bring forward evidence to rebut any inferences that may be 
drawn from the plaintiff’s case. If it does not do so, the defendant runs the strategic risk 
that the court may choose to draw an inference argued by the plaintiff. 
A discrete exercise 
8.30 The ALRC has proposed a discrete public interest balancing exercise. Another 
option might be to have public interest matters considered when determining whether 
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
23
 
8.31 Public interest matters will no doubt be relevant to the question of whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, the fact that the 
                                                        
19  C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) 355. 
20  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 28. 
21  Normann Witzleb, ‘A Statutory Cause of Action for Privacy? A Critical Appraisal of Three Recent 
Australian Law Reform Proposals’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104, 121–122. 
22  Sappideen and Vines, above n 19, 356; CR Williams, ‘Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation’ (2003) 
25 Sydney Law Review 165. 
23  That the plaintiff must have a reasonable expectation of privacy is another element of the cause of action: 
Proposal 8-1. 
 8. Balancing Privacy with Other Interests 115 
information is about a politician will be relevant to whether there is public interest in 
the information. 
8.32 However, it may sometimes be artificial to consider public interest matters in the 
context of an expectation of privacy. Sometimes, a person’s expectation of privacy 
may seem perfectly reasonable, even though the strength of a competing public 
interest, perhaps unknown to many reasonable people, suggests that the invasion of 
privacy should not be actionable. 
8.33 The NSWLRC argued that the two issues of whether or not a matter is 
legitimately private, and the significance of competing interests 
are not always clearly separable. Thus, a competing public interest may be of such 
force in the circumstances that the case will focus principally on it in reaching a 
conclusion that no reasonable expectation of privacy arises.24 
8.34 Given the importance of considering competing public interests, the ALRC 
considers that there should be a clear and discrete public interest element in the cause 
of action. 
Meaning of public interest 
Proposal 8–2 The new Act should include the following non-exhaustive 
list of public interest matters which a court may consider: 
(a) freedom of expression, including political communication; 
(b) freedom of the media to investigate, and inform and comment on matters 
of public concern and importance; 
(c) the proper administration of government; 
(d) open justice; 
(e) public health and safety; 
(f) national security; 
(g) the prevention and detection of crime and fraud; and 
(h) the economic wellbeing of the country. 
Should public interest be defined? 
8.35 ‘Public interest’ should not be defined, but a list of public interest matters could 
be set out in the new Act. The list would not be exhaustive, but may provide the parties 
and the court with useful guidance, making the cause of action more certain and 
predictable in scope. This may in turn reduce litigation. 
                                                        
24  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 19. 
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8.36 In Hogan v Hinch, French CJ stated that when ‘used in a statute, the term 
[public interest] derives its content from “the subject matter and the scope and 
purpose” of the enactment in which it appears’.
25
 
8.37 In the UK, the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions concluded that there 
should not be a statutory definition of the public interest, as ‘the decision of where the 
public interest lies in a particular case is a matter of judgment, and is best taken by the 
courts in privacy cases’.
26
 
8.38 Including a non-exhaustive list of public interest matters seems more helpful 
than a definition of public interest, which might necessarily have to be overly general 
or overly confined and inflexible.
27
 
8.39 Community expectations of privacy change over time. This is another reason to 
include a non-exhaustive list of public interest matters for a court to consider, rather 
than a definition of public interest. It will allow the meaning of public interest to 
develop in line with changing community attitudes and developments in technology. 
8.40 There is precedent in Australian law and in regulation for providing guidance on 
the meaning of ‘public interest’, including the public interest exemptions in the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).
28
 
8.41 A number of stakeholders expressed support for including a non-exhaustive list 
of factors in the Act.
29
 
8.42 Other stakeholders said that the Act should not provide guidance on the meaning 
of public interest.
30
 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted: 
This is a phrase commonly used in legislation and one with which courts are familiar. 
‘Public interest’ is a broad concept that is flexible enough to respond to the facts and 
circumstances of any particular case. Given that privacy is fact and context specific, it 
is appropriate to keep concepts such as ‘public interest’ broad and flexible.31 
8.43 Alternatively, broad concepts which go to the meaning of public interest could 
go in the objects section or the preamble of the Act. 
                                                        
25  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [31] (citation omitted). 
26 Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012) 19. See also B Arnold, Submission 28. 
27  The Australian Press Council defines public interest as ‘involving a matter capable of affecting the people 
at large so they might be legitimately interested in, or concerned about, what is going on, or what may 
happen to them or to others’: Australian Press Council, General Statement of Principles. 
28  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 11B. 
29  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 
43; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
30  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22.  
31  Ibid. 
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Which public interests should be listed? 
8.44 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which recognises the 
right to respect for private and family life, provides that there should no interference by 
a public authority with the exercise of this right: 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.32 
8.45 The public interests that will perhaps most commonly conflict with a plaintiff’s 
interest in privacy are the public interest in freedom of speech and in a free media.
33
  
8.46 Many who oppose a new cause of action for privacy fear that it will impede 
freedom of speech and the freedom of the media. In the absence of a human rights legal 
framework in Australia, it seems important for the statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy to give express recognition to the public interest in freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press. 
8.47 When balancing an interest in privacy with a public interest in freedom of 
expression, the nature of the expression will be relevant. Not all speech is of equal 
value to the public. Political communication, for example, should be given 
considerable weight in the proposed balancing exercise, particularly considering that 
freedom of political communication is implied in the Australian Constitution.
34
 
8.48 In Campbell, Baroness Hale LJ said that there are ‘undoubtedly different types 
of speech, just as there are different types of private information, some of which are 
more deserving of protection in a democratic society than others’: 
Top of the list is political speech. The free exchange of information and ideas on 
matters relevant to the organisation of the economic, social and political life of the 
country is crucial to any democracy. Without this, it can scarcely be called a 
democracy at all. This includes revealing information about public figures, especially 
those in elective office, which would otherwise be private but is relevant to their 
participation in public life. Intellectual and educational speech and expression are also 
important in a democracy, not least because they enable the development of 
individuals’ potential to play a full part in society and in our democratic life. Artistic 
speech and expression is important for similar reasons, in fostering both individual 
originality and creativity and the free-thinking and dynamic society we so much 
value. No doubt there are other kinds of speech and expression for which similar 
claims can be made.35 
                                                        
32  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 8(2). 
33  For many purposes, these may be the same: ‘the traditional view in English law has been that freedom of 
the press and the freedom of individual writers are substantially the same. … However, this perspective 
may fail to do justice to the complexity of media freedom…’ Eric Barendt et al, Media Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Pearson, 2013) 18–19.  
34  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
35  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [148]. Part of this passage was quoted by SBS, who stressed the 
importance of respecting the public interest in the ‘free exchange of information and ideas’: SBS, 
Submission 59. 
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8.49 Other matters of public interest may also conflict with privacy interests. The 
ALRC has listed some of these in Proposal 8-2. 
8.50 Finally, it should be noted that privacy is also a public interest, not merely a 
personal interest. Although it is not included in the list proposed above which deals 
with countervailing matters of public interest, the ALRC considers that the public 
interest in respecting privacy should be considered in the proposed balancing exercise. 
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Summary 
9.1 This chapter considers a number of details in the legal design of the statutory 
cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, including the appropriate forums to 
hear the cause of action, costs orders, and limitation periods. 
9.2 The ALRC proposes that federal, state and territory courts should have 
jurisdiction to hear an action for serious invasion of privacy. The ALRC also proposes 
that an action under the new tort should generally be brought within one year. This is 
consistent with the one year limitation period prescribed for actions in defamation. It 
will also encourage the proper and timely administration of justice.  
9.3 The chapter then discusses who should have standing to sue for a serious 
invasion of privacy. The ALRC proposes that the plaintiff must be a natural person, 
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rather than a company or other organisation. The ALRC also proposes that the 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy should not survive in favour of 
a plaintiff’s estate or against a defendant’s estate. These proposals reflect the fact that 
privacy is a matter of personal sensibility. 
9.4 There may often be alternatives to bringing an action under the new tort, such as 
making a complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. Failing 
to pursue such alternative dispute resolution processes should not bar a plaintiff from 
bringing an action under the new tort. However, the ALRC proposes that the new Act 
provide that, in determining any remedy, courts may take into account whether or not a 
party took reasonable steps to resolve the dispute without litigation and the outcome of 
any alternative dispute resolution process. 
Forums 
Proposal 9–1 Federal, state and territory courts should have jurisdiction to 
hear an action for serious invasion of privacy under the new Act. 
Question 9–1 If state and territory tribunals should also have jurisdiction, 
which tribunals would be appropriate and why? 
9.5 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to make recommendations 
concerning jurisdiction and access to justice. The ALRC has taken into account a range 
of factors including: the need to minimise confusion or inconsistency in the application 
of legislation across Australian jurisdictions; the range of available remedies; issues of 
costs of proceedings; relevant constitutional issues; and existing courts and tribunals. 
9.6 In considering which forums would be appropriate to hear actions under the new 
tort, a number of considerations are relevant. First, is the importance of access to 
justice for a wide range of litigants in a wide range of circumstances. Both plaintiff and 
defendant interests must be considered. A number of stakeholders expressed concerns 
that litigation through the courts may be so expensive as to discourage plaintiffs who 
may be unable to afford legal representation. For example, PIAC submitted that: 
Accessibility is a key factor in considering which forum is appropriate to determine 
matters under a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. Otherwise, 
there is a risk that this type of action would become the sole preserve of those wealthy 
enough to afford to pay for legal representation and to run the risk of incurring an 
adverse costs order if they are unsuccessful.1 
9.7 Other stakeholders similarly supported low-cost forums.
2
 The ALRC notes the 
importance of actions for serious invasion of privacy not being prohibitively costly to 
the wide range of individuals who might seek redress.
3
 
                                                        
1  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
2  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
3  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
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9.8 Secondly, decision-makers should be able to order appropriate remedies or relief 
to plaintiffs. As noted by a number of stakeholders,
4
 one of the most effective ways to 
limit the harm of an invasion of privacy is to prevent the invasion before it occurs, or to 
limit the effects of the invasion after it has occurred. For these purposes, an injunction 
will often be the appropriate remedy. Injunctive relief, however, is not available from 
all courts. 
9.9 Lower courts and tribunals are often limited in the amount of damages that they 
may award. This also affects whether a particular forum is appropriate to hear an action 
for serious invasion of privacy. 
9.10 Thirdly, an action for the new tort will frequently be brought concurrently with 
other actions. Where an invasion of privacy occurs through the disclosure of private 
information there may, for example, also be an action for breach of confidence or 
defamation. If it involves physical intrusion, there may also be a trespass claim. For 
both the plaintiff and defendant, it is preferable that all the actions arising from a 
particular incident be dealt with in a single forum, rather than new proceedings being 
required for each action. Courts may be better placed to allow multiple actions to be 
heard concurrently. While courts have existing jurisdiction to deal with a wide range of 
actions, providing powers to tribunals or other bodies to hear all other complaints 
related to the privacy matter would require the enactment of additional laws. 
9.11 In light of these considerations, and as detailed further below, the ALRC has 
proposed that power to hear actions for serious invasion of privacy under the new 
federal statute should be vested in the Federal Court, the Federal Circuit Court, and 
state and territory courts. These state and territory courts would include local courts 
and magistrates courts where the claim is within their jurisdiction and the remedy 
sought is within their powers. 
9.12 The ALRC has also asked for feedback on which tribunals, if any, would be 
appropriate forums to hear privacy actions under the new Act. The powers of various 
tribunals to hear these actions, as well as the possible limitations of these tribunals with 
respect to the action under the new Act, are discussed in more detail in the following 
sections. 
Federal courts 
9.13 The power to vest judicial power in the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) and 
the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) arises under s 71 of the Australian 
Constitution. The jurisdictions of the FCA and the FCCA are generally conferred by a 
wide range of federal Acts such as the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the Migration Act 
1958 (Cth), the Australian Consumer Law,
5
 the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act). As 
proposed in Chapter 4, the new tort should be located in a federal statute, and this 
statute could vest power to hear actions in the FCA and the FCCA. 
                                                        
4  National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61; Google, Submission 54; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; B Arnold, Submission 28. 
5  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. 
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9.14 Given that many serious invasions of privacy may involve parties in different 
states or territories, vesting the power to hear privacy actions in courts with jurisdiction 
across the entire country—such as the FCA and the FCCA—may reduce the costs, time 
and burdens for plaintiffs. 
9.15 Both the FCA and the FCCA have, in addition to jurisdiction granted to them by 
legislation, ‘associated jurisdiction’
6
 and ‘accrued jurisdiction’
7
 for matters, not 
otherwise within these courts’ respective jurisdictions, that are related to matters which 
are within their respective jurisdictions. Thus, for example, while no statue confers 
jurisdiction on these courts for breach of contract actions, either court is able to hear a 
claim for breach of contract that is brought alongside, for example, a claim for 
misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. While associated 
and accrued jurisdiction would potentially mean that matters not currently within the 
jurisdiction of the FCA or FCCA could be heard by these courts, if brought alongside a 
privacy action, the ALRC does not consider this to be particularly problematic. Many 
related matters can already be brought before these courts—actions for defamation and 
negligence might be brought alongside an action arising under the Privacy Act, for 
instance.
8
 
9.16 However, the ALRC considers that the FCA and the FCCA should not have 
exclusive jurisdiction
9
 to hear actions under the new Act, as in many cases it would be 
less costly for litigants to use state local courts or district or circuit courts to hear 
proceedings. 
State and territory courts 
9.17 State and territory courts include Supreme Courts, District or County courts, and 
Local or Magistrates Courts. The new Act, as a Commonwealth law, could vest federal 
jurisdiction in state and territory courts to hear the new cause of action.
10
 
9.18 Different powers are available to the different levels of state and territory courts. 
The Supreme Courts of the states and territories have general, unlimited jurisdiction.
11
  
9.19 District and County Courts (and the Magistrates Court of the ACT) generally 
have similar powers to Supreme Courts, including powers to grant injunctions and 
                                                        
6  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32; Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 18. 
7  Stack v Coastal Securities (No 9) (1983) 154 CLR 261. 
8  See, eg, Dale v Veda Advantage Information Services and Solution Limited [2009] FCA 305 (1 April 
2009). 
9  The power to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts is provided to the Commonwealth under 
s 77(ii) of the Constitution. For an example of exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court, see 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 86. 
10  This vesting of jurisdiction is possible under ss 71 and 77(iii) of the Constitution and s 39 of the Judiciary 
Act 1903 (Cth) (in the cases of states), and s 122 of the Constitution (in the case of territories). James 
Crawford and Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law (Oxford University Press, 4th ed) 57. A state or 
territory court will only have the power to exercise federal jurisdiction in line with ss 35 and 122 of the 
Australian Constitution where that jurisdiction power derives from a Commonwealth Act, not a state or 
territory act. 
11  See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 23; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 85(1). 
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equitable remedies.
12
 However, the jurisdiction of District and County Courts is 
typically limited to certain values. For example, the County Court of Victoria may only 
hear claims up to $200,000; the District Courts of Queensland and Western Australia, 
may only hear claims up to $250,000; and the District Court of NSW may only hear 
claims up to $750,000.
13
 
9.20 The powers of Local and Magistrates Courts with respect to civil actions are 
often restricted in certain ways. For example, the Local Court of NSW does not have 
jurisdiction to hear defamation proceedings;
14
 and the Magistrates Court of South 
Australia has powers limited to certain procedural functions, adjourning proceedings, 
certain statutory matter, and ‘minor civil actions’.
15
 Local and Magistrates Courts may 
have equitable jurisdiction and so may be able to hear breach of confidence actions, 
although this jurisdiction may be limited to cases where any relief claimed is an 
amount of money under a certain limit.
16
 Local and Magistrates Courts typically do not 
have the power to grant an injunction. 
9.21 While the jurisdictions of the Local, Magistrates, District and County Courts of 
the states and territories may in some cases have restrictions that limit their 
effectiveness in dealing with some privacy actions, the ALRC does not consider that 
there is any reason to expressly exclude these courts as possible forums for privacy 
actions. There would also be considerable benefit in terms of providing wider access to 
justice in privacy claims if these courts could hear some privacy actions. 
Cost management in courts 
9.22 While proceedings in courts may result in substantial costs for parties, there are 
mechanisms available to minimise these costs. Courts are variously empowered to 
direct parties to mediation, conciliation and arbitration,
17
 which are designed to offer 
cheaper and faster dispute resolution than litigation. Courts also have the power to 
waive fees and, in certain cases, fees are not payable.
18
 While these mechanisms will 
not remove the costs for all litigants, they do temper the costs associated with court 
proceedings in some cases. 
                                                        
12  District Court Act 1973 (NSW) ss 44, 46; District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) ss 68, 69; District 
Court Act 1991 (SA) s 8; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 37, 49; District Court Act 1969 (WA) ss 50, 55; 
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 257, 258. 
13  County Court Act 1958 (Vic) s 3, 37; District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 68; District Court 
Act 1969 (WA) s 50; District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 44. 
14  Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 33. 
15  Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) ss 8, 10, 15. 
16  See, eg, Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) s 6. 
17  See, eg, the following provisions for the power to order mediation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
(Cth) s 53; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 26; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 48(2)(c); Supreme 
Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 50.07. 
18  Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 No 393 (NSW) reg 11. 
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9.23 The ALRC has asked a question in this Discussion Paper concerning possible 
additions to the powers of courts to grant costs orders.
19
 
Tribunals 
9.24 Several states and territories have created tribunals that are able to hear civil 
matters, and which may be suitable forums for hearing privacy actions under the new 
Act. These tribunals include the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT); the 
NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT); the Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (QCAT); the State Administrative Tribunal of Western 
Australia (SAT); and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). These 
tribunals have a range of powers including, in some cases, powers to grant 
injunctions.
20
 
9.25 The usefulness of these tribunals has been noted before—for example, the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended that jurisdiction for privacy actions 
should be vested exclusively in the VCAT: 
VCAT is designed to be more accessible than the courts. It seeks to be a speedy, low-
cost tribunal where legal costs do not outweigh the issues at stake. The experience in 
other jurisdictions demonstrates that any damages awards in cases of this nature are 
likely to be relatively small. The sums of money involved do not justify the level of 
legal costs usually associated with civil litigation in the courts.21 
9.26 However, the power of the federal Parliament to vest federal jurisdiction in state 
courts under s 77(iii) of the Constitution may not extend to vesting jurisdiction in the 
ACAT, NCAT, QCAT, SAT and VCAT,
22
 unless these tribunals are determined to be 
‘courts’, for constitutional purposes.  
9.27 While the ALRC considers that these tribunals may offer a useful forum for 
hearing privacy actions, no specific proposal is made at this stage for granting 
jurisdiction to a tribunal. However, the ALRC is interested in submissions from 
stakeholders on which civil tribunals might be appropriate. 
9.28 Although federal tribunals exist, these federal tribunals do not appear to be 
suitable for hearing privacy actions under the new Act. Federal tribunals are limited to 
administrative jurisdiction. They cannot, under the Constitution, be granted judicial 
powers.
23
 Moreover, the majority of these tribunals have specific areas of focus, which 
do not include privacy—for example, the Australian Competition Tribunal; the 
Copyright Tribunal of Australia; and the Migration and Refugee Review Tribunals. 
                                                        
19  See Question 11–1. 
20  ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 22; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Act 1998 (Vic) s 123; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 90 (interim injunctions only). 
21  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 2010) [7.226]. 
22  Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic); NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 
2013 (NSW); Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld); South Australian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA). 
23  R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
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9.29 The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was suggested as a possible forum 
for privacy actions by some stakeholders.
24
 However, although the AAT has a wide 
range of functions and powers, including functions under the Privacy Act, the functions 
and powers are related to the review of decisions made by administrative bodies. Some 
invasions of privacy may give rise to both a complaint under the Privacy Act and an 
action under the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. However, a 
claim based on the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, by itself, 
would not usually arise out of a decision by an administrative body. The AAT would 
therefore not be an appropriate forum to determine liability, although the existence of a 
civil cause of action would not prevent the plaintiff otherwise challenging a decision by 
an administrative body.  
The role of government regulatory bodies 
9.30 In addition to courts and tribunals, complaints about serious invasions of privacy 
might be brought through administrative bodies. The Australian Information 
Commissioner, in particular, has power to receive complaints from individuals who 
consider that a government agency or private organisation has engaged in conduct 
amounting to an ‘interference with the privacy of an individual’ by breaching the 
APPs.
25
 The Commissioner is empowered to make a determination, including a range 
of declarations, such as a declaration that the respondent pay the complainant an 
amount by way of compensation, or that the respondent take a specified action to 
redress any loss or damage suffered by the complainant.
26
 Similar powers are granted 
to state and territory information privacy commissioners.
 27
 
9.31 While these complaints mechanisms provide a cheaper and potentially faster 
dispute resolution system than courts, the ALRC does not consider that these 
regulatory bodies are appropriate forums to hear complaints under the statutory cause 
of action for serious invasion of privacy. In the absence of significant reform, the 
remits of these administrative bodies are typically restricted to information privacy, 
and to particular entities such as government agencies or large businesses. 
Furthermore, the possible remedies available under these complaints mechanisms are 
generally more limited than those available through a court, and a complainant is 
typically required to seek a court order to enforce a determination arising from a 
complaint. 
9.32 However, administrative dispute resolution processes continue to play a useful 
role in providing cheaper, faster, and otherwise less burdensome avenues for dispute 
resolution.  
                                                        
24  Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
25  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 40. 
26  Ibid s 52(1A). 
27  Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); 
Premier and Cabinet Circular No 12 (SA); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Information 
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic); Information Act (NT). 
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Cause of action limited to natural persons 
Proposal 9–2 The new Act should provide that the new tort be limited to 
natural persons. 
9.33 The ALRC proposes that the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy be limited to natural persons.
28
 This means that corporations, government 
agencies or other organisations
29
 would not have standing to sue for invasions of 
privacy. This was unanimously recommended by previous Australian law reform 
inquiries.
30
 Actions in defamation, which are analogous to privacy actions, are also 
generally limited to living, natural persons.
31
 
9.34 An action in privacy is designed to remedy a personal, dignitary interest. It 
would be incongruous to assign this interest to a corporation or other body. In 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
suggested in obiter that any common law tort of privacy (were one to develop in 
Australian law), should be confined to natural persons as corporations lack the 
‘sensibilities, offence and injury … which provide a staple value for any developing 
law of privacy’.
32
  
Non-survival of the cause of action  
Proposal 9–3 A cause of action for serious invasion of privacy should not 
survive for the benefit of the plaintiff’s estate or against the defendant’s estate. 
9.35 The ALRC proposes that a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy be limited to living persons. The ALRC, VLRC and NSWLRC also previously 
recommended that a cause of action be restricted to living persons.
33
 This proposal 
means that actions cannot survive for the benefit of a deceased person’s estate, whether 
or not proceedings had been commenced before the death of the plaintiff. Actions also 
cannot subsist against the estate of a deceased person, whether or not proceedings had 
commenced before the death of the defendant. 
                                                        
28  Barristers Animal Welfare Panel and Voiceless, Submission 64. 
29  Including elected bodies: Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680 
30  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 2010) Rec 32; ALRC, For 
Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–3(a); NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWRC Draft Bill, cl 74(1). 
31  Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9. Some small businesses (which employ less than 10 employees) and not 
for profit organisations have standing under the Act to sue for defamation. 
32  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [126]. 
33  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008); Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 2010) Rec 32; NSW Law Reform 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 79. 
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9.36 This provision has a similar effect to the provisions of the Uniform Defamation 
Laws.
34
 
Privacy action protects personal interests 
9.37 The new tort is intended to remedy the wrong to a person’s dignitary interests. It 
should therefore be limited to living persons.
35
 This position is in keeping with the 
common law rule of actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action dies with 
the plaintiff or the defendant).
36
  
9.38 Given the personal nature of a privacy action, the ALRC considers that only the 
individual who has suffered loss or damage should be able to sue for relief. An action 
cannot therefore be commenced, or continued, by the legal personal representative of 
the deceased person.  
9.39 The so-called ‘mischief’ to be remedied by a privacy action is the mental harm 
and hurt to feelings suffered by a living person.
37
 PIAC noted that: 
Most existing statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy lapse with the death of 
the person whose privacy has allegedly been invaded. This can be seen as flowing 
from the fact that the right to privacy is generally seen as a personal right. It has also 
been justified on the basis that because the main mischief of an invasion of privacy is 
the mental harm and injured feelings suffered by an individual, only living individuals 
should be allowed to seek relief.38 
9.40 A statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is analogous to an 
action in defamation, which does not survive the death of the person defamed, nor the 
person who published the defamatory matter.
39
 The Law Institute of Victoria made the 
distinction between actions in defamation and actions for breach of confidence, arguing 
that a duty of confidence can persist after death.
40
 However, breach of confidence 
actions protect quasi-proprietorial interests, that is, the plaintiff’s interest in the 
confidential information, which will often be commercial information. By contrast, 
privacy actions protect a personal interest in the plaintiff’s privacy. 
9.41 Several stakeholders, however, support the principle of the survival of the 
action.
41
 However, even where actions survive for the benefit of an estate, the relevant 
legislation generally restricts the damages recoverable to special damages for the 
precisely calculated pecuniary losses suffered as a result of actual damage from injuries 
received, such as medical expenses or loss of earnings before death and does not allow 
damages for pain and suffering and the like.
42
 
                                                        
34  Eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 10.The Tasmanian Act does not include this provision. 
35  Several stakeholder supported this position: Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15; Arts Law 
Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Telstra, Submission 45. 
36  RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [11.53], [28.38]. 
37  Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Civil Liability for Invasion of Privacy, (2004) [29]. 
38  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
39  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 10. 
40  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
41  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
42  Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) s 2. 
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9.42 Some stakeholders submitted that the action could survive in some specific 
circumstances.
43
 For example, PIAC argued that the action should survive the death of 
a plaintiff where ‘important systemic issues are involved’.
44
 By way of example, PIAC 
pointed to anti-discrimination complaints which, in NSW, survive the death of a 
complainant.
45
 PIAC suggested that the value of privacy as a matter of public interest is 
akin to the public value in eliminating discrimination and should thus survive the death 
of a complainant for the good of all society. It could be argued, however, that any 
damages payable to an estate for an invasion of the privacy of a now deceased 
individual are a windfall to the estate and the beneficiaries who may not have been 
harmed in any way by an invasion of privacy. 
Impact on family member’s privacy 
9.43 Given that a privacy action generates a personal right of action, it follows that an 
action should not be designed to remedy any secondary damage others might suffer—
for example, a surviving family member who has suffered distress caused by the 
invasion of the deceased person’s privacy while he or she was alive. However, there 
may be instances where the conduct of a defendant following the death of an individual 
may invade the privacy of surviving relatives or other parties who are closely involved. 
It is important to note that the non-survival of a deceased person’s action does not 
mean that family members or other parties are unable to pursue their own actions for 
serious invasion of privacy where they meet the tests for actionability in their own 
right.
46
 These actions may arise out of conduct indirectly involving a deceased person, 
such as where the privacy of a family member or other relevant party is invaded in a 
private moment of grief or mourning,
47
 or in circumstances where a deceased’s medical 
record is published to disclose a condition affecting surviving relatives.  
9.44 Another example, outlined in PIAC’s submission, is where a so-called tribute or 
dedication page to a deceased person established on a social media site such as 
Facebook reveals personal information about a third party.
48
 These circumstances may 
generate a cause of action for the third party. This position is generally in line with 
defamation law where a family member may only bring an action in respect of a 
defamatory slur against a deceased family member where he or she has been personally 
defamed.
49
 
Representative actions by affected parties 
9.45 The Arts Law Centre of Australia and the Law Institute of Victoria argued that 
an action should survive the death of the person whose privacy is invaded if that person 
identified as being Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, given the specific cultural 
                                                        
43  I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
44  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
45  Anti-Discrimination Act (NT) s 93(1). 
46  SBS, Submission 59; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Australian Subscription Television and 
Radio Association, Submission 47. 
47  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
48  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
49  Krahe v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 536. 
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beliefs of those communities associated with mourning and death.
50
 In these cases, a 
family or other affected party would bring the claim on behalf of the deceased person. 
However, the ALRC considers that the wrong for which action may be brought is 
committed against the individuals whose privacy has been invaded.  
9.46 There is some guidance at law about representative actions brought by affected 
parties. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), for 
example, provides for a court to make orders that apply to a class of ‘affected 
individuals’, even where those individuals are not subject to the proceedings.
51
 In 
consumer class actions or data breaches where plaintiffs can be easily identified, such a 
provision may well be useful. However, in the highly personal context of invasions of 
privacy, identifying relevant or affected parties to a representative action may be 
difficult. 
9.47 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted that remedies could be limited to ‘those 
that protect the deceased’s identity, for example, to allow corrective orders and 
declarations but not damages’.
52
 The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that a court 
may consider the financial circumstances of a deceased defendant when awarding 
remedies against their estate.
53
 However these considerations would require valuation 
of a deceased’s estate, and may lead to lengthy and costly legal disputes over the 
administration and distribution of a defendant’s estate, tying up the estate and leaving 
creditors and beneficiaries waiting many years for distribution. 
9.48 The Law Society of NSW Young Lawyers’ Committee on Communication, 
Entertainment and Technology recommended vesting power to bring actions on behalf 
of a deceased person in the OAIC.
54
 This approach would require significant reform of 
the operation of the Privacy Act including, but not limited to, broadening the powers of 
the OAIC to consider privacy matters beyond information privacy and removing the 
various exemptions to the Act. It may also conflict with the independent and impartial 
role of the OAIC as conciliators of privacy complaints. 
International consistency 
9.49 Limiting the action for statutory invasion of privacy to living persons would, 
generally speaking, bring Australian law into line with international privacy law.
55
 
PIAC noted, however, the exception of French law which allows family members to 
bring civil privacy actions on behalf of a deceased relative.
56
 An example is the 2007 
case of Hachette Filipacchi Associés (Paris-Match) v France.
57
  
                                                        
50  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
51  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12GNB. The OAIC highlighted this 
provision in its submission as a possible model for matters which impacted on the privacy of a large 
group of individuals. 
52  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
53  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
54  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58. 
55  See, eg Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 s 5. 
56  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
57  Hachette Filipacchi Associés (Paris-Match) v France (2009) 49 EHRR 515. 
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Representative and class actions 
9.50 Several stakeholders raised the issue of representative or class actions, arguing 
that the availability of these mechanisms in the new statutory tort would strengthen 
access to justice.
58
 The ALRC supports the principle of access to justice, noting it is a 
Term of Reference for this Inquiry. However, the ALRC has not made a proposal on 
representative or class actions as existing mechanisms would apply to the statutory tort 
in the same way they apply to other civil actions. For instance, Part IVA of the Federal 
Court Act 1976 (Cth) provides a framework for representative proceedings to the 
Federal Court. 
9.51 The Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland) submitted that the ALRC 
should consider ways to accommodate a litigation guardian to conduct legal 
proceedings on behalf of an adult with impaired decision-making capacity.
59
 The 
ALRC also considers that this is an important issue concerning access to justice, but 
that it requires broader consideration than its application just to the proposed new 
statutory tort. The ALRC is currently undertaking an inquiry into equality, capacity and 
disability in Commonwealth laws. That inquiry is considering, among other things, the 
role of litigation guardians in civil proceedings. Its proposals would have relevance and 
application to any new statutory cause of action.
60
 
Limitation period 
Proposal 9–4 A person should not be able to bring an action under the 
new tort after either (a) one year from the date on which the plaintiff became 
aware of the invasion of privacy, or (b) three years from the date on which the 
invasion of privacy occurred, whichever comes earlier. In exceptional 
circumstances the court may extend the limitation period for an appropriate 
period, expiring no later than three years from the date when the invasion 
occurred.  
9.52 The ALRC proposes a primary limitation period of one year from the date a 
plaintiff became aware of the invasion, with the discretion for a court to extend this 
period to up to three years from the date the invasion occurred.
61
 
9.53 Previous law reform inquiries have diverged on this issue. The NSWLRC 
proposed a one year limitation period, in line with actions in defamation.
62
 In contrast, 
                                                        
58  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; B Arnold, Submission 28; Pirate 
Party of Australia, Submission 18. 
59  Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland), Submission 12. 
60  Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws <www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/legal-barriers-
people-disability>. 
61  Several stakeholders supported this proposal: SBS, Submission 59; Australian Subscription Television 
and Radio Association, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 
43; Optus, Submission 41; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
62  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Para. 9.1. 
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the VLRC proposed a three year limitation period, consistent with actions for personal 
injury.
63
 
Ensure fairness and certainty to both parties to a proceeding 
9.54 A one year limitation period will assist in providing fairness to both parties to a 
proceeding and encourage the proper and timely administration of justice. A relatively 
short limitation period will balance the interests of both parties to a proceeding, 
providing adequate time for a plaintiff to appreciate and manage the emotional and 
financial repercussions of a serious invasion of privacy, while also providing certainty 
and a timely opportunity to defend proceedings to defendants. 
9.55 It would be burdensome on defendants if the existence of a longer limitation 
period led to uncertainty and anxiety as to whether they are likely to be sued. Preparing 
a defence case and calculating the likely cost of litigation and possible remedies may 
be more challenging the longer a plaintiff takes to initiate proceedings.  
9.56 Some stakeholders have raised the concern that extending a limitation period 
beyond one year may encourage plaintiffs to delay bringing an action.
64
 The Australian 
Subscription Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) argued that a plaintiff may be 
motivated to delay an action in order to exacerbate the damage caused by the invasion 
with a view to increasing a possible award of damages.
65
 There is a legitimate policy 
rationale in designing law in a way that encourages plaintiffs to act reasonably quickly 
to initiate proceedings. This approach is also in the interests of plaintiffs who should 
seek to reduce the possibility of escalating or exacerbating an invasion of privacy by 
bringing an action as quickly as possible. 
9.57 The ALRC considers a primary one year limitation period best balances the 
interests of plaintiffs (in being afforded sufficient time after discovering a breach to 
investigate and organise their claim) with the interests of defendants (in being able to 
arrange their affairs knowing that claims will not be brought against them after a 
particular period of time).  
Consistency with comparable causes of action 
9.58 This proposal is consistent with the one-year limitation period prescribed for 
actions in defamation.
66
 Consistency with the position in defamation law may avoid the 
risk that plaintiffs will forum-shop between comparable actions. A one year limitation 
period is also consistent with the limitation period for defamation actions in the UK.
67
  
9.59 The rationale for one year limitation periods in defamation is applicable to 
privacy actions. Defamation actions are based on damage to a person’s reputation, a 
                                                        
63  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 2010) Para. 7.248; ALRC, 
For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008).  
64  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; Arts Law Centre of Australia, 
Submission 43. 
65  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
66  See, eg, Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 14B.  
67  Limitation Act 1980 (UK) s 4A. 
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harm which is complete on publication. Arguably, the act of publication should be 
apparent to a litigant in defamation actions as the media has a significant and visible 
presence in contemporary life. The same logic can be applied to privacy actions, as a 
serious invasion of privacy is likely to be more apparent than in other civil causes of 
action. This is particularly compelling given the high threshold for actionability where 
a plaintiff must demonstrate a serious invasion of privacy. It is probable that a serious 
invasion of privacy will be immediately evident to a plaintiff. A short limitation period 
would not therefore hinder a plaintiff’s capacity to commence proceedings. 
9.60 In contrast to actions in defamation, actions in personal injury, which generally 
have a longer limitation period of three years, are based on injury to the individual 
which may take longer to eventuate.  
9.61 This proposal is also consistent with the limitation periods in the Privacy Act 
with respect to when the OAIC can hear complaints.
68
 A complaint of privacy 
interference by an APP entity can be made within 12 months from the date the 
applicant becomes aware of the relevant act or conduct.
69
 The OAIC then has 
discretion as to whether or not to investigate a complaint of privacy interference made 
after this date. The OAIC supports the application of a similar limitation period to a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy.
70
 
9.62 Several stakeholders suggested that a longer time period, closer to the three year 
limitation period for personal injury actions,
71
 would be more appropriate.
72
 These 
stakeholders suggested that an individual whose privacy has been seriously invaded 
may be too distressed to consider legal avenues for redress within a one year period. 
The ALRC considers this to be an important consideration to be taken into account by 
a court when considering whether an extension on the limitation period is reasonable in 
all the circumstances. 
Commencement of limitation period 
9.63 The ALRC considers the limitation period should start when the complainant 
becomes aware of the invasion of privacy.
73
 The OAIC submitted that applicants may 
be unaware they have experienced a serious invasion of privacy for some period after 
the event, due to advances in communication and surveillance technology.
74
 These 
developments in technology mean that plaintiffs may not be immediately aware of the 
disclosure of their private information on the internet, or the use of covert and unlawful 
surveillance devices to monitor their private activities. 
                                                        
68  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 41(1)(c). 
69  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
70  Ibid. 
71  See, eg, Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 18A. 
72  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Civil Liability for 
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73  N Witzleb, Submission 29.  
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9.64 SBS argued that the limitation period should commence from the date of 
disclosure or publication of the private information.
75
 As previously outlined, this is in 
keeping with defamation law. Publication of an individual’s private information in the 
mainstream media will, necessarily, be relatively obvious to a plaintiff. However, the 
ALRC considers it would be unfair to restrict individuals from pursuing a civil claim in 
privacy in circumstances where the invasion is less obvious, but still serious. 
9.65 It is important to consider the interaction of the limitation period with other 
elements of the cause of action. The ALRC proposed that the tort for serious invasion 
of privacy should be actionable per se. Commencing the limitation period from the date 
when the plaintiff became aware of the invasion will not conflict with this element of 
the cause of action as a plaintiff will not have to demonstrate harm or damage suffered 
at a particular time. 
Extension of limitation period 
9.66 The ALRC’s proposal provides a court with the discretion to extend a limitation 
period where there are reasonable circumstances for a plaintiff’s delay in initiating 
proceedings. This proposal provides a degree of flexibility to courts and parties to a 
proceeding, ensuring protection for plaintiffs and allowing for the fair and timely 
resolution of meritorious claims. 
9.67 This proposal is in keeping with the recommendations of the NSWLRC.
76
 It is 
also consistent with defamation law which provides that a court may allow an 
extension of up to three years from the date of publication of the defamatory matter, ‘if 
satisfied that it was not reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have 
commenced an action in relation to the matter complained of within 1 year from the 
date of the publication’.
77
 
9.68 This position is also consistent with the UK’s approach to defamation actions. 
Under the Limitation Act 1980 (UK),
78
 a UK court may extend limitation periods 
where it would be ‘prejudicial’ to a plaintiff and/or to a defendant to restrict the period 
to one year. In making an order for an extension of time, a court must have regard to all 
the circumstances of the case and in particular to the length of the delay and the 
reasons for the delay.
79
 The ALRC considers this a useful model for Australian courts. 
9.69 There is precedent at common law and statute in Australian jurisdictions for 
courts to grant extensions on limitation periods. The factors a court may consider in 
granting an extension include: whether the justice of the case requires that the 
application be granted; whether a fair trial is possible by reason of the time that has 
elapsed since the events giving rise to the cause of action; the length of delay and any 
                                                        
75  SBS, Submission 59. 
76  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [9.1]. 
77  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 56A; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 56A. 
78  Limitation Act 1980 (UK) s 32A. 
79  Ibid s 32A(2). 
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explanation for it are relevant considerations; and whether a respondent is prima facie 
prejudiced by being deprived of the protection of the limitation period.
80
 
Alternative dispute resolution processes 
Proposal 9–5 The new Act should provide that, in determining any 
remedy, the court may take into account:  
(a) whether or not a party took reasonable steps to resolve the dispute 
without litigation; and  
(b)   the outcome of any alternative dispute resolution process. 
9.70 Complaints about serious invasions of privacy may be made to statutory bodies. 
These include, in particular, to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
(the OAIC), the Australian Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA), state 
and territory privacy commissioners and ombudsmen. Various industry bodies also 
provide alternative dispute resolution processes. 
9.71 These alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes offer several advantages 
over judicial proceedings. In particular, they may be cheaper and faster than judicial 
proceedings, and they may be less emotionally burdensome on the parties involved. 
The use of ADR may also reduce the case load of courts, which is desirable for the 
efficient administration of justice. 
9.72 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is enacted, the 
availability of these existing dispute resolution processes should be recognised. Some 
possibilities include requiring a complainant to pursue some other form of dispute 
resolution before commencing judicial proceedings, prohibiting judicial proceedings if 
ADR has been undertaken, or prohibiting ADR if judicial proceedings have been 
undertaken. 
9.73 For reasons set out below, the ALRC has concluded that a complainant should 
not be required to pursue ADR before initiating judicial proceedings. Nor should they 
be barred from initiating judicial proceedings where ADR has previously been pursued. 
The ADR and judicial processes should remain independent, although the fact that an 
individual has pursued one process might be taken into account in another process. 
No requirement to pursue ADR 
9.74 That the use of some form of ADR should be encouraged is widely 
acknowledged. However, stakeholders took different views on whether or not ADR 
prior to judicial proceedings should be mandatory. Several stakeholders supported 
mandatory ADR,
81
 and a number supported only voluntary ADR.
82
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9.75 There would be several difficulties in requiring plaintiffs to pursue ADR before 
initiating judicial proceedings. Although there is a range of ADR options available, the 
various options are often limited to specific types of matters. For instance, the OAIC 
may investigate complaints relating to data protection under the Privacy Act; state and 
territory commissioners and ombudsmen may investigate complaints relating to state 
and territory agencies; and the ACMA may investigate complaints relating to media 
and communications organisations. There is at present no single ADR forum that is 
empowered to deal with all types of complaints that might lead to proceedings under a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. A requirement that potential 
plaintiffs pursue ADR before initiating judicial proceedings may therefore be too 
onerous, requiring them to research a complex and fragmented landscape to determine 
which ADR option would apply in their case. 
9.76 Moreover, barring potential plaintiffs from initiating ADR without first pursuing 
non-judicial proceedings would present a significant restriction on the potential 
plaintiffs’ access to justice. This would be particularly problematic where the 
individual wished to seek an injunction, or where the defendant would be unlikely to 
engage in ADR in good faith—in either case, the plaintiff would be faced with 
additional time and financial costs with little chance of obtaining appropriate redress. 
9.77 Mandatory ADR may also be inappropriate in cases where one party poses a 
serious threat, including a serious psychological or emotional threat, to the other party. 
Several stakeholders argued that this would be a particular problem in many privacy 
cases involving domestic violence.
83
 
9.78 Rather than a general requirement that potential plaintiffs pursue ADR processes 
before initiating judicial proceedings, it is preferable to use existing court powers to 
refer matters to dispute resolution where appropriate (and other existing provisions 
relating to dispute resolution in court rules).
84
 This would allow the courts to take into 
account the urgency of a matter, the relationship between the parties, and any other 
factors relevant to whether such an order should be made. However, possible 
administrative dispute resolution providers, such as the OAIC and the ACMA, may 
require specific powers in order to receive court-referred disputes. As the OAIC noted, 
under the current Privacy Act, 
It would not be appropriate for the OAIC to take on an alternative dispute resolution 
role in the absence of a complaints model being adopted. For example, the OAIC 
suggests it would not be workable for a court to refer matters to the OAIC for 
conciliation. In particular, this is because the OAIC relies to some extent on the 
investigative powers in Part V of the Privacy Act in order to successfully conduct its 
                                                                                                                                             
82  SBS, Submission 59; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Women’s Legal Service Victoria 
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conciliations, and those investigative powers would not be triggered in such 
circumstances.85 
No bar on judicial proceedings after ADR 
9.79 The ALRC has not proposed that a complainant who has received a 
determination from an ADR process should be barred from initiating judicial 
proceedings about the same matter. 
9.80 While it may be undesirable to have individuals ‘double-dipping’ by receiving 
successful outcomes from a non-judicial process as well as judicial proceedings, a 
statutory bar on judicial proceedings after a non-judicial process would present a 
serious limitation on access to justice and discourage the use of non-judicial processes.  
9.81 The risks of a complainant double-dipping would likely be minimal. An 
unsuccessful ADR process would generally be a strong indicator that an action under 
the statutory cause of action would be unsuccessful as well. 
Courts empowered to take account of non-judicial proceedings 
9.82 In order to encourage the use of ADR and to ensure that inappropriate double-
dipping is kept to a minimum, courts should be empowered, when determining any 
remedies under the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, to take into 
account: (i) whether or not parties to proceedings have undertaken ADR in good faith; 
and (ii) the outcome of that non-judicial process, including the award of any monetary 
remedy. 
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Summary 
10.1 The plaintiff’s right to succeed under the new tort will be limited by appropriate 
defences. Defences reflect the need to protect important countervailing interests, 
whether they are interests of a personal or public nature. Defendants will bear the onus 
of proving that their conduct is subject to a defence or exemption. 
10.2 This chapter begins with a defence of lawful authority. This defence will arise 
where, for example, law enforcement agencies rely on their statutory authority to carry 
out an act which would invade a person’s privacy.  
10.3 The ALRC also proposes a defence for conduct that was incidental to the 
exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property where the conduct was 
proportionate, necessary and reasonable.  
10.4 This chapter considers the desirability of a defence of necessity. The ALRC has 
not made a proposal for this defence, instead posing a question to stakeholders. 
10.5 The ALRC proposes a number of defences which are the same as, or analogous 
to, defamation defences: absolute privilege; qualified privilege; publication of public 
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documents; and fair and accurate reporting of public proceedings. These defences 
reflect the need to protect defendants in privacy actions from liability which would 
stifle legitimate reporting, debate and discussion. 
10.6 There are some factors which the ALRC considers would be more appropriately 
considered when the court is determining whether a plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The ALRC has not therefore proposed the following as 
defences: material in the public domain; consent; or public interest. As in the case of 
other intentional torts, contributory negligence will not be a defence.  
10.7 This chapter includes a proposal for a safe harbour exemption for internet 
intermediaries which would exempt internet hosts and platform providers from liability 
provided they meet certain conditions. The ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback 
on the form and content of a safe harbour exemption. 
Lawful authority  
Proposal 10–1 The new Act should provide a defence of lawful authority. 
10.8 The defence of lawful authority provides government agencies, security and 
intelligence organisations, and law enforcement agencies with protection from liability 
for serious invasions of privacy where that conduct was consistent with their statutory 
powers.
1
  
10.9 This defence is consistent with the principle that any licence for public bodies or 
officials to pursue conduct which may infringe the rights or interests of an individual 
must be clearly and unambiguously justified in legislation. In Coco v R a majority of 
the High Court of Australia explained this so-called principle of legality: 
Statutory authority to engage in what otherwise would be tortious conduct must be 
clearly expressed in unmistakeable and unambiguous language...The insistence on 
express authorisation of an abrogation or curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom 
or immunity must be understood as a requirement of some manifestation or indication 
that the legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation 
or curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms and immunities, but also determined 
upon abrogation or curtailment of them.2 
10.10 The analogous defence of statutory authority to intentional torts protects 
individuals and agencies from civil suits where a defendant’s conduct was committed 
in order to prevent and detect crime; in exercise of powers of arrest; and in the 
provision of public utilities and services.
3
 
                                                        
1  A number of stakeholders supported this defence: SBS, Submission 59; NSW Young Lawyers, 
Submission 58; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, 
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2   Coco v The Queen [1994] HCA 15 (13 April 1994) [8]–[9] (Mason CJ, Brennan, Toohey, Gaudron and 
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3  RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (Butterworth Law, 5th ed, 2009) [6.49]. 
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10.11 The NSWLRC noted that this defence is necessary to enable state agencies, such 
as the Australian Federal Police (AFP), to carry out their functions in a manner 
consistent with the protection of public interests such as security and public order.
4
 The 
ALRC recognises that activities that may otherwise amount to an invasion of privacy 
may be justified where the invasion was necessary for law enforcement purposes.
5
 
10.12 The AFP provided examples of legal requirements which may involve the 
authorised procurement of an individual’s private information.
6
 For example, the 
Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth)
7
 requires the AFP to safeguard the interests 
of the Commonwealth, prevent crime and protect persons from injury, death and 
property damage. The AFP stated that 
undertaking these activities will inevitably involve interfering with an individual’s 
privacy on occasions. Where this does occur every effort is made to respect an 
individual’s privacy by ensuring the information that is obtained is properly protected 
and dealt with whilst in the possession of the AFP. Indeed, the various Acts contain 
provisions which set out how the information can be used by law enforcement 
agencies and how it must be protected.8 
10.13 The AFP submitted that their activities are already subject to a range of existing 
internal and independent ‘accountability frameworks’.
9
  
10.14 However, the ALRC considers the statutory cause of action would provide 
personal redress for individuals whose privacy has been invaded, where an agency acts 
outside their lawful authority. 
10.15 The AFP raised the concern that the risk of liability may lead to unmeritorious 
litigation which could divert resources away from important law enforcement and 
security operations.
10
 However, the ALRC considers that the thresholds built into the 
design of the statutory cause of action, including the requirement that the conduct was 
serious, will prevent unmeritorious claims proceeding to trial. 
10.16 The AFP also raised the concern that not exempting law enforcement from 
liability may inhibit the legitimate and lawful activities of law enforcement and 
intelligences agencies, causing agencies to change established and efficient modes of 
operation.
11
 Similarly, the process of having to adduce evidence of intelligence 
gathering methods may disclose the lawful, covert practices of law enforcement and 
intelligence organisations and may reveal the identity of individuals under surveillance 
                                                        
4   NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 43. 
5  Eg, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and mobile phone records may be valuable sources of evidence in 
criminal investigations: The Queen v Bayley [2013] VSC 313 (19 June 2013). 
6  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
7  Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth). 
8   Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
9  Ibid. These frameworks include s 180F of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
(Cth) (TIA Act) which requires the AFP to consider whether any interference with privacy may result 
through the disclosure of information. Similarly, s 46(2)(a) of the TIA Act requires a judge or AAT 
member to consider whether an individual's privacy would be interfered with by interception through the 
use of a warrant. 
10  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
11  Ibid. 
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or investigation. The ALRC considers however, there are strong protections at current 
law to mitigate this risk. These protections include closed court proceedings and other 
measures provided by federal, state and territory court acts.
12
 
Meaning of ‘lawful authority’ 
10.17 The ALRC has not provided guidance on the meaning of ‘lawful authority’, as 
this may well be a drafting issue. However, the ALRC welcomes stakeholder responses 
on the wording of this defence, with consideration to whether the exception should be 
clarified. 
10.18 When considering the meaning of the phrase ‘required or authorised by or under 
law’ in its previous privacy Inquiry, the ALRC recommended that the defence include 
authority under Commonwealth, state and territory acts and delegated legislation; a 
duty of confidentiality under common law or equity; an order of a court or tribunal; and 
documents that are given the force of law by an Act, such as industrial awards’.
13
  
10.19 In this Inquiry, the ALRC considers that ‘lawful’ should give effect to the above 
legislative and non-legislative instruments. ‘Lawful’ should also extend to documents 
which have the ‘force of the law’. The ALRC’s previous Inquiry found that a document 
may have the ‘force of law’ if it is an offence to breach its provisions, or it is possible 
for a penalty lawfully to be imposed if its provisions are breached.
14
 This would 
include warrants obtained by law enforcement pursuant to a relevant act. 
10.20 The term ‘authority’ implies discretion to pursue certain lawful conduct, and 
may apply to a wide range of acts or practices.
15
 
10.21 Dr Normann Witzleb argued that the defence of lawful authority is unnecessary 
as where an authorised person exercises their statutory authority, they are necessarily 
authorised to commit that action.
16
 However the ALRC considers clear legislative 
direction as to the interaction of a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy with the activities of law enforcement agencies will provide certainty to 
parties. 
10.22 The availability of a defence of lawful authority is consistent with previous law 
reform inquiries.
17
  
10.23 In light of new technologies and recent revelations of surveillance and data 
sharing by public agencies, there is a strong community expectation that public 
agencies should not be exempt or immune from liability for serious invasions of 
privacy.  
                                                        
12  Eg, National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
13  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [13.44]. 
14  Ibid [16.22]. 
15  Ibid [16.72]. 
16  Witzleb, Submission 29. 
17  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.194]; NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009); ALRC, For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008). 
 10. Defences and Exemptions 141 
Incidental to lawful rights of defence 
Proposal 10–2 The new Act should provide a defence for conduct 
incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property 
where that conduct was proportionate, necessary and reasonable. 
10.24 This defence protects individuals from liability where a serious invasion of 
privacy was necessary to prevent a threatened or actual harm, and where their response 
to that harm was reasonable.
18
 This defence will arise where the defendant has 
reasonable grounds for apprehending a threat of harm to persons or property. The 
defence will arise in several circumstances: self-defence; defence of another person; 
and defence of property. The requirement that the conduct be proportionate, necessary 
and reasonable is an important qualification. At tort law, the question of whether a 
defendant’s conduct was reasonable is a question of fact.
19
 
10.25 This defence will protect an individual from liability where they act in self-
defence. Civil liability legislation around the country provides an analogous protection 
for self-defence where the conduct to which the person is responding was unlawful and 
where: 
(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if and only if the person considers the 
conduct is necessary:  
 (a)   to defend himself or herself or another person, or  
 (b)  to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of his or her liberty or the 
liberty of another person, or  
 (c)  to protect property from unlawful taking, destruction, damage or 
interference, or  
 (d)  to prevent criminal trespass to any land or premises or to remove a person 
committing any such criminal trespass,  
and the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she perceives 
them.20 
10.26 The defence will also protect individuals from liability where their conduct 
protects a third party from harm particularly where that third party is under the 
individual’s care or responsibility, or where that third party is incapable of exercising 
self-defence. This may involve the protection of children and young people, vulnerable 
groups or animals. The defence of the person of another operates at tort law and has 
been codified in some Australian jurisdictions.
21
 At common law, the defence extends 
                                                        
18  Similar defences were recommended by the VLRC, ALRC and NSWLRC: Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 27b; NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.2]; ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–4. 
19  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.15]. 
20  Eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 52. 
21  Criminal Code (Cth) cl 10.4. 
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to protection of an individual’s household, employer, family members and even, in 
some circumstances, strangers.
22
  
10.27 The defence would also protect individuals from liability where their conduct 
was incidental to the defence of property in situations where another person threatens 
to commit, or does commit, trespass to property. This is analogous to the defence for 
intentional torts where a defendant’s conduct in response to the threat or harm to their 
property is reasonable.
23
 
10.28 The defence that conduct was incidental to the defence of persons or property 
operates in Canadian law. It has been used in Canada to protect defendants from 
liability in the following situations: where an employer used covert surveillance to 
monitor an employee whom the employer reasonably suspected of stealing stock; and 
where an individual intercepted a neighbour’s phone to gain evidence of blackmail.
24
 
10.29 The Insurance Council of Australia proposed a defence that ‘the act or conduct 
was for the purpose of investigating potential fraud or misrepresentation’.
25
 However, 
the ALRC considers that individuals or organisations that pursue such conduct—where 
it is reasonable and proportionate—will already be protected from liability given the 
operation of the public interest balancing test proposed in Chapter 8. In that chapter, 
the ALRC proposes that ‘the prevention and detection of crime and fraud’ be included 
in a list of public interest factors to be considered by a court.
26
  
10.30 Furthermore, in some instances, the power to investigate fraudulent insurance 
claims is authorised by statute. For example, s 116 of the Motor Vehicle Compensation 
Act 1999 (NSW) requires a licensed insurer to ‘take all such steps as may be reasonable 
to deter and prevent the making of fraudulent claims’. 
Reasonable, proportionate and necessary 
10.31 The qualification that conduct be ‘reasonable, proportionate and necessary’ will 
provide a court with the opportunity to balance competing interests.
27
 Privacy is a 
complex concept which necessarily involves analysis of competing interests and 
assessments of proportionality. The qualification that conduct be proportionate, 
necessary and reasonable acknowledges the fact that the circumstances leading to an 
invasion of privacy require careful consideration.  
10.32 This balancing process is consistent with other elements of the cause of action, 
specifically the public interest test. Witzleb argued that requiring a balance of 
competing interests in the defence that conduct was incidental to the defence of person, 
                                                        
22  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.17]. 
23  This defence is codified in some Australian jurisdictions, for example: Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 
274. 
24  These were pursued under the Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia). 
25  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
26  See, Proposal 8-2. 
27  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
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property or interests ‘underlies the cause of action as a whole, in particular in relation 
to countervailing public interests’.
28
 
10.33 The operation of this qualified defence relies on concepts of proportionality and 
reasonableness which are derived from human rights jurisprudence. Their inclusion in 
the new Act would make it more consistent with Australia’s international human rights 
obligations to appropriately balance the protection of privacy with free speech and 
other interests.
29
 The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that proportionality is a 
fundamental test which is necessary to justify any restriction on human rights under the 
ICCPR.
30
 
10.34 Some stakeholders may argue that this qualified defence shifts the burden of 
proof from the question of whether there has been a serious invasion of privacy, to 
whether there has been a justifiable invasion. Any such emphasis would not prevent an 
equitable outcome. A defendant will be required to show that there was at least an 
apprehended threat to their privacy interest and that the invasion of privacy was 
necessary and reasonable for the protection of his or her rights against that threat. 
10.35 The ABC submitted that the qualification of proportionality is ‘appropriate’ and 
consistent with media guidelines including their Editorial Policies and Code of 
Practices.
31
 
Absolute privilege 
Proposal 10–3 The new Act should provide for a defence of absolute 
privilege for publication of private information that is co-extensive with the 
defence of absolute privilege to defamation. 
10.36 The ALRC proposes that the defence of absolute privilege be available as a 
defence to the new tort.
32
 This defence should be stated to be co-extensive with the 
defence of absolute privilege to defamation, so that it includes both statutory and 
common law defences of absolute privilege.
33
  
                                                        
28  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
29  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Opened for Signature 16 December 1966, UNTS 
171 (entered into Force 23 March 1976) Articles 17, 19. 
30  UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 
31  ABC, Submission 46. 
32  The ALRC and the VLRC previously recommended of a defence of privilege to a statutory cause of 
action. Some stakeholders preferred the availability of a broad privilege defence: Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission 66. The NSWLRC recommended the defence of absolute 
privilege, qualified privilege to protect a duty or interest, qualified privilege to protect the fair reporting of 
public proceedings and innocent dissemination. Several stakeholders supported the inclusion of this 
defence: Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Law Institute of Victoria, above n 30; ABC, above 
n 1; Telstra, Submission 45; NSW Young Lawyers, above n 1; D Butler, Submission 10. 
33  Eg Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 27; Des A Butler and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (Thomson 
Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, 2011) 67. See also NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of 
Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.9] and Draft Bill, cl 75. 
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10.37 Absolute privilege protects individuals who reveal personal information about 
another person in the course of public forums such as parliament and proceedings in a 
court or tribunal.
34
 Publication on an occasion of absolute privilege provides a 
defendant with complete protection from liability in defamation. Rigorous debate in 
such proceedings may involve the revelation of personal information. Absolute 
privilege applies to statements made in these particular contexts in order to ‘protect and 
facilitate frank and fearless communication even if it is damaging to reputations 
because it is considered in the public interest to do so’.
35
 
10.38 In Mann v O’Neill a majority of the High Court of Australia stated that absolute 
privilege attaches to statements made in the course of parliamentary proceedings for 
reasons of inherent necessity or, as to judicial proceedings, as an indispensable 
attribute of the judicial process.
36
 This defence operates as a function of Australia’s 
democratic system by facilitating the free and fair exchange of debate in certain 
circumstances which may involve the disclosure of an individual’s private information.  
10.39 The defence is in addition to other forms of privilege such as parliamentary 
privilege which attaches to statements made within the confines of a parliamentary 
chamber to protect members of parliament (MPs) from liability.
37
  
Qualified privilege  
Proposal 10–4 The new Act should provide for a defence of qualified 
privilege to the publication of private information where the defendant published 
matter to a person (the recipient) in circumstances where: 
(a) the defendant had an interest or duty (whether legal, social or moral) to 
provide information on a subject to the recipient; and 
(b) the recipient had a corresponding interest or duty in having information on 
that subject; and 
(c) the matter was published to the recipient in the course of giving to the 
recipient information on that subject. 
The defence of qualified privilege should be defeated if the plaintiff proves that 
the conduct of the defendant was actuated by malice. 
Question 10–1 Should the new Act instead provide that the defence of 
qualified privilege is co-extensive to the defence of qualified privilege to 
defamation at common law? 
                                                        
34  Legislation provides a non-exhaustive list of occasions which attract absolute privilege, for example, 
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 27. Schedule 1 of the uniform defamation laws extends absolute privilege 
to other occasions. 
35   N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
36  Mann v O’Neill [1997] HCA 28 (31 July 1997) 212 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
37  Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16 and parallel state acts. See, Butler and Rodrick, above n 34, 
[3.700]. 
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10.40 The ALRC is particularly interested in comments from stakeholders and legal 
practitioners as to the need for and practicability of a defence of qualified privilege for 
the publication of private information and the content of the defence.  
10.41 This proposal is modelled on the proposal of the NSWLRC.
38
  
10.42 There are three ways in which qualified privilege operates as a defence in 
defamation law. First, there is the defence at common law which operates on occasions 
of qualified privilege.
39
 
The common law protects a defamatory statement made on an occasion where one 
person has a duty or interest to make the statement and the recipient of the statement 
has a corresponding duty or interest to receive it. Communications made on such 
occasions are privileged because their making promotes the welfare of society. But 
the privilege is qualified - hence the name qualified privilege - by the condition that 
the occasion must not be used for some purpose or motive foreign to the duty or 
interest that protects the making of the statement.40 (footnotes omitted) 
10.43 The duty which the common law protects may be a legal, social or moral duty.
41
 
The reciprocity of interest or duty is essential, thus the common law defence tends to 
apply only to publications that are limited in extent to individuals or groups with a 
particular common interest. Matters which the court will consider in deciding whether 
the occasion was one of qualified privilege include ‘the nature of the defamatory 
communication, the status or position of the publisher, the number of recipients and the 
nature of any interest they had in receiving it, and the time, place and manner of, and 
reason for, the publication’.
42
  
10.44 The fact that a matter was one of public interest does not of itself attract 
qualified privilege. The common law defence is therefore of little utility to the media 
because of the usually wide extent of publication, except in very limited circumstances 
such as the publication of a reply to an attack or the correction of previously published 
information. It does however provide important protections for statements made 
without malice on limited occasions. 
10.45 Secondly, there is the defence of qualified privilege under s 30 of the uniform 
defamation laws of 2005 (UDL).
43
 This requires the publication to have been made 
where the recipient of the information had an interest or apparent interest in having 
information; the matter was published to the recipient in the course of giving that 
information to the recipient; and the defendant’s conduct in publishing the matter was 
reasonable in the circumstances. The UDL sets out a number of considerations which 
                                                        
38  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009), [6.11]-[6.12]. 
39  Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510; Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Trad [2012] HCA 44; Atkas v Westpac 
Banking Corporation Ltd [2010] HCA 25. 
40  Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, [62] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
41  Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309, 334. 
42  Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 5 (2004) [54] (McHugh J). 
43  See, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (WA); Defamation 
Act 2006 (NT) 2006; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) 2005; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 2005 
(Tas). 
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the court may take into account when determining whether the conduct of the 
defendant was reasonable, including the extent to which the published matter is in the 
public interest, the seriousness of the matter, and the source of the information.  
10.46 The statutory defence in the UDL is modelled on s 22 of the Defamation Act 
1974 (NSW)
44
 but includes additional factors. Because of, among other things, its 
inclusion of public interest as a relevant consideration, the statutory defence is more 
useful to the media than common law qualified privilege, although it also requires 
proof that the defendant acted reasonably, which may not be a conclusion that courts 
will draw without convincing proof. Like the common law defence, the defence is 
defeated where the publication was actuated by malice. 
10.47 Essentially the value to defendants of the statutory defence over the common 
law was that it could be used to defend publications in the public interest. The ALRC 
considers that a defence in similar terms to s 30 of the UDL is unnecessary in view of 
the balancing of public interest required for actionability of the cause of action. 
10.48 The third type of qualified privilege defence is the extended common law 
defence of qualified privilege which encompasses the implied constitutional freedom 
of communication on government and political matters, as formulated by the High 
Court of Australia in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
45
 The defence is 
defeated where the publication was actuated by malice. Again, because of the public 
interest required for actionability of the cause of action, the ALRC considers that there 
is no need to make special provision for this freedom. An invasion of privacy would 
not be actionable where this would infringe or unduly burden the implied freedom of 
political communication. 
10.49 The proposal is then a statutory formulation only of the defence of qualified 
privilege at common law. The defence may be useful where a publication made under a 
relevant duty or interest is not protected by absolute privilege, by the public interest 
consideration in the cause of action, or by the defence of lawful authority set out above.  
10.50 Examples may include where an individual shares a mutual interest with the 
recipient, such as in a tenancy or building matter involving a common landlord or 
neighbour; where the individual and recipient are co-employees or co-members of an 
association; or where a defendant is subject to a legal duty which necessitates the 
disclosure of private information such as where an individual provides a statement to 
police containing a third party’s private information
46
 or informs a professional body 
about the health or conduct of a member. The NSWLRC gave the example of a person 
providing an employment reference.
47
 Without a defence of qualified privilege, 
individuals would have to rely on broader defences which may provide inadequate 
protection.  
                                                        
44  Butler and Rodrick, above n 33, [3.1000–3.1050]. 
45  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Attorney-General (SA) v 
Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3 (27 February 2013). 
46   Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
47  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.12].  
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10.51 There are a number of similar defences in state and territory surveillance devices 
legislation relating to communications which are reasonably necessary to protect a 
defendant’s interest, to protect the public interest, and are made in the course of legal 
proceedings.
48
 These may act as a guide for legislators. So too may the range of 
defamation defences available at US tort law. These were canvassed in D Butler’s 
submission.
49
 At US law, qualified or conditional privilege is also understood as 
common interest privilege and extends to the protection of an interest of the recipient 
of a defamatory matter, or a third person.
50
 In Indianapolis Horse Patrol, Inc. v. Ward 
(1966), 247 Ind. 519, 524, 217 N.E.2d, the Indiana Supreme Court held that: 
The rule concerning a qualified privilege is that a communication made in good faith 
on any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or 
in reference to which he has a duty either public or private, either legal, moral, or 
social, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, is privileged. 
10.52 Whilst supporting the defence of qualified privilege, SBS qualified this support 
by arguing that concepts of reasonableness and proportionality should affect the 
operation of the defence
51
 and that guiding principles look at the conduct of the 
disclosing party (for example, was it reasonable? was it proportionate?). The ALRC 
has not included these particulars in its proposal, because the defence proposed is 
already limited by such factors.  
Publication of public documents 
Proposal 10–5 The new Act should provide for a defence of publication of 
public documents. 
10.53 The defence should be similar in terms to the defence for publication of public 
documents in the UDL which attaches privilege to the publication of public documents 
including court judgements, and reports and papers tabled in Parliament, and 
Parliamentary voting records, where the copies are fair and accurate.
52
 The ALRC 
considers the meaning of ‘public documents’ in defamation legislation would apply to 
this defence, though the ALRC leaves this task to drafters.  
10.54 Access to public documents supports a transparent and open government and 
judicial system. This proposal is consistent with the ALRC’s Terms of Reference for 
this Inquiry which requires consideration of the effect of a cause of action on the 
necessity of balancing privacy with fundamental values including freedom of 
expression and open justice.  
10.55 The NSWLRC argued that the consideration of public interest in their 
recommended statutory cause of action provided adequate protection for publication of 
                                                        
48  Eg Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 11(2); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 9(2). 
49   D Butler, Submission 10. 
50   American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) §§ 595, 596. 
51   SBS, Submission 59. 
52   Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 28. 
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public documents and fair report of proceedings of public concern.
53
 A number of 
media stakeholders expressed their support for the availability of this defence.
54
 
Fair report of proceedings of public concern 
Proposal 10–6 The new Act should provide for a defence of fair report of 
proceedings of public concern. 
10.56 This proposal provides a defence for individuals who fairly report on public 
proceedings which may reveal private information that could otherwise amount to a 
serious invasion of privacy. This defence will be of particular significance to media 
organisations, court reporters and educational institutions. 
10.57 The provision is modelled on the defence of fair report of proceedings of public 
concern in the UDL.
55
 This statutory defence to defamation applies to the publication 
of defamatory matter contained in documents from public proceedings such as 
proceedings of a Parliamentary body, an international organisation, court or tribunal, 
inquiries including Royal Commissions, meeting of shareholders of a public company, 
and other public proceedings.  
10.58 The ALRC considers that the meaning of ‘fair’ as it has developed at common 
law and in the interpretation of defamation statutes should apply to this proposal. In 
that context, fair refers to summaries of proceedings which intend to honestly convey 
to the reader the impression which the proceedings would have had.
56
 Whether a report 
is fair will be a question of fact for a court. 
Necessity 
Question 10–2 Should the new Act provide for a defence of necessity? 
10.59 The ALRC is not proposing a defence of necessity at this stage in the Inquiry, 
however the ALRC welcomes stakeholder responses to the question raised in this 
section. 
10.60 A defence of necessity would protect individuals from liability where a situation 
of overwhelming urgency justifies a serious invasion of privacy.
57
 This defence will 
arise in situations where a defendant is or feels compelled
58
 to invade an individual’s 
                                                        
53  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.8]. 
54   SBS, Submission 59; D Butler, Submission 10. 
55   Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 29. 
56  Cook v Alexander [1974] 1 QB 279 [288]; Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd [2004] 
HCA 5 (2004); Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 184.  
57   Telstra suggested the availability of an exemption for emergency services: Telstra, Submission 45. T 
Gardner, Submission 3 was in favour of a defence of necessity. 
58  The defence of necessity to intentional torts involves an assessment by the court that the steps taken by an 
individual to prevent imminent danger were reasonable. See, Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.21]. 
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privacy in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of a more serious harm. Situations 
of public emergency where emergency service professionals need to access the private 
information of at-risk or vulnerable persons may give rise to this defence. This 
necessity may arise for example, where an individual has indicated an intention to 
commit suicide and mental health professionals or emergency services require private 
information from another individual. Or where a doctor is called to a school and needs 
to reveal private information about vaccinations or a contagious disease or condition.
59
  
10.61 The defence of necessity is an established defence to intentional torts to protect 
activities and conduct pursued to prevent a greater harm,
60
 including in medical and 
other emergencies, and is recognised in criminal law.
61
 
10.62 This defence differs from qualified privilege as it does not involve a mutual 
interest between two parties which necessitates the disclosure of private information or 
intrusion into someone’s seclusion. Moreover, a defence of necessity provides more 
targeted protection than is offered by the public interest test as arguably public interest 
focuses on invasions carried out in the interests of public or community safety and 
wellbeing rather than that of an individual or smaller group. While there may be some 
overlap in defences, the ALRC does not consider this a problem. 
Safe harbour scheme for internet intermediaries 
Proposal 10–7 The new Act should provide a safe harbour scheme to 
protect internet intermediaries from liability for serious invasions of privacy 
committed by third party users of their service. 
Question 10–3 What conditions should internet intermediaries be required 
to meet in order to rely on this safe harbour scheme? 
10.63 The ALRC proposes the introduction of a safe harbour scheme for internet 
intermediaries,
62
 to protect them from liability for serious invasions of privacy 
committed by persons who use their services,
63
 where the intermediary meets certain 
conditions. Where an intermediary meets these conditions, a plaintiff will only be able 
to pursue the third party, the primary tortfeasor. This defence will not apply to 
invasions of privacy that intermediaries themselves intentionally commit.  
                                                        
59  News Limited, Special Broadcasting Service, Submission No 76 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
60  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.21]. 
61  R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443, [448]. 
62  The broad term ‘internet intermediary’ is commonly used to cover: carriage service providers, such as 
Telstra or Optus; content hosts, such as Google or Yahoo!; and search service and application service 
providers, such as Facebook, Flickr and YouTube: Peter Leonard, ‘Safe Harbors in Choppy Waters-
Building a Sensible Approach to Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Australia’ (2010) 3 Journal of 
International Media and Entertainment Law 221, 226. 
63  A safe harbour exemption was recommended by some stakeholders in response to the DPM&C’s 2011 
Issues Paper: Peter Leonard and Michael Burnett, Submission No 77 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
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10.64 Special defences for internet intermediaries may be necessary for a number of 
reasons. Imposing liability on internet intermediaries for serious invasions of privacy 
by third parties may impose onerous obligations on platforms to review and moderate 
user-generated content. Given the quantity of material generated on these sites, and the 
instantaneous way in which online communications are sent and received, this may be 
oppressive and unreasonable. Facebook submitted that the cost to online businesses of 
reviewing third party content before it appears on their platforms would be 
prohibitive.
64
  
10.65 While software may be used to detect pornography, using software to identify 
content that invades someone’s privacy may be more difficult. Peter Leonard has 
written that ‘such fact-based determinations require contextual analysis and, in many 
instances, additional facts’.
65
 
10.66 Safe harbours are used in various contexts at Australian law including in 
classification and copyright law.
66
 For instance, the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(Cth) provides immunity for online content platforms where the host was not aware of 
the nature of the relevant content.
67
 Online content platforms must show a lack of 
awareness or knowledge of the offending content hosted on their site in order to access 
this provision. 
10.67 There are comparable safe harbours at US and European law.
68
 Section 230 of 
Communications Decency Act 1996 (US) contains a particularly strong and broadly 
applicable
69
 safe harbour scheme: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider...No 
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or 
local law that is inconsistent with this section.70 
10.68 Section 230 has been said to have ‘flourished’ in the United States.  
It has been interpreted quite broadly to apply to any form of Internet intermediary, 
including employers or other companies who are not in the business of providing 
Internet access and even to individuals who post the content of another. And it has 
been uniformly held to create absolute immunity from liability for anyone who is not 
the author of the disputed content, even after they are made aware of the illegality of 
the posted material and even if they fail or refuse to remove it. The result is that 
Internet intermediaries need not worry about the legality of the content others post or 
                                                        
64   Facebook, Submission 65. 
65  Leonard, above n 62, 238. 
66  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AG. 
67   Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) sch 5 cl 91. 
68  Communications Decency Act 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act 1996, 47 U.S.C; EU Directive 
on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC). Articles 14 and 15 of the EU directive protect certain 
‘information society service providers’ from liability for damages or other pecuniary remedy or any 
criminal sanction, though not from injunctive relief, in circumstances where information was disclosed 
with their knowledge or control. 
69  M Lemley, ‘Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors’ (2007) 6 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 101, 102. 
70  Communications Decency Act 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
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send through their system, with one significant exception: section 230 does not apply 
to intellectual property claims.71 
10.69 Electronic Frontiers Australia supported the adoption in Australia of a model 
similar section 230.
72
 
10.70 In the US case of Barnes v Yahoo!,
73
 a woman unsuccessfully sued Yahoo! for 
its failure to remove compromising photographs of her—posted by a third party—from 
a Yahoo! message board which a Yahoo! employee had agreed to remove from its 
website. The US court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Yahoo! could not be 
sued in tort for invasion of privacy
74
 because of the operation of s 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act:
75
 a website cannot be treated as the ‘publisher or 
speaker’ of material posted online by a third party.  
10.71 Arguably, section 230 provides too much protection from liability. As discussed 
below, it may be appropriate to require internet intermediaries to take reasonable steps 
to remove material that invades a person’s privacy, when given notice. This might be a 
condition of relying on a safe harbour scheme.  
10.72 Similarly, the UK’s Defamation Act 2013 provides a defence for ‘Operators of 
websites’.
76
 The defence will be defeated if a claimant proves that: it was not possible 
for the claimant to identify the person who posted the statement; the claimant gave the 
operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement; and the operator failed to 
respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any provision contained in 
regulations. Given the proposal of a safe harbour exemption for internet intermediaries, 
the ALRC has not proposed a defence of innocent dissemination. 
10.73 The defence of innocent dissemination may be considered a type of safe 
harbour.
77
 Innocent dissemination is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter, 
available where a defendant proves that they published the defamatory material merely 
in the capacity of a ‘subordinate distributor’. This means that they neither knew, nor 
ought reasonably to have known, that the matter was defamatory, and that their lack of 
knowledge was not due to any negligence.
78
 As noted above, a number of stakeholders 
submitted that there should be a defence of innocent dissemination to any new 
Australian cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. 
10.74 However, unlike the safe harbour scheme proposed above, a defence of innocent 
dissemination does not impose any additional conditions on the defendant. The ALRC 
considers that such additional conditions may be justified. 
                                                        
71  Lemley, above n 69, 103. 
72  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
73  Barnes v Yahoo!, Inc 570 F3d 1096 (9th Circ 2009). 
74  Paul J Larkin, ‘“Revenge Porn”, State Law and Free Speech’ (2014) 48 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review (forthcoming). 
75  Communications Decency Act 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act 1996, 47 U.S.C. 
76  Defamation Act 2003 (UK) 2013 s 5. 
77  Leonard, above n 62, 235. 
78  Eg Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 32. 
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10.75 A safe harbour scheme may not be necessary if, as the ALRC proposes, the new 
tort is only actionable where the defendant has intentionally or recklessly invaded the 
privacy of the plaintiff. Internet intermediaries may rarely have this requisite fault 
when third parties use their services to invade someone’s privacy.  
10.76 However, argument may be raised as to whether they would be liable in some 
circumstances, for example, perhaps when given notice of a serious invasion of privacy 
that they have the power to prevent. The ALRC proposes the enactment of a safe 
harbour scheme to avoid doubt and provide the necessary certainty to internet 
intermediaries. 
Conditions 
10.77 To rely on a safe harbour defence, internet intermediaries might be required to 
comply with certain conditions. For example, they might be required to do some or all 
of the following:  
 remove, or take reasonable steps to remove, material that invades a person’s 
privacy, when given notice; 
 provide consumer privacy education or awareness functions, such as warnings 
about the risk of posting private information;  
 comply with relevant industry codes and obligations under the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth);  
 provide individuals with a mechanism to remove private content they post on 
online platforms; and  
 provide a privacy complaints system where the intermediary responds in a 
reasonable time to consumer complainants. 
10.78 The ALRC is interested in stakeholder views on what conditions should be 
imposed on internet intermediaries, in order for them to be able to rely on a safe 
harbour defence to serious invasions of privacy.  
Unnecessary defences 
Other defamation defences 
10.79 The ALRC is not proposing that all defences to defamation be replicated in the 
new tort. There are differences in the nature and application of the two causes of action 
which mean that not all defamation defences are appropriate in a privacy context.  
10.80 First, the defence of truth is not relevant to a privacy tort. Most cases involving 
invasions of privacy by disclosure of information are brought to prevent or seek redress 
for disclosure of true information.  
10.81 Secondly, a defence of fair comment as in defamation law
79
 is arguably 
inappropriate for a privacy tort. Public interest will already have been considered as 
                                                        
79  The Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 s 2 includes the defence of fair comment. 
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part of the actionability of the cause of action, so that a defence is unnecessary: the 
right to speak freely that is protected by the defence of fair comment in defamation 
law, both at common law and under the UDL, is limited to matters of public interest. 
Further, the relevant wrong in the invasion of privacy tort is the disclosure of 
information. Outside matters of public interest, a person should not be able to disclose 
private information about another under the guise of making a comment or opinion.
80
 
The VLRC recommended a defence of fair comment but such a defence was not 
recommended by the ALRC previously or by the NSWLRC.
81
 
10.82 Thirdly, the defence of innocent dissemination
82
 is inappropriate, as the statutory 
cause of action is limited to intentional acts. In any event, the ALRC has proposed a 
safe harbour scheme, which may provide a suitable defence for some innocent 
disseminators of material that invades privacy.  
10.83 Lastly, the defence of triviality is unnecessary as the statutory cause of action is 
confined to serious invasions of privacy.
83
 
Material in the public domain  
10.84 Several stakeholders supported the inclusion of a defence that the material was 
already in the public domain.
84
 However the ALRC proposes that consideration of 
whether and to what extent material was in the public domain should be considered by 
a court when determining whether a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
85
 
This factor is therefore discussed more fully in Chapter 6. The ALRC recognises that 
there may be some circumstances where the widespread dissemination of an 
individual’s private information may diminish their reasonable expectation of privacy. 
However a complete defence would be inappropriate as the extent and effect of a prior 
disclosure on an individual’s privacy is variable. Moreover, unlike confidential 
information, private information does not necessarily lose its quality of privacy once it 
has been disclosed. PIAC argued that information may still be private in nature, despite 
the fact that it has been published.
86
 Information such as a person’s criminal record, 
certain health information such as their HIV status, or the fact that they were a victim 
of crime may no longer be of such public interest that publication outweighs the 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Public interest  
10.85 The ALRC has proposed earlier in this Discussion Paper that a plaintiff only has 
a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy where a court is satisfied that the 
plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in freedom of 
                                                        
80  N Witzleb, Submission 29.  
81  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.8]. 
82  Some stakeholders supported the inclusion of a defence of innocent dissemination, eg, Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59. However the necessity of the 
defence flows from the fault element of the cause of action.  
83  SBS, above n 21 supported the availability of the defence of triviality. 
84   Ibid; ABC, Submission 46; D Butler, Submission 10; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
85   N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
86   Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
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expression and any broader public interest.
87
 A defence of public interest is therefore 
unnecessary. Public interest is discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
10.86 Several stakeholders favoured a defence of public interest.
88
 Some stakeholders 
argued that a defence would provide greater accessibility to litigation for plaintiffs as 
defendants will often be in a better position to adduce evidence relevant to the question 
of whether there was a public interest in their conduct.
89
 In the case of a media 
organisation for instance, this may be due to their experience in handling public 
interest similar matters such as submitting FOI requests to government agencies in the 
public interest.  
10.87 Similar or analogous actions also provide for a public interest defence. For 
instance, qualified privilege under the UDL
90
 provides that a court may consider public 
interest matters when assessing whether a defendant behaved reasonably when 
publishing a defamatory matter. 
10.88 However, the ALRC considers that a balancing exercise is a more appropriate 
way to determine whether there is a public interest in the disclosure of the private 
information or the intrusion into an individual’s seclusion. Expressly incorporating 
public interest into the actionability of a statutory cause of action will ensure that 
privacy interests are not unduly privileged over other rights and interests, particularly 
given that Australia does not have express human rights law protection for freedom of 
speech. 
Consent 
10.89 Several stakeholders argued in favour of a defence of consent.
91
 The ALRC 
proposes that whether the plaintiff has consented to the conduct of the defendant 
should be considered as a factor in whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. The inclusion of consent in the test for actionability will provide an 
opportunity for the court to balance the quality and scope of a plaintiff’s consent with 
the defendant’s conduct and interests.  
Contributory negligence 
10.90 The ALRC is not proposing a defence of contributory negligence. A defence of 
contributory negligence would have the effect of defeating a claim for serious invasion 
                                                        
87  Several stakeholders supported this model: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 66; Google, Submission 54; Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, 
Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 
43. 
88  NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of 
Australia, Submission 43; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; Law Institute 
of Victoria, Submission 22; D Butler, Submission 10; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
89  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; D 
Butler, Submission 10. 
90  Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 30. 
91   Google, Submission 54; Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52; ABC, 
Submission 46; Interactive Games and Entertainment Association, Submission 40; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
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of privacy where a plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable care contributed to the invasion 
of their privacy. Further, because contributory negligence is not to be a defence, there 
would also be no basis for arguing that the apportionment provisions in state and 
territory legislation
92
 should apply.  
10.91 A defence of contributory negligence would be inconsistent with the design of 
the cause of action which is limited to intentional conduct. The ALRC considers that 
where a defendant intends to invade another person’s privacy, and cannot rely on one 
of the available defences, that conduct should not be excused or mitigated by any fault 
of the plaintiff. This approach is consistent with the law relating to other intentional 
torts law, such as conversion, battery and assault.
93
 
Other defences and exemptions 
10.92 Several stakeholders expressed the view that no activity or organisation should 
be exempt from the statutory cause of action, arguing that defences would be sufficient 
to protect serious invasions of privacy which are nonetheless warranted.
94
 
10.93 Stakeholders have raised a number of other possible exemptions and defences. 
However, the ALRC considers that many of these are appropriately captured by the 
defences proposed above. SBS favoured an exemption for journalists and media 
organisations, provided the serious invasion of privacy occurs whilst they are engaged 
in journalism.
95
 This would operate in a similar fashion to the journalism exemption in 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  
10.94 Telstra favoured an emergency services exemption.
96
 The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) favoured an exemption for the use of official data for statistical and 
related purposes.
97
 The Australian Bankers’ Association argued that compliance with 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) should be a complete exemption to a statutory cause of 
action for serious invasion of privacy.
98
  
10.95 Voiceless and the Barrister’s Animal Welfare Panel Ltd submitted that there 
should be a defence for activities carried out ‘for the purpose of, or resulted in, the 
procuring of evidence of an iniquity’.
99
 The ALRC considers that such a defence would 
be much too extensive. The defence of lawful authority and the defence for conduct 
incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property, both 
proposed above, are more appropriate. 
                                                        
92  Eg Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) 
Act (NT); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld). 
93  Cf New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496, [104]. 
94  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Law Society of NSW Young 
Lawyers Communications, Entertainment and Technology Committee and Human Rights Committee, 
Submission 58; Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 51; ABC, Submission 46; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; N Witzleb, Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
95   SBS, Submission 59. 
96   Telstra, Submission 45. 
97   Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32. 
98   Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
99  Barristers Animal Welfare Panel and Voiceless, Submission 64. 
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10.96 The Arts Law Centre of Australia
100
 (supported by the National Association for 
the Visual Arts and the Australian Institute of Professional Photography) favoured the 
following exemptions: photography or filming in a public place; documentary film-
making or photography; journalistic or investigative photography, film-making or 
reporting; photography or filming of privately owned land or premises, or people on 
those premises, where the premises are accessible to the public; and photography or 
filming of people on private premises for purposes such as education, journalism, 
artistic expression and documentary. 
 
 
                                                        
100   Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
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Summary 
11.1 The ALRC proposes that courts be granted the discretion to award a range of 
remedies—monetary and non-monetary—to plaintiffs who successfully bring an action 
for serious invasion of privacy. 
11.2 The proposed range of remedies reflects the different objectives, experience and 
circumstances of plaintiffs who may pursue privacy actions. Some plaintiffs may seek 
monetary compensation, some may wish the offending behaviour to cease, some will 
seek to deter similar conduct in the future, while others may seek public vindication of 
their interests. A range of non-monetary remedies may provide a more appropriate 
response for the often immeasurable effects occasioned by invasions of privacy. 
11.3 Most actions for invasion of privacy will concern harm to dignitary interests or 
emotional distress. It is therefore important that courts may award compensatory 
damages, including damages for the plaintiff’s emotional distress, in an action for 
serious invasion of privacy. 
11.4 This chapter begins with the ALRC’s proposal for the courts to be empowered 
to award damages for economic and non-economic loss, including damages for any 
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff. The ALRC proposes that a court may 
consider a range of mitigating and aggravating factors in the assessment of such 
damages, and that a separate award of aggravated damages may not be made. A court 
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should have the discretion to award exemplary damages in exceptional circumstances 
where the court considers that other damages would not be a sufficient deterrent 
against such conduct occurring in the future. The total award of damages available for 
exemplary damages and damages for non-economic loss should be capped at the same 
level as damages for non-economic loss in defamation. This will avoid plaintiffs 
cherry-picking between defamation and privacy. 
11.5 The ALRC also proposes that a court be empowered to award an account of 
profit in circumstances where a defendant has profited from the invasion of privacy. A 
court should be empowered to assess damages by reference to a notional licence fee. 
11.6 The ALRC also proposes that courts be empowered to award non-monetary 
remedies: injunctive relief; an order requiring the defendant to apologise; a correction 
order; an order for the delivery up, destruction or removal of material; and declaratory 
relief. These remedies are not mutually exclusive, and may also be awarded in addition 
to monetary remedies. It will be at the discretion of a court to award appropriate relief 
in all the circumstances of a case. Therefore, a non-monetary order such as injunctive 
or declaratory relief will not necessarily reduce an award of damages. 
Compensatory damages 
Proposal 11–1 The new Act should provide that courts may award 
compensatory damages, including damages for the plaintiff’s emotional distress, 
in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
11.7 The ALRC proposes that courts be empowered to award compensatory damages 
for loss suffered to a plaintiff, including damages for emotional distress. Previous law 
reform inquiries made similar recommendations.
1
 
11.8 Compensatory damages would be assessed by reference to existing tort 
principles.
2
 One reason for the ALRC’s proposal that the statutory cause of action be 
described as an action in tort
3
 is to allow a court when determining an action for 
serious invasion of privacy to draw on principles that have been well settled and 
applied by the courts in analogous common law actions. The proposal that the new tort 
be actionable per se will make it most closely analogous to actions like trespass to the 
person, but it will also be analogous in other respects to defamation actions. 
                                                        
1  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–5; NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 
(2009) cl 76(1)(a); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 
(2010) Rec 29(a). 
2  K Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2012) chs 2.8, 16. 
3  See Ch 4. 
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11.9 It should first be noted that nominal damages would not be appropriate in an 
action for serious invasion of privacy.
4
 
11.10 A plaintiff might suffer actual loss in the form of physical or psychiatric injury, 
property damage
5
 or other economic loss as a result of the serious invasion of privacy. 
Regardless of the type of harm or the tort, the general principle in tort law is that the 
role of compensatory damages is to place a plaintiff, so far as money can do, in the 
position he or she would have been in had the tort not been committed.
6
 
11.11 Where a plaintiff has suffered physical or psychological injury, compensatory 
damages may include special
7
 and general
8
 damages to remedy economic loss suffered 
by a plaintiff, as well as general damages for non-economic loss. The financial loss 
suffered by a plaintiff may include medical expenses incurred and loss of earnings as a 
result of the injury and in some instances, the effect of the injury on a plaintiff’s future 
earnings.
9
 Damages for non-pecuniary loss recognise the pain and suffering caused by 
the injury. 
11.12 However, the ALRC proposes that the new Act also clearly provide that a court 
may award damages for ‘mere’ emotional distress, in an action for serious invasion of 
privacy. Serious invasions of privacy commonly cause emotional distress or harm to 
the plaintiff’s dignitary interests, often unaccompanied by any physical or psychiatric 
illness. This fact, given the failure of the common law to provide redress for the 
intentional infliction of mere emotional distress outside actions such as trespass, is one 
of the key justifications for the proposed statutory cause of action. So too is the 
uncertainty about whether Australian courts can award damages for emotional distress 
in equitable actions for breach of confidence.
10
 Making an intentional or reckless 
serious invasion of privacy actionable per se will allow a court to award general 
damages in compensation for a plaintiff’s emotional distress. 
11.13 Compensation for distress or injury is not the only basis for an award of 
damages. In torts which are actionable per se, such as trespass to the person in the form 
of battery, assault or false imprisonment, trespass to land, and also in defamation where 
harm to the plaintiff’s reputation from a defamatory statement is presumed,
11
 the courts 
                                                        
4  Nominal damages are available in trespass cases: RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [27.3]. 
5  For example, damage to stock or the cost of repairs to property occasioned by trespass to land or trespass 
to goods: Ibid [5.15]. 
6  Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, 39 (Lord Blackburn); Harriton v Stephens (2006) 
226 CLR 52 [166] (Hayne J); Butler v Egg Pulp Marketing Board (1966) 114 CLR 185, 191 (Taylor and 
Owen JJ). 
7  Special damages refer to ‘those items of loss which the plaintiff has suffered prior to the date of trial and 
which are capable of precise arithmetical calculation—such as hospital expenses’: Balkin and Davis, 
above n 4, [27.5]. 
8  General damages refer to all injuries which are not capable of precise calculation. They refer to financial 
loss which may be suffered after the date of judgement and all non-financial such as pain and suffering or 
loss of amenities: Ibid. 
9  Ibid [11.27]. 
10  The only Australian appellate authority on the award of damages for emotional distress in a breach of 
confidence case is Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. See Ch 12 for further discussion. 
11  Balkin and Davis, above n 4, [18.17]. 
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have often recognised that an award of general compensatory damages may serve the 
purpose or have the effect of vindicating the plaintiff’s right. For instance, In Uren v 
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd [1966], Windeyer J gave the following explanation of the 
purpose of compensatory damages in defamation: 
compensation by damages operates in two ways—as a vindication of the plaintiff to 
the public and as consolation to him for a wrong done.12 
11.14 In Plenty v Dillon (1991), Gaudron and McHugh JJ of the High Court of 
Australia characterised the award of general damages for an action in trespass to land 
as fulfilling vindicatory purposes: 
the appellant is entitled to have his right of property vindicated by a substantial award 
of damages.13 
11.15 Witzleb and Carroll explain that civil remedies are aimed at ‘vindicating the 
interests that underlie the right or rights infringed’.
14
 
Factors in mitigation and aggravation of general damages 
Proposal 11–2 The new Act should set out the following non-exhaustive 
list of factors that may mitigate damages for serious invasion of privacy: 
(a)  that the defendant has made an appropriate apology to the plaintiff about 
the conduct that invaded the plaintiff’s privacy; 
(b)  that the defendant has published a correction of any untrue information 
disclosed about the plaintiff; 
(c)  that the defendant has made an offer of amends in relation to the 
defendant’s conduct or the harm suffered by the plaintiff; 
(d)  that the plaintiff has already recovered compensation, or has agreed to 
receive compensation in relation to the conduct of the defendant; 
(e)  that the defendant had taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute with the 
plaintiff in order to avoid the need for litigation; and 
(f)  that the plaintiff had not taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute, prior 
to commencing or continuing proceedings, with the defendant in order to 
avoid the need for litigation. 
                                                        
12  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 150 (Windeyer J). 
13  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 655. 
14  Robyn Carroll and Normann Witzleb, ‘“It”s Not Just about the Money’: Enhancing the Vindicatory Effect 
of Private Law Remedies’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 216, 219. 
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Proposal 11–3 The new Act should set out the following non-exhaustive 
list of factors that may aggravate damages for serious invasion of privacy: 
(a)  that the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps, prior to commencing or 
continuing proceedings, to settle the dispute with the defendant in order 
to avoid the need for litigation; 
(b)  that the defendant had not taken reasonable steps to settle the dispute with 
the plaintiff in order to avoid the need for litigation; 
(c)  that the defendant’s unreasonable conduct at the time of the invasion of 
privacy or prior to or during the proceedings had subjected the plaintiff to 
special or additional embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation; 
(d)  that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or committed with the 
intention to cause embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation to the 
plaintiff; and 
(e)  that the defendant has disclosed information about the plaintiff which the 
defendant knew to be false or did not honestly believe to be true. 
11.16 The ALRC proposes that in assessing damages in an action for serious invasion 
of privacy, a court may consider any mitigating or aggravating factors which occurred 
before and during court proceedings.
15
 
11.17 Mitigating factors have the effect of reducing the effect or the harm of the 
serious invasion of privacy and will therefore reduce the amount of compensatory 
damages awarded to a plaintiff. Aggravating factors such as whether the plaintiff 
suffered particular embarrassment or humiliation due to the nature of the defendant’s 
conduct will increase the award of general damages. 
11.18 Possible mitigating factors that a court may consider include whether either 
party had made attempts at alternative dispute resolution (ADR); whether the 
complaint had first been the subject of a determination by the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, the ACMA or another body, (either by way of complaint 
or own-motion investigation) and the outcome of any determination; and whether a 
defendant had taken reasonable steps to redress the invasion of privacy such as through 
a public apology, correction order or removing the private information from an online 
platform. 
11.19 Aggravating factors a court may consider include: where the defendant’s 
conduct subjected a plaintiff to additional embarrassment or hurt; where their conduct 
                                                        
15  The Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 38 sets out mitigating factors for a court when assessing damages. 
These include whether the defendant has made an apology to the plaintiff or has published a correction of 
the defamatory matter. In the tort of false imprisonment, the defendant’s conduct up to and including 
conduct at the trial is relevant in a court’s assessment of general and aggravated damages: Spautz v 
Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1. 
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was unjustifiable or improper;
16
 or whether the defendant had published information 
which the defendant knew to be false.
17
 
11.20 This proposal is also intended to encourage the parties to attempt to resolve their 
dispute without litigation if it would be reasonable to expect them to do so. 
No separate award of aggravated damages 
Proposal 11–4 The new Act should provide that the court may not award a 
separate sum as aggravated damages. 
11.21 Given that the court is able to take into account any aggravating factors in the 
assessment of general damages, the ALRC proposes that the new Act should 
specifically provide that the court is not to make a separate award for aggravated 
damages. 
11.22 At common law, aggravated damages are compensatory in nature as a form of 
general damages.
18
 Aggravated damages comprise an additional sum to take account of 
the special humiliation suffered by the plaintiff due to the nature of the defendant’s 
conduct in the commission of a wrong.
19
 When considering such awards, courts have 
been astute to prevent the risk of damages overlapping in two ways. First, there is a 
potential for overlap between an ordinary award of general damages for injury to the 
plaintiff’s feelings and an award of aggravated damages. Sackville AJA has noted that: 
In New South Wales v Riley, Hodgson JA (with whom Sheller JA and Nicholas J 
agreed) pointed out that in certain circumstances “ordinary compensatory damages” 
can be awarded for injury to feelings, falling short of a recognised psychiatric injury. 
Such damages can be awarded in actions for assault. His Honour also pointed out that, 
if, in addition to ordinary damages for injury to feelings, aggravated damages are to 
be awarded, it is important to avoid double counting. 20 
11.23 Secondly, there is a risk of overlap between the award for aggravated damages 
and that for exemplary damages, considered below, which are intended to punish or 
deter the defendant because of the nature of his or her conduct. As Spigelman CJ noted 
in NSW v Ibbett
21
 in a passage approved by the High Court on appeal, ‘in the case of 
aggravated damages the assessment is made from the point of view of the plaintiff and 
in the case of exemplary damages the focus is on the conduct of the defendant’.
22
 
Nevertheless, both awards have some reference to the nature of the defendant’s 
                                                        
16  These standards have been applied by courts in NSW in assessing awards of aggravating damages; see, 
for example, Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Fitzpatrick (1984) 1 NSWLR 643, [653] (Samuels JA). 
17  McKenzie v Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 20 NSWLR 42, [361] (Grove J). 
18  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129–130 (Taylor J). 
19  ‘[A]ggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful 
act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done’: Ibid 149 (Windeyer J). 
20  New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496, [129]. This passage was quoted by Sackville AJA in 
New South Wales v Radford [2010] NSWCA 276 (28 October 2010) [96].  
21  NSW v Ibbett (2005) 65 NSWLR 168. 
22  Ibid [83]. 
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conduct. As Taylor J said in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd, ‘in many cases, the 
same set of circumstances might well justify either an award of exemplary or 
aggravated damages’.
23
 This proposal will avoid the risk of both types of overlaps. 
11.24 The ALRC’s proposal is consistent with the approach of the NSWLRC on this 
issue. The NSWLRC explained that aggravating circumstances would already form 
some part of an assessment for general damages, stating that:  
To the extent to which the conduct of the defendant has increased the damage to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s loss is simply the greater—a fact that will, obviously, be 
reflected in the size of the award.24 
Exemplary damages 
Proposal 11–5 The new Act should provide that, in an action for serious 
invasion of privacy, courts may award exemplary damages in exceptional 
circumstances and where the court considers that other damages awarded would 
be an insufficient deterrent. 
11.25 The ALRC proposes that a court be given the discretion to award exemplary 
damages in exceptional circumstances.
25
 This head of damages focuses on the 
defendant’s conduct rather than the plaintiff’s loss. It may be appropriate where the 
defendant’s conduct was in outrageous and contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s 
rights. An award of exemplary damages is intended to punish a defendant and deter 
similar conduct in the future. 
11.26 The ALRC considers that the award of exemplary damages should only be made 
in exceptional circumstances or, in exceptional circumstances where the court is 
satisfied that the other damages or remedy awarded would not provide a sufficient 
deterrent against such conduct in the future. This later formulation would stress the 
arguably more valuable deterrent function of exemplary damages, rather than their 
punitive function. 
11.27 The ALRC considers that a court should be able to make such an award, in 
exceptional circumstances, in an action under the proposed tort—particularly given that 
the tort proposed in this paper is confined to invasions of privacy that are both serious 
and intentional or reckless.
26
 An award for exemplary damages is considered separately 
to other heads of damages.
27
 
                                                        
23  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129–130 (Taylor J). 
24  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [7.10]. 
25  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Women’s Legal 
Centre (ACT & Region) Inc., Submission 19; I Turnbull, Submission 5; P Wragg, Submission 4; 
T Gardner, Submission 3. 
26  See Chs 5 and 7. 
27  Henry v Thompson (1989) 2 Qd R 412. 
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11.28 In Lamb v Cotogno
28
 the High Court quoted from Mayne & McGregor on 
Damages their oft-cited description of exemplary damages: 
Such damages are variously called punitive damages, vindictive damages, exemplary 
damages, and even retributory damages. They can apply only where the conduct of 
the defendant merits punishment, which is only considered to be so where his conduct 
is wanton, as where it discloses fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, insolence or the like, 
or, as it is sometimes put, where he acts in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s 
rights. 29 
11.29 Brennan J has said that an award of exemplary damages ‘is intended to punish 
the defendant for conduct showing a conscious and contumelious disregard for the 
plaintiff's rights and to deter him from committing like conduct again’.
30
 
11.30 While compensatory damages may often be sufficient remedy for serious 
invasions of privacy, additional damages will sometimes be justified where the conduct 
of the defendant can be characterised as outrageous or contumelious. Posting on the 
internet so-called ‘revenge pornography’—intimate photographs or video of an ex-
partner or ex-spouse without their consent—may be an example of an outrageous 
invasion of privacy. 
11.31 Profits made from an invasion of privacy can be greater than the sum that is 
likely to be awarded to compensate the victim. Exemplary damages may help deter 
invasions of privacy that might otherwise be profitable for the defendant. 
11.32 Furthermore, an award of exemplary damages may be more appropriate where a 
gain-based remedy is unavailable, such as in circumstances where a defendant had 
attempted to procure some financial gain from the intentional invasion of privacy but 
did not in fact make a profit.
31
  
11.33 Although exemplary damages are available in Australia at common law for a 
wide range of intentional torts,
32
 statute prevents the courts awarding exemplary 
damages in defamation claims.
33
 They are also not available for breach of equitable 
obligations such as breach of confidence,
34
 or in actions for breach of a contractual 
duty of confidence.
35
 
                                                        
28  Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, [8]. 
29  JD Mayne and H McGregor, Mayne & McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 12th ed, 
1961) 196. 
30  Xl Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 12 (28 February 1985) 471. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1. They have been excluded for defamation and for negligence claims, 
but claims under the new tort for invasions of privacy will be more analogous to other intentional torts. 
33  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 35. 
34  In Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, the Victorian Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff an award of 
exemplary damages for breach of confidence, however the court did award damages for emotional 
distress. See also Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (2008) [172]–[197]. 
These decisions are in contrast to the NSW Supreme Court's decision in Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd 
(2003) 56 NSWLR 298 which overturned an award of exemplary damages for breach of fiduciary duty.  
35  This is in contrast to the UK approach: Attorney General v Blake [2000] UKHL 45 (27 July 2000). 
 11. Remedies and Costs 165 
11.34 However, unlike in defamation cases, there would be no presumption of harm in 
privacy cases, under the tort proposed in this Discussion Paper, and there may well be 
cases, such as Kaye v Robertson,
36
 where the plaintiff may not be capable of suffering 
distress yet the circumstances of the invasion of privacy were outrageous and warrant 
exemplary damages to deter such conduct. 
11.35 There is a legitimate concern that an award of exemplary damages provides a 
windfall to plaintiffs. Courts, however, are conscious of this concern and the High 
Court has ruled that awards of exemplary damages should be moderate.
37
  
11.36 In addition to determining whether the exceptional circumstances of the case 
call for an award of exemplary damages, the court will also consider whether the other 
damages already awarded against the defendant are sufficient to fulfil the retributive, 
punitive or deterrent purposes of exemplary damages. In NSW v Ibbett the High Court 
when dismissing the appeal, quoted the earlier judgment of Spigelman CJ who stated 
that it is necessary, 
to determine both heads of compensatory damages before deciding whether or not the 
quantum is such that a further award is necessary to serve the objectives of 
punishment or deterrence or, if it be a separate purpose, condemnation.38  
11.37 Views of stakeholders, previous inquiries in Australia and recent inquiries in the 
United Kingdom show a range of views on this issue. 
11.38 Witzleb has suggested that ‘exemplary damages should only be available as a 
last resort, i.e. where no other remedy would be a sufficient response to the wrong 
committed by the defendant’.
39
  
11.39 The NSWLRC
40
 recommended against allowing courts to award exemplary 
damages, noting the difficulty of reconciling exemplary damages with the purposes of 
the civil law. Analogous statutory actions such as defamation claims
41
 and negligence 
claims for personal injury,
42
 limit or exclude access to exemplary damages. The VLRC 
did not include exemplary damages in its recommendations.
43
 
11.40 While a number of stakeholders supported courts being able to award exemplary 
damages,
44
 often for similar reasons to those set out above, several stakeholders 
                                                        
36  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
37  Xl Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 12 (28 February 1985). 
38  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, [34]. 
39  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
40  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 78. The ALRC 
previously adopted the same list of remedies, also excluding exemplary damages, but with no explanation 
on this last point; see ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 
(2008) [74.177]. 
41  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 37. 
42  See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 21. 
43  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 29(a), [7.196]–
[7.200]. 
44  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Women’s Legal 
Centre (ACT & Region) Inc., Submission 19; I Turnbull, Submission 5; P Wragg, Submission 4; T 
Gardner, Submission 3.  
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opposed the availability of an award of exemplary damages.
45
 The OAIC submitted 
that remedies for a privacy action should be directed at compensating a plaintiff, while 
exemplary damages are targeted at punishing a defendant.
46
 There is also some concern 
that if exemplary damages were available, this may stifle important and legitimate 
activities like investigative journalism, and as such may restrict freedom of expression. 
11.41 The UK’s Leveson Inquiry recommended that courts be able to award 
exemplary or punitive damages for actions in breach of confidence, defamation and the 
tort of misuse of personal information.
47
 Similarly, the Joint Committee of the House 
of Lords and House of Commons on Privacy and Injunctions in 2012 recommended 
that courts be empowered to award exemplary damages in privacy cases, arguing that 
compensatory damages were too low to act as an effective deterrent.
48
 This 
recommendation led to the enactment of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK), which 
provides for the award of exemplary damages against a defendant who is a news 
organisation in misuse of information cases.
49
 
11.42 Canadian privacy statutes also provide that courts may award punitive 
damages.
50
 
Cap on damages 
Proposal 11–6 The total of any damages other than damages for economic 
loss should be capped at the same amount as the cap on damages for non-
economic loss in defamation. 
11.43 The ALRC proposes a cap on damages for all damages other than for economic 
loss. This means that the total amount of general damages for non-economic loss and 
exemplary damages awarded would be capped at the same amount as the cap on 
damages for non-economic loss in defamation awards.
51
 This proposal would ascribe 
equal weight to privacy and reputational interests. The proposal militates against the 
risk of plaintiffs cherry-picking between causes of action based on the availability of 
higher awards of damages.
52
 
11.44 Restrictions on the scope of damages for non-economic loss for personal injury 
actions are stipulated at statute. For instance, in NSW, the initial cap was set at 
                                                        
45  SBS, Submission 59; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
46  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
47  Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, House of Commons 
Paper 779 (2012) vol 4, [5.12]. 
48  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012) 134. 
49  Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) s 34. 
50  See, for example, Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373. 
51  See for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 35. 
52  Nicholas Petrie, ‘Reforming the Remedy: Getting the Right Remedial Structure to Protect Personal 
Privacy’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 139. 
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$350,000
53
 and is now set at $551,500.
54
 Damages for non-economic loss at 
defamation were initially capped at $250,000
55
 and are now set at $355,000.
56
 
11.45 In 2009, the NSWLRC proposed a cap on damages for non-economic loss for 
invasions of privacy of $150,000,
57
 some $100,000 less than the defamation cap at the 
time. 
11.46 David Rolph has argued that a cap on damages for a statutory cause of action 
should be higher than that stipulated at defamation law. He argued that a lower cap on 
damages for non-economic loss in privacy actions would be ‘undesirable’ as it fails to 
reflect the relative importance Australia should now prescribe to privacy.
58
 Witzleb 
argued that existing caps on damages in other areas of Australian law were introduced 
to restrain what some perceived to be excessive compensation orders.
59
 The ABC 
supported a cap on damages for non-economic loss, stating that the cap should not be 
higher than that at defamation law.
60
 
11.47 Some stakeholders argued against a cap on damages.
61
 The OAIC submitted that 
setting a cap ‘may have the effect of focusing attention on that upper limit and 
implying that serious privacy invasions should result in a payout of that magnitude’.
62
 
However it will be at the court’s discretion to make this assessment. 
Account of profits 
Proposal 11–7 The new Act should provide that a court may award the 
remedy of an account of profits. 
11.48 The ALRC proposes that a court be empowered to award an account of profits.
63
 
This award would be an alternative to damages. The gains-based remedy of an account 
of profit will deter defendants who are commercially motivated to invade the privacy 
of another for profit, by removing any unjust gain made from a serious invasion of 
privacy.
64
 
                                                        
53  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 16. This includes a statutory indexation mechanism: s17. 
54  Civil Liability (Non-Economic Loss) Amendment Order 2013. 
55  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (SA) ss 35, 35(4). 
56  NSW Government Gazette No 65 of 31 May 2013. This figure is due to be increased on 1 July 2014. 
57  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 77. 
58  David Rolph, ‘The Interaction of Remedies for Defamation and Privacy’ [2012] Precedent 14. 
59  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
60  ABC, Submission 46. 
61  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30. 
62  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
63  Several stakeholders were in favour of this proposal: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 66; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 15; I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
64  N Witzleb, Submission 29. The ALRC proposed the availability of an account of profits in its previous 
Inquiry: ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–
5(b). 
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11.49 In Australia, an account of profits is an equitable remedy that may be granted in 
cases where a defendant has profited from an equitable wrong. It is also available in 
some limited types of tort actions, such as passing off.
65
 It is distinct from an award of 
damages in that it responds to the gain of the wrongdoer rather than the loss of the 
wronged party.
66
 An account of profits will deter defendants who calculate that the 
gain to be made from publishing an individual’s private information exceeds the cost of 
any compensatory damages they may incur if the matter goes to court. 
11.50 An alternative way to achieve the same result would be to award exemplary 
damages to strip the defendant of any gain made from the unauthorised use of the 
plaintiff’s information.
67
  
11.51 This award is available as a remedy in breach of confidence actions.
68
 In 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3), the UK Court of Appeal made clear that it would have 
had ‘no hesitation to award an account of profits’
69
 if ‘Hello!’ magazine had made a 
profit from the publication of surreptitiously obtained photographs of the wedding of 
Michael Douglas and Catherina Zeta-Jones. 
11.52 It may however be difficult to prove that the defendant has made any profit or 
gain from the invasion of privacy. Media publication of private information may often 
be unsuited to the award of an account of profit because the story may be only one part 
of the media program or edition and cannot be attributed with a distinct amount of 
profit. 
11.53 An account of profits was recommended as a remedy for a serious invasion of 
privacy in ALRC Report 108.
70
 The NSWLRC also recommended an account of 
profits, at least in exceptional cases.
71
 Both commissions noted the concerns of some 
stakeholders that it would in many cases be difficult to determine the profits arising 
from a serious invasion of privacy, but neither commission considered that this should 
more generally preclude an account of profits being available. 
Damages based on notional licence fee 
Proposal 11–8 The new Act should provide that courts may award damages 
assessed on the basis of a notional licence fee in respect of the defendant’s 
conduct, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
                                                        
65  RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and 
Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002) [25–002]. 
66  Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544. 
67  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490, 497.  
68  Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (2008); Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109. 
69  Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595 (18 May 2005) [200]. 
70  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–5. 
71  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [7.23]–[7.24]. 
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11.54 Damages assessed on the basis of a notional licence fee would require the 
defendant to pay to the plaintiff any sum that the plaintiff would have received if the 
defendant had asked prior permission to carry out the activity that invaded the 
plaintiff’s privacy. An assessment of damages calculated on the basis of a notional 
licence fee is a remedy which seeks to target the value to the defendant of deliberately 
invading the plaintiff’s privacy. 
11.55 The possibility of an assessment of damages on the basis of a notional licence 
fee was discussed by Hodgson J in LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Pty Ltd, a 
case involving trespass to land by the erection of scaffolding into the plaintiff’s 
airspace:  
[I]n my view, if what is used has peculiar value for a defendant, then damages under 
this head should reflect that value, rather than the general market value. For example, 
if a plaintiff is the last tenant in a development site, and is forcibly ejected and the 
building immediately demolished; and if the defendant acted on incorrect legal advice 
that he was entitled to do this, so that he may be able to escape exemplary damages; 
then I think the plaintiff’s damages should not be limited to the general market value 
of the plaintiff’s tenancy, but should reflect he price which the plaintiff and defendant 
would reasonably have negotiated, having regard to the plaintiff’s position and the 
defendant’s wish to develop the site.72 
11.56 Damages assessed on the basis of notional licence fees have been considered by 
courts in the UK. In Irvine v Talksport
73
 a radio station used the image of a well-known 
racing driver in its publicity material, without the driver’s knowledge or agreement. 
The court granted the driver damages equal to the driver’s minimum endorsement fee 
at the time the image was used. In Douglas v Hello!(No 3) the UK Court of Appeal 
recognised the availability of a hypothetical-fee award in situations where a plaintiff 
had permitted to the invasive act in question but had not been compensated for the use 
of their image.
74
 
11.57 The assessment of damages based on the calculation of a notional licence fee is 
consistent with the fault requirement of the statutory cause of action proposed in this 
Discussion Paper—confined to intentional acts—as a notional licence fee would target 
defendants who had deliberately set out to enrich themselves or save expense by 
invading an individual’s privacy. 
11.58 Sirko Harder examined the argument that the exclusive right to authorise use of 
one’s image is a commercial publicity right.
75
 Harder argued that a publicity right is 
akin to a property right which is transferable, as distinguished from an individual’s 
privacy interests which are not assignable in a proprietorial sense. However, there are 
cases where private information is provided in return for a monetary value. For 
instance, individuals who enter into contractual arrangements to disclose their private 
information such as ‘tell-all interviews’ on television—often in exchange for monetary 
                                                        
72  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1990) 24 NSWLR 499, 507. 
73  Irvine v Talksport Ltd (2003) 2 ER 881. 
74  Sirko Harder, ‘Gain-Based Relief for Invasion of Privacy’ (2011) 1 DICTUM-Victoria Law School 
Journal 63, 68. 
75  Ibid 74. 
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compensation—attach some monetary value to their private information. Moreover, 
Harder argued that gain-based remedies are appropriate to remedy invasions of privacy 
given that 
the right to privacy constitutes a right to exclude others from one’s private sphere and 
thus an exclusive entitlement against the whole world. … Gain-based relief is the 
natural consequence of the unauthorised use of an exclusive entitlement.76  
11.59 Also in favour of gain-based remedies in privacy actions, Witzleb argued that 
‘gain-based relief as a less intrusive, and more carefully targeted, remedy should be 
preferred as the primary defendant-focused remedy in privacy cases’.
77
 
Contributory negligence should not be considered in 
assessing damages 
11.60 The ALRC does not propose that contributory negligence be included as a factor 
to be considered by a court to reduce an award of damages. Under state apportionment 
legislation, a court may reduce an award of damages in certain claims to the extent that 
the plaintiff was at fault,
78
 but only where the defence of contributory negligence 
would have been a complete defence at common law. Contributory negligence is not a 
defence at common law to intentional torts and the apportionment legislation therefore 
does not apply to such claims.
79
 
11.61 Including contributory negligence as a factor in the assessment of damages 
would be inconsistent with the fault element of the proposed statutory cause of action 
which limits liability to intentional or reckless conduct. 
Injunctions 
Proposal 11–9 The new Act should provide that courts may award an 
injunction, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
11.62 The availability of an order of injunctive relief to prevent or restrain the 
publication of private information is an important protection proposed by the ALRC. In 
privacy actions, plaintiffs are likely to seek interlocutory or interim injunctions to 
prevent the commission or continuance of a serious invasion of privacy. For example, a 
plaintiff may seek to prevent the publication of their personal information by a media 
outlet. Given the fragile nature of privacy, preventing the irreparable harm of 
publication or disclosure of private information is critical. 
                                                        
76  Ibid 79. 
77  Normann Witzleb, ‘Justifying Gain-Based Remedies for Invasions of Privacy’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 325, 355. 
78  See, for example, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 9. 
79  Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club (1983) 1 VR 153.  
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11.63 The availability of an interim or interlocutory injunction to restrain publication 
may, in some cases, reduce or eliminate the need for further litigation or the need for a 
court to grant other remedies. 
11.64 Previous law reform inquiries recommended that courts be able to order 
injunctive relief.
80
 Principles relating to injunctive relief in privacy cases are discussed 
further in Chapter 12. 
Delivery up, destruction or removal of material 
Proposal 11–10 The new Act should provide that courts may order the 
delivery up and destruction or removal of material, in an action for serious 
invasion of privacy. 
11.65 Orders for the delivery up, destruction or removal of material will be an 
appropriate remedy for serious invasions of privacy where a defendant has obtained 
private information about a plaintiff and has exhibited an intention to disclose that 
information to a third party. This may arise in a situation where two people in an 
intimate relationship share images or text of a highly personal nature and, at the end of 
the intimate relationship, one party intends to publish or disclose those images to a 
third party. In such a case, courts may order that the material be delivered to a court 
and destroyed. Several stakeholders supported this proposal.
81
 
11.66 The ALRC intends this power to extend to orders for the take-down of online 
content which amounts to a serious invasion of privacy. A court may order that an 
online provider or an individual who controls their own website (such as a blogger) 
must remove or take-down specific content. An analogous provision exists at s 133 of 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), which empowers a court to order the delivery up and 
destruction of material which violates copyright law. 
11.67 Australian courts have existing powers to issue similar orders. For instance, 
Anton Pillar orders are a form of mandatory injunction, issued by a court to prevent the 
destruction of evidence.
82
 Anton Pillar orders are issued when a court considers that a 
defendant is likely to destroy documents or property necessary for proceedings.
83
 
11.68 The NSWLRC and ALRC
84
 previously recommended that courts be empowered 
to make an order for the delivery up and destruction of material. The NSWLRC 
recommended that courts be empowered to order a defendant to deliver to a plaintiff 
                                                        
80  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(c). 
81  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
82  Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia, 8th ed, 2009) 
[13.80]. 
83  Long v Specifor Publications Pty Ltd (1988) 44 NSWLR 545, [547] (Powell JA). 
84  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(f). 
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any ‘articles, documents or material (and any copies), that were made or disclosed as a 
result of the invasion’.
85
 
11.69 The OAIC and PIAC suggested that, in an action under the new tort, courts be 
able to make an order requiring a defendant to rectify its business or IT practices to 
redress systemic problems with the way it stores private information.
86
 The ALRC has 
not proposed such an order as such systemic problems would generally be the result of 
negligent acts or omissions and be more appropriately dealt with by the regulator. The 
cause of action proposed in this Discussion Paper is confined to intentional or reckless 
invasions of privacy. 
Correction orders 
Proposal 11–11 The new Act should provide that courts may make a 
correction order, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
11.70 The ALRC proposes that courts be given the power to order defendants to 
publish, in appropriate terms, a correction.
87
 Such an order can set the record straight, 
and may be necessary where, for example, the defendant disclosed untrue private 
information about the plaintiff. 
11.71 The disclosure of private information may amount to a serious invasion of 
privacy despite the information being untrue.
88
 Private information can include 
information which is true or false so long as it has a quality of privacy, that is, the 
subject matter of the information is sufficiently private or personal in nature so that its 
disclosure would cause emotional distress to a relevant individual. In the Canadian case 
of Ash v McKennit, Longmore J noted: 
The question in a case of misuse of private information is whether the information is 
private, not whether it is true or false. The truth or falsity of the information is an 
irrelevant inquiry in deciding whether the information is entitled to be protected and 
judges should be wary of becoming side-tracked into that irrelevant inquiry. 89 
11.72 Correction orders may reduce the need for a plaintiff’s interests to be vindicated 
through an award of damages.
90
 Some plaintiffs may be primarily concerned with 
correcting the public record, in which case the advantage of correction orders is they 
                                                        
85  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWRC Draft Bill, cl 76(1)(d). 
86  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. The OAIC suggested this power 
would be similar in nature to the OAIC’s power to instigate an own-motion investigation under the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
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2005 (NSW) s 14. 
88  See Ch 5. 
89  McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, 86. 
90  Carroll and Witzleb, above n 14, 236. 
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appear in the original publication and therefore target the same audience. Witzleb and 
Carroll have made the point that in actions to restore personality interests, monetary 
remedies may be ill-suited.
91
 Instead, coercive methods such as public corrections may 
be more appropriate to reverse or reduce the effect of an invasion of privacy which has 
demeaned and distressed the plaintiff in a public forum. 
11.73 The Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) 
opposed any remedies which would compel corrections, arguing that media 
organisations are already subject to similar provisions in ASTRA Codes which are 
registered with the ACMA.
92
 However there may be instances where a plaintiff is 
awarded a range of remedies as part of the cause of action including damages and an 
order for apology. In such cases, the availability of those remedies in a single cause of 
action will provide simplicity for all parties to a proceeding. A plaintiff would not need 
to pursue a defendant through both a regulatory scheme and through the courts in 
relation to the same serious invasion of privacy. Furthermore, if a defendant has 
already made a statement involving a correction, this will mitigate an award of 
damages.
93
 
Apology orders 
Proposal 11–12 The new Act should provide that courts may make an order 
requiring the defendant to apologise to the plaintiff, in an action for serious 
invasion of privacy. 
11.74 The availability of an order requiring a defendant to apologise would, in some 
circumstances, vindicate the hurt and distress caused to a plaintiff by a serious invasion 
of privacy.
94
 Given the aim of the tort is to redress harm done to a personal, dignitary 
interest, an apology may assist in rectifying a plaintiff’s feelings of embarrassment and 
distress. Witzleb and Carroll argued that orders for apology help to ‘redress the injury 
by restoring the plaintiff’s dignity and personality’.
95
 Similarly, Prue Vines has argued: 
Apologies are also a tool of communication and of emotion. Apologies may redress 
humiliation for the victim, shame the offender and help to heal the emotional wounds 
associated with a wrong.96 
11.75 The purpose of a plaintiff seeking an order for apology will depend on the 
circumstances of each case, but may involve the need for acknowledgement of their 
suffering.
97
 The publicity garnered by a public statement of apology may help to 
                                                        
91  Ibid, 233. 
92  Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47. 
93  See Proposal 6-3. 
94  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15; I Pieper, Submission 6; I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
95  Carroll and Witzleb, above n 14, 237. 
96  Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space 1, 15. 
97  Robyn Carroll, ‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 317, 337. 
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‘restore the esteem and social standing which has been lost as a consequence of the 
contravention’.
98
 
11.76 The ALRC previously recommended that courts be empowered to order a 
defendant to apologise.
99
 The NSWLRC recommended that the defendant’s conduct—
including whether they had apologised or made an offer of amends prior to 
proceedings—should be taken into account when determining actionability.
100
 The 
VLRC did not recommend such an order be available to a court, however the VLRC’s 
final report stated: 
Sometimes it may be appropriate to direct a person to publish an apology in response 
to the wrongful publication of private information or to apologise privately, for an 
intrusion into seclusion.101 
11.77 Australian law recognises the significance of apologies where there has been 
damage to personality or reputation in a range of actions at statute, equity and at the 
common law.
102
 For example, a court may order an apology under Commonwealth and 
state anti-discrimination legislation.
103
 This area of law is analogous to privacy actions 
in that anti-discrimination law aims to remedy damage to feelings. Similarly, in 
defamation law, a court may take a publisher’s apology for defamatory matter into 
account when assessing damages.
104
 
11.78 Public apologies may also serve to educate the public about privacy and deter 
future serious invasions of privacy.
105
 A plaintiff may value the public vindication an 
apology brings. 
11.79 In Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2), the NSW Anti-Discrimination 
Tribunal defined a court-ordered apology as an acknowledgement of ‘wrongdoing’ that 
is distinguished from a personal apology which is ‘sincere and which is incapable of 
being achieved by a court order’.
106
 
Declarations 
Proposal 11–13 The new Act should provide that courts may make a 
declaration, in an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
                                                        
98  Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114, [15]. 
99  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(d). 
100  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWRC Draft Bill, cl 
74(3)(a)(vi). 
101  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.207]. 
102  Carroll, above n 97, 213. 
103  See, for example, the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of NSW is empowered to issue an order requiring a 
respondent to publish or issue an apology or retraction: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 108. 
Apologies made by respondents in personal injury matters are not treated as evidence of admission of 
fault: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69. 
104  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 38. 
105  Carroll, above n 97, 339. 
106  Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWADTAP 69 (6 December 2005). 
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11.80 The availability of declaratory relief will provide applicants with a sense of 
certainty and may avoid lengthy and costly court proceedings.
107 
Several stakeholders 
submitted that declaratory relief should be availabile.
108
 
11.81 A declaration in an action for serious invasion of privacy will take the form of a 
non-coercive order by a court that states the nature of the interests, rights or duties of 
the applicant to an action.
109
 Their availability will provide both parties to a proceeding 
with clarity as to their obligations and rights in order to avoid future litigation. A 
declaration may establish that a plaintiff has enforceable rights which may be upheld at 
a later date if the wrong continues. Similarly, a declaration may declare that future 
conduct by a defendant (or possible defendant) will not be a ‘breach of contract or 
law’.
110
 
11.82 Declarations are available in a variety of areas of Australian law.
111
 Section 21 
of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) provides that the court may make a declaration on 
the legality of another party’s conduct.
112
 The ACCC has sought declarations under this 
provision in numerous cases in order to determine whether a party has violated 
Australian consumer law.
113
 
11.83 The ALRC, NSWLRC and VLRC previously proposed that courts be able to 
make declarations.
114
 
11.84 ASTRA opposed the availability of declarations, arguing that the ACMA’s 
existing powers provide it with the power to require a licensee to acknowledge a 
finding of the ACMA on the licensee’s website. Section 205W of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth) provide the ACMA with the power to accept undertakings 
from broadcasters on a range of matters. However, the availability of declaratory relief 
will have a significant normative impact on the future conduct of a defendant, given the 
risk of monetary remedies if legal rights which have been the subject of a judicial 
pronouncement are contravened. 
11.85 The operation of a declaration will not affect the availability of other remedies, 
if a court exercises their discretion to award other appropriate remedies. 
                                                        
107  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 65, [19–180]. 
108  N Witzleb, Submission 29; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
109  Cairns, above n 82, [1.20]. 
110  Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) CLR 198 334, [356] (Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 
198 CLR 334, [356] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
111  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 65, [19–075]. 
112  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21. ‘The Court may, in civil proceedings in relation to a 
matter in which it has original jurisdiction, make binding declarations of right, whether or not any 
consequential relief is or could be claimed’: s 21(1). 
113  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd [2001] [2001] FCA 187 (6 
March 2001). 
114  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(g); 
NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWRC Draft Bill, cl 76(1)(c); 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 29(c). 
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Costs 
Question 11–1 What, if any, provisions should the ALRC propose 
regarding a court’s power to make costs orders? 
11.86 At this stage in the Inquiry, the ALRC has not made a proposal on a court’s 
power to make costs orders in a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. The 
ALRC welcomes stakeholder feedback on this issue. The ALRC is particularly 
interested in the issue of costs in the context of ensuring access to justice.
115
 
11.87 The VLRC recommended that costs be dealt with in accordance with s 130 of 
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).
116
 That section 
provides that each party should bear their own costs in a proceeding, unless the 
Tribunal orders one party to pay all or a part of the costs of the other party, if that 
would be fair to do so. This recommendation is consistent with the VLRC’s 
recommendation that their proposed privacy actions be heard in the VCAT. Any 
proposal on costs will depend on the forum in which a statutory cause of action is 
heard. 
11.88 PIAC’s submission raised the concern that many plaintiffs will be deterred from 
starting proceedings due to the risk of an adverse costs order.
117
 PIAC suggested that if 
the cause of action were to be vested in a federal court, the ALRC should propose that 
courts be empowered to make orders protecting litigants from adverse costs orders. 
11.89 Special provisions about costs orders may be made in the legislation enacting 
the statutory cause of action, or it may be preferable to rely on any discretion given to 
the court hearing the matter under its own enabling legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
115  The OAIC’s submission raised costs as an issue which influences the accessibility of civil proceedings: 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
116  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 30. 
117  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
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Summary 
12.1 This chapter makes two proposals dealing with existing protections of privacy at 
common law and with a view to the likely development of the common law if a 
statutory cause of action is not enacted.
1
 
12.2 In addition to and separate from the detailed legal design of a statutory cause of 
action for serious invasion of privacy, the Terms of Reference require the ALRC to 
make recommendations as to other legal remedies to redress serious invasions of 
privacy and as to innovative ways in which the law may reduce serious invasions of 
privacy. 
12.3 The Terms of Reference also direct the ALRC to make recommendations as to 
the necessity of balancing the value of privacy with other fundamental values including 
freedom of expression and open justice. 
12.4 The first proposal is intended to redress uncertainty in the community as to 
whether Australian law provides a remedy for emotional distress suffered as a result of 
a breach of privacy which takes the form of the disclosure or misuse of private 
                                                        
1  In this chapter, the ALRC does not consider the possible development at common law of a new or 
separate tort for harassment or intrusion into seclusion, because it considers that, in the absence of a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, a statutory action for protection against 
harassment is the more appropriate way for the law to be developed: see Ch 14. If, however, the common 
law were to develop a tort of harassment or a tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion into seclusion, it 
would be necessary for the courts expressly to identify its elements, including whether: it was actionable 
per se, by analogy with trespass to the person; required damage in the usual sense of psychiatric or 
physical illness; or required damage but including emotional distress. 
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(possibly confidential) information.
2
 The first proposal is that courts be empowered to 
award compensation for emotional distress in such cases. 
12.5 The ALRC also proposes that countervailing public interests, including freedom 
of expression, be considered by a court in an application to prevent publication of 
private information. This may be particularly important if the tort proposed in this 
Discussion Paper is not enacted, and greater protections against disclosure of private 
information instead develop at common law. It is unclear what principles should 
govern the exercise of the court’s discretion in any action to protect merely private (not 
confidential) information. Australian case law provides only a very limited role for 
public interest considerations as a justification for restraining the breach of an 
obligation of confidence. By contrast, defamation law incorporates well-established 
principles which protect freedom of speech. The ALRC considers that there should be 
protections for freedom of speech in applications to prevent the disclosure of private, 
but not confidential, information. 
The likely future development of the action for breach of 
confidence 
12.6 In ABC v Lenah Game Meats Gleeson CJ appeared to foreshadow that the 
equitable action for breach of confidence may be the most suitable legal action for 
protecting people’s private information from disclosure, stating: 
[E]quity may impose obligations of confidentiality even though there is no imparting 
of information in circumstances of trust and confidence. And the principle of good 
faith upon which equity acts to protect information imparted in confidence may also 
be invoked to ‘restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or 
surreptitiously obtained’. The nature of the information must be such that it is capable 
of being regarded as confidential. A photographic image, illegally or improperly or 
surreptitiously obtained, where what is depicted is private, may constitute confidential 
information … 
If the activities filmed were private, then the law of breach of confidence is adequate 
to cover the case … There would be an obligation of confidence upon the persons 
who obtained [images and sounds of private activities], and upon those into whose 
possession they came, if they knew, or ought to have known, the manner in which 
they were obtained … 
The law should be more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a 
kind which fall within the concept of privacy. 
55. For reasons already given, I regard the law of breach of confidence as providing a 
remedy, in a case such as the present, if the nature of the information obtained by the 
trespasser is such as to permit the information to be regarded as confidential.3 
                                                        
2  This proposal would not, therefore, apply to cases involving commercial information or the like. In this 
chapter, the ALRC intends ‘private’ information to mean information as to which a person in the position 
of the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances. 
3  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [34], [39], [40], 
[55]. 
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12.7 Gummow and Hayne JJ, with whom Gaudron J agreed, considered a broader 
range of privacy invasions and left open the direction that the future development of 
the law protecting privacy may take: 
In the present appeal Lenah encountered … difficulty in formulating with acceptable 
specificity the ingredients of any general wrong of unjustified invasion of privacy. 
Rather than a search to identify the ingredients of a generally expressed wrong, the 
better course, as Deane J recognised [in Moorgate Tobacco Ltd v Philip Morris Pty 
Ltd (No 2)[1984] HCA 73; (1984) 156 CLR 414, 444-445], is to look to the 
development and adaptation of recognised forms of action to meet new situations and 
circumstances … 
Lenah’s reliance upon an emergent tort of invasion of privacy is misplaced. Whatever 
development may take place in that field will be to the benefit of natural, not artificial, 
persons. It may be that development is best achieved by looking across the range of 
already established legal and equitable wrongs. On the other hand, in some respects 
these may be seen as representing species of a genus, being a principle protecting the 
interests of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and 
private life, in the words of the Restatement, ‘free from the prying eyes, ears and 
publications of others’. Nothing said in these reasons should be understood as 
foreclosing any such debate or as indicating any particular outcome.4 
12.8 Despite this influential and open invitation to the courts to develop further 
protection, there has been only isolated development at common law of further privacy 
protection in Australia, as discussed in Chapter 3 above, making it difficult to predict 
the precise direction of future developments.
5
 Both of the proposals in this chapter 
assume that, in the absence of a statutory cause of action, the development of the 
equitable action for breach of confidence is the most likely way in which the common 
law may, in time, develop greater protection of privacy in relation to disclosure of 
private information. 
Damages for emotional distress in action for breach of 
confidence 
Proposal 12–1 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy 
is not enacted, appropriate federal, state, and territory legislation should be 
amended to provide that, in an action for breach of confidence that concerns a 
serious invasion of privacy by the misuse, publication or disclosure of private 
information, the court may award compensation for the claimant’s emotional 
distress. 
                                                        
4  Ibid [110], [132]. 
5  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [56]–[59] (Gault P and Blanchard J): 'The recent High Court of 
Australia decision in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd does little to 
clarify the future direction of Australian jurisprudence'. The Australian cases dealing with issues relating 
to invasions of privacy are set out in Ch 3. 
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12.9 There are several arguments in favour of the ALRC’s proposal. First, if 
legislation clarified or confirmed that compensation could be awarded for emotional 
distress, the existing action for breach of confidence would more readily be seen as a 
useful response to serious invasions of privacy, and be more attractive to potential 
claimants.
6
 This is particularly important in the event that the statutory cause of action 
is not enacted. Secondly, the effectiveness and availability of the remedy may deter 
invasions of privacy involving disclosures of private information. Thirdly, this 
proposal would be an effective way of addressing a significant gap in existing legal 
protection of privacy while being more limited and directed than the introduction of a 
new statutory cause of action. Fourthly, this provision would also indicate that 
Australian legislatures intended that the action for breach of confidence could be relied 
on to remedy these kinds of invasions of privacy. 
12.10 In traditional claims for breach of confidence in Australia, claimants have 
generally sought one of three remedies: an injunction to restrain an anticipated or 
continuing breach of confidence; compensation for economic loss due to a breach; or 
an account of the anticipated profits derived from a breach. This has been so, whether 
the relevant confidence concerned commercial, governmental or personal information. 
12.11 However, where a breach of confidence in relation to personal confidential or 
private information has already occurred and an injunction is futile, the consequence 
that a claimant is most likely to suffer is emotional distress, rather than harm in the 
nature of economic loss.
7
 Professor Michael Tilbury has noted that ‘the very object of 
the action [for invasion of privacy] will be to protect plaintiffs against [mental or 
emotional distress], at least in part.’
8
 
12.12 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted that ‘harm caused by breaches of 
privacy is more likely to be harm such as embarrassment, humiliation, shame and guilt. 
Given the centrality of privacy to identity, these harms should not be seen as 
insignificant, even though they are not physical or financial’.
9
 
12.13 While the limited circumstances for the recovery of compensation for ‘mere’ 
emotional distress, even intentionally caused, has been a perennial issue for the law of 
                                                        
6  Normann Witzleb, ‘Giller v Procopets: Australia’s Privacy Protection Shows Signs of Improvement’ 
(2009) 17 Torts Law Journal 121, 123–124: ‘Considering that breach of confidence will, until more 
specific protection is in place, continue to act as Australia’s quasi-privacy tort, courts need to afford 
adequate protection against emotional distress.’ 
7  A claimant may suffer some other harm that the law accepts as actual damage, such as personal or 
psychiatric injury. 
8  Michael Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-Pecuniary Loss and the Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman 
and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 
127, 140. Note also: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 52(1) provides that the Information Commissioner 
investigating a complaint concerning a breach of that Act may make a determination that the complainant 
is entitled to compensation for loss, which is defined to include injury to the complainant’s feelings or 
humiliation suffered by the complainant. 
9  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
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torts,
10
 the issue of recovery in equity had not been raised in Australia until the case of 
Giller v Procopets,
11
 decided by the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal in 
2008. In that case, Neave JA noted: ‘The Australian position appears to be at large on 
this issue. I am not aware of any appellate court decision which has considered it.’
12
 
Ashley JA stated: ‘No Australian authority was cited at trial or on appeal to support the 
proposition that, in the context now under discussion, equitable compensation or 
equitable damages … can be awarded for mental distress alone.’
13
 
12.14 In Giller v Procopets the court held that the claimant could recover damages for 
emotional distress in her equitable claim for breach of confidence. The claim was 
clearly one for breach of confidence, as the material that had been disclosed by the 
defendant, a videotape of intimate activities, had been created by the claimant and 
defendant while in a de facto relationship. The court unanimously agreed that the 
claimant could recover compensation for her consequent emotional distress as 
equitable compensation. Neave JA, with whom Maxwell JA agreed, also upheld the 
award as damages under the Victorian equivalent of Lord Cairns’ Act,
14
 s 38 of the 
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).
15
 An application by Procopets to the High Court of 
Australia for leave to appeal was rejected.
16
 
12.15 There are several reasons why it would be desirable for legislation to clarify the 
courts’ powers to award compensation for emotional distress, notwithstanding the 
judgment in Giller v Procopets. 
12.16 First, at the time of this Discussion Paper, Giller v Procopets remains the sole 
appellate authority for the recovery of compensation of emotional distress in a breach 
                                                        
10  Unlike the position in the United States, Australian courts, like those in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere, do not recognise a cause of action for wilful infliction of emotional distress. The tort action for 
wilful infliction of nervous shock, known as the action under Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57 is an 
'action on the case', and like an action in negligence, requires proof of actual damage, such as a 
recognised psychiatric illness: Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 (Neave JA & Ashley JA, Maxwell P 
dissenting); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 
2 AC 406. See further, Barbara McDonald, ‘Tort’s Role in Protecting Privacy: Current and Future 
Directions’ in James Edelman, James Goudkamp and Degeling (eds), Torts in Commercial Law 
(Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
11  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
12  Ibid [419]. 
13  Ibid [133]. 
14  A statute following Lord Cairns’ Act (21 & 22 Vict c 27) 1858 generally provides, in brief, that where a 
court has power to grant an injunction or to order specific performance, the court may award damages to 
the party injured either in addition to or in substitution for the injunction or specific performance. An 
example of the common form is s 68 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Section 38 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1986 (Vic) has different wording: 'If the Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an 
injunction or specific performance, it may award damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an 
injunction or specific performance'. 
15  Ashley JA in Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 at [141] did not agree that s 38 empowered the award: ‘I 
should next say that, upon the question of the availability of damages for mental distress, the common law 
would provide no assistance to the appellant even if s 38 was treated as making common law remedies 
available in a case within the exclusive jurisdiction. With few exceptions, the common law has turned its 
face against awards of damages for distress.’ Later at [148]: ‘But that does not mean that equity must do 
so’. He supported the award of compensation under the exercise of equity’s inherent jurisdiction. 
16  Procopets v Giller (M32/2009) [2009] HCASL 187. 
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of confidence action, over five years after it was decided. The position reached in that 
case has not been further tested or applied in Australia. Prior to that decision, a county 
court judge in Victoria, in the 2007 case of Doe v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, awarded equitable compensation of $25,000 for breach of confidence, for 
‘hurt, distress, embarrassment, humiliation, shame and guilt’, as part of a larger award 
for other wrongs.
17
 The case was settled before appeal. 
12.17 Secondly, s 38 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), relied upon to justify the 
award of compensation in Giller v Procopets, differs from the form of Lord Cairns’ 
Acts in other jurisdictions
18
 where there is still controversy as to whether Lord Cairns’ 
Act applies in aid of purely equitable rights such as breach of confidence.
19
 
12.18 Thirdly, even if Lord Cairns’ Act or s 38 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) 
does apply, this does not explain the basis on which equity can award compensation, in 
the form of common law compensatory damages and aggravated damages, for 
emotional distress arising from the breach of an equitable wrong. Regardless of the 
wording of the statute, it is problematic to have an equitable grant of compensation or 
‘damages’ by analogy with tort law: as Ashley JA points out, ‘with few exceptions, the 
common law has turned its face against awards of damages for distress’
20
 and, as the 
majority held, tort law would not have provided a remedy in the circumstances. This 
point is not an argument that the judgment undesirably fuses law and equity.
21
 Rather it 
is an argument based on the need for legal coherence. 
12.19 Fourthly, if the award for emotional distress in Giller v Procopets is better 
treated as an award of equitable compensation, there remains an unsettling lack of 
precedent for the decision. Further it is arguably inconsistent with another decision in 
which a state appellate court rejected a claim in an equitable action for punitive 
damages, previously only given at common law.
22
 While the courts of the United 
Kingdom, starting with Campbell v MGN Ltd in 2004, have routinely awarded 
                                                        
17  Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281, [186].  
18  Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 68; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 30; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) 
s 25; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 11; Judicature Act 1876 (Qld) s 4; RP Meagher, 
JD Heydon and MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002), [23–030]. See above n 14. 
19  Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) [19.11] states 
that some courts ‘have taken the view that Lord Cairns’ Act could, and should, apply to confidence 
claims’, but that ‘leading commentators continue to argue that Lord Cairns’ Act had no effect on causes 
of action which were purely equitable (such as breach of confidence), rather in such cases equitable 
compensation should be awarded.’ See also Ibid [19.15] and Cadbury Schweppes v FBI Foods [2000] 
FSR 491. 
20  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, [141]. 
21  Aplin et al, above n 19, [17.13] notes the ‘acceptance by the courts in most common law jurisdictions that 
(in relation to remedies at least) the rules of equity and law can be moulded to do practical justice means 
that the availability of remedies for breach of confidence are not, and should not be, confined by the 
nature of the jurisdiction upon which the claim is based. Rather the approach the court adopts should be 
flexible with the full panoply of remedies being available in appropriate cases. Nevertheless, this 
approach is not at present acknowledged by the Australian courts, and there is some indication that fusion 
has not been fully embraced elsewhere.’ 
22  Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298. 
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damages for emotional distress in the so-called ‘extended’ action of breach of 
confidence which protects against disclosures of private information, they are clearly 
underpinned by the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which provides 
a very different remedial framework from that in the Australian legal system. 
12.20 However, equity is traditionally seen as having a great deal of remedial 
flexibility and, provided the award is seen as consistent with broad equitable principles 
and doctrines, a lack of precedent may not be a significant problem.
23
 Gummow J has 
contrasted the approach of equity to the common law: 
The common law technique … looks to precedent and operates analogically as a 
means of accommodating certainty and flexibility in the law. Equity, by contrast, 
involves the application of doctrines themselves sufficiently comprehensive to meet 
novel cases. The question of a plaintiff ‘what is your equity?’[as posed by Gleeson CJ 
in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd24] thus has no common law counterpart.25 
12.21 Further, there is much strength in the simple point made by Neave JA, that ‘[a]n 
inability to order equitable compensation to a claimant who has suffered distress would 
mean that a claimant whose confidence was breached before an injunction could be 
obtained would have no effective remedy.’
26
 On these grounds, it is strongly arguable 
that compensation for emotional distress should be part of the armoury of remedies 
available to a court of equity when determining a claim for breach of confidence 
through the disclosure of private information. 
12.22 It may well be that courts will arm themselves with this power by following the 
lead of Giller v Procopets in the future. However, the position would be rendered more 
certain, and there would be less room for argument and expensive litigation along the 
way, if legislation were the source of that power. As Gurry has commented, ‘[a]ny 
discussion of the application of the remedy of damages in breach of confidence cases is 
fraught with difficulty at the outset’.
27
 It is therefore highly desirable that there be some 
legislative clarification. 
Injunctions, privacy and the public interest 
Proposal 12–2 Relevant court acts should be amended to provide that, 
when considering whether to grant injunctive relief before trial to restrain 
publication of private (rather than confidential) information, a court must have 
particular regard to freedom of expression and any other countervailing public 
interest in the publication of the material. 
                                                        
23  Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298, 304 (Spigelman CJ), quoted in Giller v Procopets 
(2008) 24 VR 1, [436] (Neave JA). 
24  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 216. 
25  Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 324 CLR 330, [57] (emphasis added). 
26  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, [424]. Cf [168]–[169] (Gillard J).Ibid [424], ibid [168]–[169].   
27  Aplin et al, above n 19, [19.02]. 
186 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
12.23 An interlocutory injunction is the most significant remedy to prevent a 
threatened invasion of privacy, such as the broadcast or publication of private 
information. However, of all remedies, an interlocutory injunction restraining 
publication is also the most significant restriction on freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the media to report on matters of public interest and concern. 
12.24 There is a strong and justifiable concern that undue restrictions upon freedom of 
speech and the freedom of the press might arise from unmeritorious claims to prevent 
the disclosure of allegedly ‘private’ information in which there is a legitimate public 
interest. 
12.25 The ALRC proposes that courts should be directed by appropriate legislation to 
consider countervailing interests in freedom of expression and other matters of public 
interest when considering the award of an interlocutory injunction to restrain the 
publication of private information. 
12.26 Several stakeholders supported this proposal.
28
 The ALRC would welcome 
further comment on the desirability and practicability of the proposal and the form and 
content of the proposed provision. 
12.27 The statutory tort for serious invasion of privacy proposed in this Discussion 
Paper itself provides for a public interest balancing process.
29
 In addition to this, the 
statute could further provide that courts must have particular regard to freedom of 
expression, when considering whether to grant injunctive relief. The experience in the 
United Kingdom, as discussed later in this chapter, would be relevant to the function 
and desirability of such a provision. 
12.28 However, this proposal would arguably be of particular benefit, on its own, if 
the statutory cause of action is not enacted. As set out below, there is some uncertainty 
as to the approach that a court should take to applications for injunctive relief in some 
cases. The question is whether it would be desirable for legislation to direct or guide 
the approach that the courts should take.  
12.29 This may be justified to promote not only coherence but also the balancing of 
freedom of expression and other public interests with privacy protection. The following 
sections set out the complex legal principles and issues that underpin this proposal. 
12.30 In a privacy case, perhaps even more so than in other cases such as cases for 
defamation,
30
 the stakes are high for both parties. Privacy in information, once lost, 
                                                        
28  RSPCA, Submission 49; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre 
Victoria, Submission 48; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, 
Submission 43; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18. 
29  See Ch 8. 
30  Defamation is essentially concerned with false and derogatory statements: David Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable 
Differences? Interlocutory Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy’ (2012) 17 Media & Arts Law Review 
170. The distinction may not be clear cut: damage to reputation may be difficult to repair, and some false 
slurs will inevitably leave a residual doubt in people’s minds, so that the harm is in fact irreparable: Hill v 
Church of Scientology of Toronto (1995) 2 SCR 1130, [166]. However, many false statements of ‘fact’ 
can be proved to be false.  
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may be lost forever,
31
 and no amount of compensation will render the information 
entirely private again.
32
 Equally, by the time the entitlement of the defendant to publish 
is adjudicated in a final hearing, the appropriate opportunity to reveal the relevant 
information or contribute to a public debate may be lost as the information’s novelty, 
relevance or interest is overtaken by other events. 
12.31 As with all court orders, the ultimate efficacy of an injunction will depend on 
the jurisdiction of the court over the apprehended conduct, as well as the location of the 
respondent. The court will not grant an injunction where it would be futile to do so, and 
one ground for futility may be the wide publicity already given to the relevant 
information.
33
 
12.32 According to equitable principles, as set out by the High Court of Australia in 
Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd
34
 and reaffirmed in ABC v O’Neill,
35
 
before the court will exercise its discretion to award an interlocutory injunction, an 
applicant must satisfy the court that: 
 there is a prima facie case, in the sense that there is a serious question to be tried 
as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, and a sufficient
36
 likelihood of success 
to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial; 
                                                        
31  Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25, 46 (Lord Cottenham): ‘In the present case, where privacy 
is the right invaded, postponing the injunction would be equivalent to denying it altogether.’ See also 
Tchenguiz v Imerman [2010] EWCA (Civ) 908, [54] (Lord Neuberger MR). Lord Nicholls made the same 
point as to confidentiality in Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee (2004) 1 AC 253, [18]. See also Eric 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 136. 
32  The court may, however, decide that damages would be an adequate remedy, and thus, on the threshold 
equitable test, refuse the injunction: see Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457, 
where Young J refused the plaintiff’s claim for an injunction to restrain the broadcast of footage obtained 
while trespassing on this ground, obviating the need to consider public interest. 
33  Candy v Bauer Media Limited [2013] NSWSC 979, [20]; Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] 
EWHC 687 (QB), [36]. See Normann Witzleb, ‘“Equity Does Not Act in Vain”: An Analysis of Futility 
Arguments in Claims for Injunctions’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 503. A related question of fact is 
whether, for the purposes of the equitable obligation, the information had the quality of confidence or 
whether it is at the relevant time in the public domain. Where publication is not widespread, there may 
still be some point to restricting further publication: Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 
CLR 408, [460]–[462] (Gaudron J); Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 
419, [428]–[429]; Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109. Contractual 
obligations of confidence raise different considerations: see Massingham v Shamin [2012] NSWSC 288 
(23 March 2012) and cases referred to therein. 
34  Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618. 
35  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57. See further David Rolph, ‘Showing 
Restraint: Interlocutory Injunctions in Defamation Cases’ (2009) 14 Media & Arts Law Review 255; 
Benedict Bartl and Dianne Nicol, ‘The Grant of Interlocutory Injunctions in Defamation Cases in 
Australia Following the Decision in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill’ (2006) 25 University 
of Tasmania Law Review 156. 
36  ‘The requisite strength of the probability of ultimate success depends upon the nature of the rights 
asserted and the practical consequences likely to flow from the interlocutory order sought… [such as the 
fact that] the grant or refusal of the interlocutory application would dispose of the action finally’: 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [71]-[72] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).  
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 the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate 
remedy;
37
 and 
 the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.
38
 
Injunctions in defamation and breach of confidence  
12.33 Applications for injunctive relief to restrain publication are commonly made in 
defamation and breach of confidence cases. 
12.34 In actions for defamation, an applicant faces additional hurdles to those set out 
in Beecham, when seeking an interlocutory injunction. The so-called rule in Bonnard v 
Perryman is derived from Lord Coleridge CJ’s statement in that case that defamation 
cases require ‘exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by 
injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong’.
39
 In particular, 
if a defendant asserts that it will defend the defamatory statement as true, then, ‘in all 
but exceptional cases’,
40
 the courts will exercise their discretion to refuse the 
injunction, leaving the defendant to publish and risk liability for damages. 
12.35 This caution in defamation cases is well-established in Australian law, although 
the defendant must go further than merely raising the defence.
41
 In ABC v O’Neill, 
Gleeson CJ and Crennan J noted that, in defamation cases, particular attention will be 
given to the public interest in free speech when considering whether an interlocutory 
injunction should be granted.
42
 Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to the need for the 
judge to consider ‘the … general and … profound issue involved in the policy of the 
law respecting prior restraint of publication of allegedly defamatory matter’.
43
 
12.36 Gummow and Hayne JJ also emphasised that claims for interlocutory 
injunctions in defamation in Australia, although reflecting the principle in Bonnard, are 
‘but one of a species of litigation to which the principles in Beecham apply’.
44
 That 
                                                        
37  This second factor is not necessary if the application is in the exclusive equitable jurisdiction of the court, 
for example to restrain the breach of an equitable duty of confidence: Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, 
above n 18, [21–345].  
38  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [19] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J); 
Ibid, [65]–[72] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
39  Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269, 283-285. Gummow and Hayne JJ point out in Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [80] that the court in Fleming v Newton [1848] 
9 ER 797 was wary both of usurping the role of the jury at trial and of constraining the liberty of the press 
after the lapsing of a statutory system of press licensing. 
40  Bonnard v Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269, 285. 
41  National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corpn Pty Ltd  [1989] VR 747; Chappell v 
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153; Clarke v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2000] 1 
Qd R 233; Jakudo Pty Ltd v South Australian Telecasters Ltd (1997) 69 SASR 440, [442]–[443]. 
42  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [19]. 
43  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) has been applied in several cases: AAMAC 
Warehousing & Transport Pty Limited v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2009] NSWSC 1030 
(28 September 2009); Crisp v Fairfax Media Ltd [2012] VSC 615 (19 December 2012); Allan v The 
Migration Institute of Australia Ltd [2012] NSWSC 965 (13 August 2012); cf Tate v Duncan-Strelec 
[2013] NSWSC 1446 (27 September 2013).   
44  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [75].  
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broader species includes cases where the disposal of the interlocutory application 
would effectively determine the case in its entirety, but also, presumably, applications 
for interlocutory injunctions in the auxiliary jurisdiction in general. 
12.37 In direct contrast to defamation cases, courts considering injunctions to restrain 
a breach of confidence do not exercise any special caution in the interests of free 
speech or other broadly defined public interests. Both in claims for breach of an 
equitable obligation of confidence, which lie in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction,
45
 and 
perhaps even more so in claims to restrain the breach of a contractual obligation of 
confidence,
46
 which lie in the auxiliary jurisdiction,
47
 authority in Australia takes a 
narrow approach to public interest considerations that would justify a breach. 
12.38 The principle of general application, where the court is considering an injunction 
to restrain the breach of an equitable obligation of confidence, was stated by Gummow 
J in Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and 
Alphapharm Pty Ltd: 
That principle, in my view, is no wider than one that information will lack the 
necessary attribute of confidence if the subject matter is the existence or real 
likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense of a crime, civil wrong or 
serious misdeed of public importance, and the confidence is relied upon to prevent 
disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing such crime, 
wrong or misdeed.48 
12.39 The current Australian approach differs from the much broader approach to 
public interest taken in the United Kingdom in such cases.
49
 In a later case, Gummow J 
stated: 
(i) an examination of the recent English decisions shows that the so-called ‘public 
interest’ defence is not so much a rule of law as an invitation to judicial idiosyncrasy 
by deciding each case on an ad hoc basis as to whether, on the facts overall, it is better 
to respect or to override the obligation of confidence, and (ii) equitable principles are 
best developed by reference to what conscionable behaviour demands of the 
                                                        
45  The exclusive jurisdiction arises where a court of equity is dealing with equitable claims: Meagher, 
Heydon and Leeming, above n 18, [21–015]. 
46  Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] 
FCA 266 (13 August 1987) [57]. 
47  The auxiliary jurisdiction of equity arises where the court is considering equitable remedies in aid of 
common law wrongs or to prevent the unconscionable reliance on common law rights: Meagher, Heydon 
and Leeming, above n 18, [21–345]. 
48  Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] 
FCA 266 (13 August 1987) [57]. 
49  Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, [72]–[94]; Re Corrs Pavey 
Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 266 (13 
August 1987), [41]; AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton 58 NSWLR 464, [173]; Meagher, Heydon and 
Leeming, above n 18, [41–115]–[41–125]. Cf Aplin et al, above n 19, [16.05]–[16.57] on the more recent, 
more expansive approach. 
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defendant not by balancing and then overriding those demands by reference to matters 
of social or political opinion.
50
 
12.40 More recently, it has been said that ‘[i]t is true that the existence of, and /or the 
extent of any public interest defence to a breach of confidentiality is by no means clear 
and settled in Australia’.
51
 
Injunctions to restrain disclosure of private information 
12.41 Questions then arise as to what approach the courts should take, in the absence 
of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, where they are considering a 
claim for misuse or disclosure of private (rather than confidential) information.
52
 
Should ‘private information’ cases be seen as more analogous to defamation cases or as 
more analogous to traditional breach of confidence cases? Should a similar caution as 
in defamation cases be exercised when considering applications for interlocutory 
injunctions to restrain publication of private information? 
12.42 In many cases where there is a potential for inconsistency between different 
causes of action, or between common law and statutory regimes, the High Court of 
Australia has emphasised the need for coherence in the development of the common 
law.
53
  
12.43 Although they may overlap, or arise concurrently, cases involving the 
apprehended disclosure of private information raise somewhat different issues from 
apprehended defamation cases. Unlike in a defamation case, a defendant in a privacy 
case cannot assert the truth of the disclosed information as a defence.
54
 There is, 
however, just as strong and justifiable a concern that undue restrictions upon freedom 
of speech and the freedom of the press might arise from unmeritorious claims to 
prevent the disclosure of allegedly ‘private’ information in which there is a legitimate 
public interest. It is therefore strongly arguable that similar considerations to those in 
defamation cases should apply where the defendant asserts a defence of sufficient 
strength to justify the court taking a cautious approach.
55
 The ALRC proposal reflects 
                                                        
50  Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Dept of Community Services and Health 
[1990] FCR 73, 111. See further, Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 
[72]–[94]. 
51  Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, [75]. 
52  Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB) (24 February 2012), [64]: ‘There is some 
uncertainty as to whether, and if so when, a court should refuse an injunction on the basis of Bonnard v 
Perryman when it is sought by a claimant who advances his cases only on the basis of privacy'. 
53  Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562. See further, Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory 
Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy’, above n 29, 187-190; Tilbury, above n 7, 130 ff.  
54  In the past, many claimants in Australia used the action for defamation to protect their privacy against 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts, because in some states, the defendant could not defend the 
defamation merely on the basis that the imputations were true, but also had to show a public interest or 
public benefit in their publication. This is no longer the case due to changes to the law by the uniform 
state Defamation Acts of 2005: C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook 
Co, 10th ed, 2011) 635–639.  
55  There is also a concern that, if the applicable considerations or approach to be applied by the courts in 
defamation cases and privacy cases differed, a claimant may attempt to avoid the cautious approach in 
defamation cases, by framing or pleading his or her case, inappropriately, as a privacy case: Lord Browne 
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that concern, and suggests that the courts should be directed to consider countervailing 
public interests when dealing with an application for an injunction to restrain the 
publication of private information. 
12.44 To avoid dispute and ensure consistency, any guidance by legislation should 
apply expressly to any action to prevent publication of information on the basis that it 
is private (rather than confidential) information. The key point is that, whether the legal 
protection of private information at common law in the future takes the form of a new 
tort or an extended action for breach of confidence, the court should be required to 
consider and weigh any countervailing public interests, such as freedom of expression, 
in its disclosure. This should apply regardless of whether the court is exercising its 
exclusive or auxiliary jurisdiction. 
12.45 The ALRC’s proposal has a similar intent to the provisions in s 12(4) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), although it is in more general terms. That provision 
reflects the concern that injunction applications in privacy actions may have a chilling 
effect on freedom of speech. Section 12(4) reinforces the requirement of the European 
Convention on Human Rights that the right to privacy in art 8 be balanced with the 
right to freedom of expression in art 10, when determining whether there has been an 
actionable invasion of privacy at all. While this balancing already takes place when 
determining whether there is an actionable misuse of private information,
56
 s 12 
provides added protection of art 10 rights:
57
 
s 12 Freedom of expression 
This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. 
... 
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the 
respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic 
material (or to conduct connected with such material), to— 
(a) the extent to which— 
  (i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
                                                                                                                                             
of Madingly v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWHC 202 (QB), [28] (Eady J). This concern 
motivated Tugendhat J in Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 202 (QB) to note at [88] that ‘it is a 
matter for the court to decide whether the principle of free speech prevails or not, and that it does not 
depend solely upon the choice of the claimant as to his cause of action’. He dismissed the claimant’s 
application for an injunction to restrain the publication of confidential and private information, at [123]: 
‘Having decided that the nub of this application is a desire to protect what is in substance reputation, it 
follows that in accordance with Bonnard v Perryman no injunction should be granted’. Witzleb argues 
that this approach is inconsistent with the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK); N Witzleb, 
‘Interim Injunctions for Invasions of Privacy: Challenging the Rule in Bonnard v Perryman?’ in N 
Witzleb et al (eds), Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014). Cf Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory Injunctions for Defamation 
and Privacy’, above n 29, on the Australian position. 
56  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
57  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012), 19-22. 
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  (ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published; 
(b) any relevant privacy code. 
12.46 Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) has been considered in a 
number of cases since its enactment and by a Joint Committee of the House of Lords 
and House of Commons in 2012. The courts rejected an interpretation that the sub-
section requires them to give greater weight to the Convention rights to freedom of 
expression than to the plaintiff’s interest in privacy. Lord Hope in Campbell v MGN 
Ltd: 
[A]s Sedley LJ said in Douglas v Hello! Ltd you cannot have particular regard to 
article 10 without having equally particular regard at the very least to article 8: see 
also Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) where Hale LJ said 
that section 12(4) does not give either article pre-eminence over the other. These 
observations seem to me to be entirely consistent with the jurisprudence of the 
European court.
58
 
12.47 The House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee’s Report stated: 
We do not think that section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 ... means that article 
10 has precedence over article 8 ... However, we support the decision of Parliament to 
make clear in law the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and would be 
concerned that removing section 12(4) might suggest that this is no longer the case.
59
 
12.48 In the light of well-established principles concerning ex parte applications,
60
 and 
the strength of the defendant’s case in interlocutory proceedings,
61
 it is not suggested 
that provisions similar to subsections (2) and (3) of s 12 of the Human Rights Act (UK) 
are necessary or desirable in Australia.
62
 
                                                        
58  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [488] (citations omitted). 
59  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012), [59]. David Price QC was quoted at [58] as 
having told the committee: ‘If the purpose of section 12 was to give the benefit of the doubt to freedom of 
expression then it has certainly failed’. Professor Gavin Phillipson of Durham Law School, quoted at 
[55], considered that s 12(4) was not intended ‘to establish priority for freedom of expression ... [and] it 
made more sense to read it as requiring judges to give as much weight to freedom of expression as the 
Convention itself allows’. 
60  See further, Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 18, [21–425]. 
61  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; Beecham Group v Bristol 
Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618.  
62  Section 12(2) and (3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) provides: ‘(2) If the person against whom the 
application for relief is made (the respondent) is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be 
granted unless the court is satisfied—(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the 
respondent; or (b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. (3) No 
such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the 
applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed’. On the meaning of ‘likely’ in 
subsection (3), see Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee (2004) 1 AC 253 where Lord Nicholls stressed at [22] 
that ‘likely’ could mean different things depending upon its context; ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2011] EWCA Civ 439 (19 April 2011), [6], [24]: '...likely in the sense of more likely than not'. 
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12.49 It should also be noted that this proposal is not intended to affect the existing 
law with regard to applications for injunctions to restrain the breach of an equitable or 
contractual obligation of confidence As explained above, particular considerations 
apply to the justification for a disclosure by a confidant in breach of a pre-existing 
obligation or by a third party who has knowledge that the information was imparted in 
confidence,
63
 where the law, for reasons of public interest, seeks to uphold and 
reinforce the obligation undertaken. Arguably, different considerations should apply, 
when there is no such obligation as the foundation for the plaintiff’s application, but 
the plaintiff relies merely on the nature of the information itself and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy that arises from the particular circumstances. In such cases, it is 
appropriate that greater weight be given to countervailing interests and matters of 
public interests. 
 
                                                        
63  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 18, [41–115]-[41–125]. See further, Australian Football League 
v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, [72]-[94]; Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of 
Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 266 (13 August 1987), [41]. Cf Aplin et al, 
above n 19, [16.05]–[16.57] on the recent more expansive English approach. 
 
13. Surveillance Devices 
 
Contents 
Summary 195 
Uniform surveillance laws 196 
A technology-neutral definition of ‘surveillance device’ 198 
Drones and mobile surveillance devices 199 
Wearable devices 199 
Data surveillance devices 200 
Tracking devices 200 
Uniform offences 201 
Uniform defences and exceptions 202 
Uniform workplace surveillance laws 205 
Compensation for victims of surveillance 206 
Surveillance device regulation by local councils 208 
Civil penalties and interaction with the statutory cause of action 209 
 
 
Summary 
13.1 In this chapter, the ALRC proposes that surveillance device laws and workplace 
surveillance laws should be made uniform throughout Australia.  
13.2 Existing surveillance device laws in each state and territory provide criminal 
offences for the unauthorised use of listening devices, optical surveillance devices, 
tracking devices, and data surveillance devices. These surveillance device laws provide 
important privacy protection by creating offences for unauthorised surveillance.  
13.3 However, there is significant inconsistency between the laws with respect to the 
types of devices regulated and with respect to the offences, defences and exceptions. 
This inconsistency results in reduced privacy protections for individuals, and increased 
uncertainty and compliance burdens for organisations. 
13.4 Additionally, the ALRC proposes that surveillance device laws make provision 
for courts to award compensation to victims of breaches of surveillance device laws. 
The ALRC has also asked whether local councils should be empowered to regulate the 
use of surveillance devices in some circumstances. Council regulation may be more 
appropriate for less serious uses of surveillance devices. 
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Uniform surveillance laws 
Proposal 13–1 Surveillance device laws and workplace surveillance laws 
should be made uniform throughout Australia.  
Proposal 13–2 Surveillance device laws should include a technology 
neutral definition of ‘surveillance device’. 
Proposal 13–3 Offences in surveillance device laws should include an 
offence proscribing the surveillance or recording of private conversations or 
activities without the consent of the participants. This offence should apply 
regardless of whether the person carrying out the surveillance is a participant to 
the conversation or activity, and regardless of whether the monitoring or 
recording takes place on private property. 
Proposal 13–4 Defences in surveillance device laws should include a 
defence of responsible journalism, for surveillance in some limited 
circumstances by journalists investigating matters of public concern and 
importance, such as corruption. 
Question 13–1 Should the states and territories enact uniform surveillance 
laws or should the Commonwealth legislate to cover the field? 
13.5 Surveillance device laws provide an important protection of privacy. Notably, 
the legislation offers some protection against intrusion into seclusion. Consistency in 
these laws is important both for protecting individuals’ privacy and for reducing the 
compliance burden on organisations that use surveillance devices in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
13.6 Protection from surveillance is a fundamental form of protection of privacy, 
particularly in the digital era. One US judge has described the impact of surveillance on 
privacy: 
What the ancients knew as ‘eavesdropping’ we now call ‘electronic surveillance’; but 
to equate the two is to treat man’s first gunpowder on the same level as the nuclear 
bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveller of human privacy ever known.1 
13.7 Surveillance laws protect other freedoms as well. Unauthorised surveillance may 
interfere with freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of association. 
13.8 Laws exist in each state and territory to regulate the use of surveillance devices.
2
 
These laws provide criminal offences for the unauthorised installation, use or 
                                                        
1  Douglas J of the Supreme Court (United States of America) as cited in Miller v TCN Channel Nine (1988) 
36 Crim R 92, 94 (Finlay J).  
2  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance 
Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act (NT). 
At the Commonwealth level, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) makes provisions for the use of 
 13. Surveillance Devices 197 
maintenance of surveillance devices to record private conversations and private 
activities.
3
 Other laws in the ACT, NSW and Victoria regulate the use of surveillance 
in the workplace. 
13.9 These surveillance device and workplace surveillance laws contain a number of 
significant inconsistencies across jurisdictions. These inconsistencies fall broadly into 
three categories. There are inconsistencies with respect to: 
 the type of the devices regulated; 
 the nature of the offences; and 
 the nature of the defences and exceptions. 
13.10 Consistency and uniformity in the surveillance device laws and workplace 
surveillance laws is desirable. Inconsistency means that privacy protections vary 
depending on which state or territory a person is located in. It also makes it more 
difficult for a person who finds themselves under surveillance to determine their legal 
position. Inconsistency also means that organisations with legitimate uses for 
surveillance devices face increased uncertainty and regulatory burden. Many 
stakeholders agreed that uniformity was desirable.
4
 The ALRC discussed the benefits 
of uniformity in its 2008 report, ‘For your information: Australian privacy law and 
practice’.
5
 
13.11 The ALRC has proposed that definitions, offences, prohibitions, defences and 
exceptions be made uniform across Australian states and territories. This proposal 
applies both to surveillance device laws and to workplace surveillance laws. 
13.12 The ALRC has not proposed a particular process for achieving uniformity. It 
may be appropriate for the Commonwealth to introduce new legislation, possibly 
through the introduction of a Commonwealth Act that covers the field, replacing state 
and territory surveillance device laws. Any such Commonwealth legislation would 
likely engage the external affairs power of the Australian Constitution, as a means of 
giving effect to Australia’s obligation under art 17 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights to protect privacy.
6
 Alternatively, a new Act may be 
supported by s 51(v) if it is characterised as regulating ‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic, 
                                                                                                                                             
surveillance devices by federal law enforcement officers, however it does not provide for offences 
applicable to general members of the public. 
3  Other laws provide related protections, without necessarily being designed to control the use of 
surveillance devices per se. For example, s 227A of the Queensland Criminal Code provides for a 
misdemeanour where a person observes or visually records another person ‘in circumstances where a 
reasonable adult would expect to be afforded privacy’, if the second person is in a private place or 
engaged in a private act and has not provided consent. A similar offence exists in s 91K of the Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW), where the recording is obtained for the purpose of obtaining ‘sexual arousal or sexual 
gratification’. While a surveillance device could be used in a way that contravened one of these laws, 
surveillance may occur in other situations. Surveillance is also included as a form of stalking in, eg, 
s 21A(f) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
4  M Paterson, Submission 60; Free TV, Submission 55; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Australian Industry Group, Submission 38; Law Institute 
of Victoria, Submission 22; D Butler, Submission 10. 
5  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) ch 3. 
6  The external affairs power and the ICCPR are discussed further in Ch 4. 
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and other like services’. A Commonwealth Act that covered the field would exist 
alongside other Commonwealth privacy protections under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), 
the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) and the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 1979 (Cth). The ALRC has asked whether it would be preferable to enact a 
Commonwealth law to replace state and territory surveillance device laws, rather than 
attempting to achieve uniformity in state and territory laws. 
A technology-neutral definition of ‘surveillance device’ 
13.13 Uniform surveillance device laws should adopt a technology-neutral definition 
of ‘surveillance device’ to ensure that the definition can be applied to a wide range of 
surveillance devices, including surveillance devices that emerge in the future. The 
definition should also extend to forms of surveillance that are not ‘devices’, such as 
data surveillance by software installed on a person’s computer.
7
 
13.14 This element of the ALRC’s proposal would address the inconsistencies in the 
types of devices regulated under the existing surveillance device laws. Four types of 
devices are recognised in at least one surveillance device law: listening devices, optical 
surveillance devices, data surveillance devices and tracking devices. However: 
 optical surveillance devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of 
the ACT, Queensland, SA or Tasmania; 
 data surveillance devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of the 
ACT, Queensland, SA, Tasmania, or WA, and are only regulated by the 
Victorian and NT surveillance device laws when used, installed or maintained 
by law enforcement officers; and 
 tracking devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of the ACT, 
Queensland, SA, or Tasmania. 
13.15 Even where two jurisdictions regulate similar devices, there are some 
inconsistencies in the definition of those devices. 
13.16 In NSW, for instance, a tracking device is defined as ‘any electronic device 
capable of being used to determine or monitor the geographical location of a person or 
an object’,
8
 while in Victoria, the definition is ‘an electronic device the primary 
purpose of which is to determine the geographical location of a person or an object’.
9
 
Many general-purpose devices—in particular, mobile phones—can also be used to 
determine location, despite this not being the primary purpose of the device. This 
difference in definition may therefore have a significant impact on the types of 
surveillance that are regulated in each state. 
13.17 In a 2001 interim report, the NSWLRC proposed defining ‘surveillance device’ 
as ‘any instrument, apparatus or equipment used either alone, or in conjunction with 
                                                        
7  R v Gittany (No 5) [2014] NSWSC 49 (11 February 2014) [7]. 
8  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 4(1) (definition of ‘tracking device’). 
9  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘tracking device’). 
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other equipment, which is being used to conduct surveillance’.
10
 The NSWLRC also 
proposed defining ‘surveillance’ as ‘the use of a surveillance device in circumstances 
where there is a deliberate intention to monitor a person, a group of people, a place or 
an object for the purpose of obtaining information about a person who is the subject of 
the surveillance’.
11
 
13.18 The regulation of several types of surveillance devices are discussed below. The 
ALRC welcomes comments from stakeholders on the appropriateness of regulating 
these or other types of surveillance devices. 
Drones and mobile surveillance devices 
13.19 The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry surveillance devices has 
generated some concern within Australia and internationally.
12
 Although a drone by 
itself may not be a surveillance device, other devices attached to a drone (such as 
microphones or video cameras) may be. 
13.20 The OAIC noted community concerns about drones in its 2012–13 annual 
report.
13
 At the time of writing, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
Social Policy and Legal Affairs is conducting an inquiry into the use of drones.
14
  
13.21 The ALRC has also received a number of submissions relating to drones. Some 
stakeholders noted, in general terms, the privacy issues relating to the use of drones.
15
 
Others commented on the use of drones to monitor activity taking place on farms.
16
 
Wearable devices 
13.22 Wearable devices, such as head-mounted cameras, have also generated public 
discussion. A notable example is Google’s ‘Glass’ technology, a wearable device that 
includes video and audio recording capabilities. Several stakeholders noted the privacy 
challenges presented by such devices.
17
 
13.23 Wearable devices with audio recording capabilities would typically fall within 
the definition of ‘listening device’ in each of the surveillance device laws. Similarly, 
wearable devices with optical recording capabilities would typically fall within the 
                                                        
10  NSW Law Reform Commission, Surveillance: An Interim Report, Report 98 (2001) Rec 1. 
11  Ibid Rec 2. 
12  See, for example, ‘Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance: Recommendations for Government Use 
of Drone Aircraft’ (American Civil Liberties Union, December 2011). 
13  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Annual Report (2012), xv. 
14  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into a matter arising from the 2012-13 Annual Report of the Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, namely the regulation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (2013). 
15  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 
20. 
16  Barristers Animal Welfare Panel and Voiceless, Submission 64; National Farmers’ Federation, 
Submission 62; RSPCA, Submission 49; Australian Lot Feeders’ Association, Submission 14. 
17  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; D Butler, 
Submission 10; P Wragg, Submission 4. 
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definition of ‘optical surveillance device’ in those laws that contain such a definition. 
However, several jurisdictions do not regulate optical surveillance devices. 
13.24 It is important to note that uniform surveillance device laws would not, and 
should not, prohibit the use of such devices generally. A wearable device may have 
many legitimate uses that do not amount to surveillance. Whether or not the use of a 
device constituted an offence would depend on the circumstances of its use, such as the 
activity being captured, the extent of the monitoring or recording, and whether or not 
parties to the activity were aware that the device was being used. 
Data surveillance devices 
13.25 Surveillance device laws generally do not regulate phone tapping and other 
types of data or communications surveillance. Communications surveillance is 
regulated under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (the 
TIA Act). Although the distinction between the two types of surveillance may become 
less clear as communication technologies continue to develop, the High Court has 
established that the TIA Act ‘covers the field’ of communications surveillance.
18
  
13.26 Some surveillance device laws regulate some types of data surveillance—for 
example, devices that capture data by recording a person’s keystrokes on a computer.
19
 
Other types of data surveillance may not be regulated under either surveillance device 
laws or the TIA Act. For example, information being transmitted over a 
radiocommunication system such as a wireless local network (wi-fi) appears to be 
excluded from the protections of the TIA Act
20
 and may also fall outside existing 
definitions of ‘data surveillance device’. Also, as noted in a submission from Associate 
Professor Moira Paterson,
21
 radio frequency identification (RFID) devices such as 
electronic door key cards or passports are capable of transmitting information, and 
should also be protected from surveillance. 
13.27 These types of data surveillance would need to be considered in drafting new 
uniform surveillance device laws. 
Tracking devices 
13.28 At present, tracking devices are regulated in only a few Australian jurisdictions. 
The definition of ‘tracking device’ is not consistent among these jurisdictions. Uniform 
surveillance device laws should address this inconsistency and ensure that tracking 
devices are regulated across Australia. 
13.29 Consideration should also be given to regulating methods of tracking that do not 
rely on a tracking device being carried by the individual, but instead make use of a 
network of devices to determine the individual’s location.
22
 This could include, for 
                                                        
18  Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269. 
19  See, eg, Surveillance Devices Act (NT) s 4 (definition of ‘data surveillance device’).  
20  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 5 (definitions of ‘telecommunications 
network’ and ‘telecommunications service’). 
21  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
22  Ibid; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
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example, a communications network being used to determine the location of an 
individual’s mobile phone, even where the mobile phone does not provide location 
information directly.
23
 
Uniform offences 
13.30 The ALRC proposes establishing uniform offences for the use of surveillance 
devices to monitor ‘private activities’ (however defined). The protection of privacy of 
individuals within Australia should not depend on the state or territory where the 
individual is located. One important step towards achieving uniformity would be 
ensuring that a given activity receives the same protection from surveillance regardless 
of the jurisdiction in which it occurs. To that end, a uniform definition of ‘private 
activity’ could be adopted.
24
 This would be in keeping with the largely uniform 
definitions of ‘private conversation’ that apply in each jurisdiction for the purposes of 
the offence for surveillance using a listening device. 
13.31 Each of the surveillance device laws provides a number of offences. These 
offences include, for example, offences for carrying out surveillance, offences for 
communicating information obtained by surveillance,
25
 and offences for providing 
surveillance devices for sale.
26
 
13.32 This chapter is concerned with the first of these types of offence—offences for 
carrying out surveillance.
27
 The nature of these surveillance offences under existing 
surveillance device laws differ across jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction has an offence of 
carrying out surveillance of a private conversation using a listening device.
28
 However, 
the offences with respect to other types of devices are inconsistent. For example: 
 the offence for optical surveillance of a private activity in Victoria does not 
apply to activities carried on outside a building—optical surveillance of 
activities in a person back yard, for example, are permitted under the Victorian 
Act;
29
 
                                                        
23  ‘Here, There and Everywhere: Consumer Behaviour and Location Services’ (Australian Communications 
and Media Authority, December 2012). 
24  An alternative approach would be to follow the NSW Act and define the offences in terms of interference 
with property rather than by reference to the nature of the conversation or activity under surveillance: 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8. 
25  Eg, Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 11, 12; Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 15, 16. 
26  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 13. 
27  This is not to say that there are no inconsistencies in the other types of offences. However, the offences 
for carrying out surveillance are the primary protections of privacy in these laws, and so removing the 
inconsistencies in these offences is a priority. 
28  Eg, Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 5; Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 4; 
Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43. 
29  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘private activity’). The Victorian Law Reform 
Commission has previously recommended removing the exception for activities carried on outside a 
building; see Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 
11. 
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 the offences for optical and data surveillance in NSW do not depend on the 
nature of the activity or information placed under surveillance, but only on 
whether the installation, use or maintenance of the surveillance device required 
entry onto premises or interference with a car, computer or other object;
30
 and 
 the offences for data surveillance in Victoria and the NT provide a more general 
offence for using a data surveillance device to monitor information input to, or 
output from, a computer system, but these offences only apply to law 
enforcement officers.
31
 
13.33 Differences also exist between the surveillance device laws with respect to the 
fault element in the offences for installing, using or maintaining a surveillance device. 
For example: 
 the offence for the use of a listening device under the Listening and Surveillance 
Devices Act 1972 (SA) requires intentional use of the device;
32
 
 the offence for the use of a listening device under the Invasion of Privacy Act 
1971 (Qld) does not require intent,
33
 although an exception applies for the 
‘unintentional hearing of a private conversation by means of a telephone’;
34
 and 
 the offence for the use of a listening device under the Listening Devices Act 
1991 (Tas) includes an exception for ‘the unintentional hearing of a private 
conversation by means of a listening device’
35
—not just for unintentional 
hearing by means of a telephone, as in the Queensland law. 
13.34 There are other inconsistencies in the surveillance device laws with regard to 
other offences, such as the communication of information obtained through prohibited 
surveillance. In order to ensure uniformity between the surveillance device laws, such 
inconsistencies would need to be removed as well. However, these other offences are 
largely dependent on the general offences (for installing, using, or maintaining 
surveillance devices) considered above. Achieving uniformity in these more general 
offences is therefore a prerequisite for obtaining uniformity in the remaining offences. 
Uniform defences and exceptions 
13.35 As well as uniform offences, the surveillance device laws of each state and 
territory should, as far as possible, provide for uniform defences and exceptions.
36
 
13.36 Many state and territory surveillance device laws contain a number of broadly 
similar exceptions to the offence of using, installing or maintaining a surveillance 
device. All jurisdictions permit surveillance in accordance with a warrant or other 
                                                        
30  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) ss 8, 10. 
31  Surveillance Devices Act (NT) s 14; Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 9. 
32  Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 4. 
33  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(1). 
34  Ibid s 43(2)(b). 
35  Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(2)(d). 
36  The inconsistency of defences in existing surveillance device laws was noted by D Butler, Submission 10. 
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authorisation,
37
 and all jurisdictions permit surveillance of a private conversation or 
activity if all the parties to the conversation or activity provide consent. Exceptions 
also exist for surveillance carried out in accordance with other legal requirements.
38
 
13.37 One significant difference between the surveillance device laws relates to 
surveillance of a private conversation or activity by a party to that conversation or 
activity. Typically, an exception to a surveillance offence exists where all parties to the 
private conversation or activity provide consent.
39
 However, in several jurisdictions, 
consent is not required if the person using, installing or maintaining the surveillance 
device is a party to the private activity or private conversation.
40
  
13.38 The inconsistency with regard to this exception for participants means, for 
instance, that a journalist who records a conversation to which they are a party may 
have committed an offence in one jurisdiction, while the same recording would be 
permitted in another jurisdiction. The VLRC has referred to this exception for 
participants as a ‘participant monitoring exception’.
41
 
13.39 Other defences and exceptions also differ between jurisdictions: 
 some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of all 
‘principal parties’ to a conversation, being those parties that speak or are spoken 
to in a private conversation or who take part in a private activity;
42
 
 some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of 
one principal party to a conversation and is reasonably necessary for the 
protection of a lawful interest of that principal party;
43
 
 some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of 
one principal party and is not carried out for the purpose of communicating the 
                                                        
37  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) ss 7(2)(a), 8(2)(a), 9(2)(a), 10(2)(a); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 
(Qld) s 43(2)(c); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 6; Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) 
s 5(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 6(2)(a), 7(2)(a), 8(2)(a), 9(2)(a); Surveillance Devices 
Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b), 6(2)(a), 6(2)(b), 7(2)(b), 7(2)(c); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 
4(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 11(2)(a), 12(2)(a), 13(2)(a), 14(2)(a). 
38  Such requirements can be found, for example, in Liquor Regulation 2008 (NSW) r 53H; Transport (Taxi-
Cab) Regulations 2005 (Vic) r 15. 
39  See, for example, Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 
1972 (SA) s 4; Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3), 6(3). In some jurisdictions, it is sufficient 
that the ‘principal parties’ to the conversation or activity provide consent. 
40  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 6(1), 7(1); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(2)(a); 
Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 11(1)(a), 12(1)(a). 
41  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [6.54]–[6.58]. 
42  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(a); Listening 
Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(c), 6(3)(a). 
43  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(b)(i); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(b)(i); 
Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(1) (but note that this does not require that the 
person is a principal party, merely a party); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(b)(i); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(d), 6(3)(b)(iii). 
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recording, or a report of the recording, to anyone who was not a party to the 
conversation or activity;
44
 and 
 some jurisdictions provide an exception where the use of a surveillance device is 
in the public interest.
45
 
13.40 The ALRC proposes that the defences and exceptions in the surveillance device 
laws be made consistent. In removing inconsistencies, it is necessary to decide which 
defences and exceptions should remain. The ABC expressed a concern that uniformity 
might be achieved by removing important defences and exceptions that allow for the 
use of surveillance devices in the public interest.
46
 The ALRC has specifically 
proposed a defence for responsible journalism (discussed further below). 
13.41 The ALRC also proposes that unified surveillance device laws do not include a 
participant monitoring exception. Removing this exception would provide greater 
privacy protections to individuals. Removing the exception would also provide greater 
freedom of expression to individuals, who would be able to take part in conversations 
and activities confident that no other participant was recording the event. 
13.42 The VLRC similarly proposed removing the participant monitoring exception 
from the Surveillance Device Law 1999 (Vic),
47
 noting that: 
[i]t is strongly arguable that it is offensive in most circumstances to record a private 
conversation or activity to which a person is a party without informing the other 
participants.48 
13.43 In the absence of the participant monitoring exceptions, certain other exceptions 
or defences may be appropriate. An exception may be appropriate where a person 
using surveillance is a party to a conversation or activity and the use of the surveillance 
is necessary for the protection of a lawful interest of that person. As noted earlier, this 
exception exists in other surveillance device laws,
49
 but is redundant where a 
participant monitoring exception applies. 
13.44 An exception should continue to apply where the consent of all parties had been 
obtained. Legitimate uses of surveillance devices (for example, to record a consumer’s 
agreement to the terms of a contract over the phone) would therefore not be affected, 
provided consent was obtained. 
                                                        
44  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(b)(ii); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(b)(ii) (this 
exception is not available with respect to optical surveillance); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 
5(3)(b)(ii). 
45  Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 24 (definition of ‘public interest’); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) 
s 41 (definition of ‘public interest’). 
46  ABC, Submission 46. 
47  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 18. 
48  Ibid [6.57]. 
49  Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(b)(i); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(b)(i); 
Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(1) (but note that this does not require that the 
person is a principal party, merely a party); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(b)(i); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(d), 6(3)(b)(iii). 
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13.45 Some legitimate uses of surveillance devices by journalists may place journalists 
at risk of committing an offence under existing surveillance device laws. Responsible 
journalism is an important public interest and should be protected. Journalists and 
media organisations should not be placed at risk of committing a criminal offence in 
carrying out legitimate journalistic activities. The ALRC has therefore proposed a 
‘responsible journalism’ defence to surveillance device laws. This defence should be 
confined to responsible journalism involving the investigation of matters of public 
concern and importance, such as the exposure of corruption. 
13.46 A number of other exceptions, as noted above, are already present in a number 
of the surveillance device laws. These exceptions should be considered in any process 
to make the surveillance device laws uniform. 
Uniform workplace surveillance laws 
13.47 Workplace surveillance legislation is also inconsistent across jurisdictions. 
Workplace surveillance laws recognise that employers are justified in monitoring 
workplaces for the purposes of protecting property, monitoring employee performance 
or ensuring employee health and safety. However, the interests of employers must be 
balanced against employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace. 
Specific workplace surveillance laws (the workplace surveillance laws) exist only in 
NSW,
50
 the ACT
51
 and, to some extent, in Victoria.
52
 As with general surveillance 
device laws, uniformity about workplace surveillance laws would promote certainty, 
particularly for employers and employees located in multiple jurisdictions. 
13.48 The Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) provides an offence for the use of an 
optical device or listening device to carry out surveillance of the conversations or 
activities of workers in workplace toilets, washrooms, change rooms or lactation 
rooms.
53
 Workplace surveillance in Victoria is otherwise subject to the same 
restrictions as general surveillance devices. 
13.49 The Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) applies to optical devices, tracking 
devices and data surveillance devices, but not to listening devices.
54
 The Act requires 
an employer to provide particular forms of notice to employees if one of these types of 
surveillance devices is in use in the workplace, and to consult with employees in good 
faith before surveillance is introduced.
55
 The Act also provides for ‘covert surveillance 
authorities’, allowing an employer to conduct surveillance without providing notice 
upon receiving an authority from a court. A covert surveillance authority will be issued 
only for the purpose of determining whether an employee is carrying out an unlawful 
activity, and is subject to various safeguards.
56
 The ACT Act also prohibits 
                                                        
50  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW). 
51  Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT). 
52  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) pt 2A. 
53  Ibid s 9B. 
54  Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) s 11(1) (definition of ‘surveillance device’). 
55  Ibid pt 3. 
56  Ibid pt 4. 
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surveillance of employees in places such as toilets, change rooms, nursing rooms, first-
aid rooms and prayer rooms, and surveillance of employees outside the workplace.
57
 
13.50 The Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) similarly applies only to ‘optical 
surveillance’, ‘computer surveillance’ and ‘tracking surveillance’.
58
 The NSW Act 
contains similar restrictions to those under the ACT Act. Surveillance devices must not 
be used in a workplace without sufficient notice being provided to employees,
59
 must 
not be used in a change room, toilet, or shower facility,
60
 and must not be used to 
conduct surveillance of the employee outside work.
61
 Covert surveillance must not be 
used unless a covert surveillance authority is obtained.
62
 The NSW Act also places 
limitations on the restriction of employee email and internet access while at work.
63
 
13.51 The inconsistencies between these workplace surveillance laws are relatively 
minor—for example, slightly different definitions apply, and the types of rooms that 
may not be put under surveillance differ slightly between each law. A more significant 
need for reform arises because specific workplace surveillance laws exist only in these 
jurisdictions. The ALRC therefore proposes that there be uniform workplace 
surveillance laws across Australia. 
13.52 Establishing uniform workplace surveillance laws in each of the states and 
territories would provide greater privacy protections for employees and greater 
certainty for employers operating in multiple jurisdictions. These laws could be 
contained in specific workplace surveillance laws, as they are in the ACT and NSW, or 
integrated into the more general surveillance device laws, as they are in Victoria.
64
 
Compensation for victims of surveillance 
Proposal 13–5 Surveillance device laws should provide that a court may 
make orders to compensate or otherwise provide remedial relief to a victim of 
unlawful surveillance. 
13.53 Privacy protections afforded to individuals by the criminal law are limited in 
that the criminal law punishes the offender without necessarily providing redress to the 
                                                        
57  Ibid pt 5. 
58  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) s 3. The definition of ‘tracking surveillance’ refers to a device 
‘the primary purpose of which is to monitor or record geographical location or movement’. This is 
arguably another inconsistency in surveillance laws. The definition of ‘tracking device’ in s 4 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) does not require that tracking be the primary purpose of the device, 
but the definition of ‘tracking device’ in s 3 of the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) does require 
that tracking be the primary purpose. 
59  Ibid pt 2. 
60  Ibid s 15. 
61  Ibid s 16. An exception applies where the surveillance is computer surveillance on equipment provided at 
the employer’s expense. 
62  Ibid pt 4. 
63  Ibid s 17. 
64  The latter, integrated approach was recommended by the NSWLRC: NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Surveillance: An Interim Report, Report 98 (2001) Rec 57. 
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victim. While an individual who has been subjected to unlawful surveillance may gain 
some satisfaction from seeing the offender fined, and while the fine may dissuade the 
offender from conducting further unlawful surveillance in the future, the victim will 
generally not receive any compensation or other personal remedy. 
13.54 If uniform surveillance device laws are introduced through reforms to existing 
state and territory legislation, a provision allowing for compensation to victims would 
operate alongside compensation provisions already provided for by existing state and 
territory legislation.
65
 However, providing for compensation within the uniform 
surveillance device laws would ensure that uniform compensation mechanisms existed 
for victims of unlawful surveillance. 
13.55 All states and territories have established victims’ compensation schemes that 
provide for compensation to be paid to victims of crimes.
66
 Unlike an order for 
compensation to be paid by an offender, a victims’ compensation scheme does not 
depend on an offender’s ability to pay the compensation. However, victims’ 
compensation schemes are generally available only for serious physical crimes such as 
assault, robbery, or sexual assault,
67
 and surveillance is therefore unlikely to give rise 
to compensation under these schemes. 
13.56 The ALRC proposes that the surveillance device laws of the states and 
territories—whether made uniform or not—should allow courts to order compensation 
be paid to individuals who are victims of unlawful surveillance. Such a change to 
surveillance device laws was suggested by Professor Des Butler, who submitted that 
the laws ‘should in addition make provision for recovery of compensation or other 
remedies such as injunction by any aggrieved person’.
68
 
13.57 Mechanisms for compensation can be found in other, analogous, criminal laws. 
Remedial relief is available, for example, under s 107A of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1997 (Cth). Under this section, an aggrieved individual 
may apply to the court for remedial relief if a defendant is convicted of intercepting or 
communicating the contents of a communication.
69
 
                                                        
65  Courts may order compensation for loss, injury or damage under, for example, Crimes (Sentencing) Act 
2005 (ACT) s 18; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 53; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 85B; 
Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) ss 91–103. 
66  For a general discussion of these schemes, see Australian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Family Violence: A National Legal Response, ALRC Report No 114, NSWLRC 
Report 128 (October 2010) ch 4. 
67  Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) s 5; Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic) ss 7–13. 
68  D Butler, Submission 10. 
69  The remedies available under this section include, but are not limited to: a declaration that the 
interception or communication was unlawful; an order for payment of damages; an order, similar to or 
including, an injunction; and an order that the defendant pay the aggrieved person an amount not 
exceeding any income derived by the defendant as a result of the interception or communication: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 107A(7). 
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Surveillance device regulation by local councils 
Question 13–2 Should local councils be empowered to regulate the 
installation and use of surveillance devices by private individuals? 
13.58 A number of submissions have raised concerns regarding CCTV cameras, 
installed for security in homes and offices, but that may also record the activities of 
neighbours. Such uses of surveillance may be more appropriately regulated by local 
councils, rather than surveillance device laws. 
13.59 By regulating surveillance devices at the local council level, it may be possible 
to resolve many disputes without recourse to the criminal law. A clear and transparent 
resolution process via local council would also potentially increase access to justice in 
circumstances where criminal penalties may be perceived as too severe. 
13.60 Local governments are responsible for duties such as assessing and authorising 
development of houses, granting or disallowing various structural changes to property 
and protection of the environment. In New South Wales, for example, the 
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) and related planning 
instruments set out the types of development that require development consent from 
the local council. The installation of surveillance devices that overlook neighbouring 
properties could similarly require development consent. 
13.61 Alternatively, the installation of surveillance devices could be included as a type 
of development that does not require development consent, provided certain conditions 
are met.
70
 
13.62 Some councils already regulate surveillance devices. The City of Sydney 
Council, for example, has made determinations in the past on details such as the 
installation location and types of camera that may be used.
71
 However, not all councils 
have such requirements. 
13.63 Mechanisms for challenging local council decisions already exist in all states. 
For example, in NSW, review of a council’s decision by the NSW Land and 
Environment Court is available under s 82A of the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). In Victoria, the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (VCAT) can hear appeals against decisions of planning and development 
applications made by local councils.
72
 
                                                        
70  The State Environment Planning Policy (Exempt and Complying Development Codes) 2008 (NSW) (the 
Policy) sets out a range of developments which do not require council development consent, as long as 
certain conditions are met. For example, cls 2.3 and 2.4 of the Policy provide that development consent is 
not required for a aerial or antenna that at least 900mm away from a lot boundary and no higher than 
1.8m above the highest point of the building’s roof (if roof-mounted). 
71  See, for example, Szann v Council of City of Sydney [2012] NSWLEC 1168 (21 June 2012). 
72  Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ss 77–86. 
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Civil penalties and interaction with the statutory cause of 
action 
13.64 Some stakeholders suggested that a civil penalties regime should be considered 
to either complement or replace the criminal regime that currently exists under the 
surveillance device laws.
73
 These stakeholders suggested that a civil penalties regime 
would be useful in light of the low levels of enforcement under the existing criminal 
regime. The VLRC has also recommended the introduction of a civil penalties regime 
in the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic).
74
 
13.65 There may be benefits in introducing a civil penalties regime into the 
surveillance device laws. For certain matters, a civil penalties process, potentially 
managed by a non-judicial regulator, could be cheaper, faster, and less burdensome 
than a criminal proceeding, both on the complainant and on the respondent. 
Additionally, criminal penalties may be unnecessarily severe for uses of surveillance 
devices that do not result in serious harm to the individual. 
13.66 However, the ALRC has not proposed a civil penalties regime. The ALRC’s 
proposal to allow courts to award compensation to victims of unlawful surveillance 
would achieve many of the objectives of a civil penalties regime, without the need to 
create new bodies to hear civil disputes about surveillance. Furthermore, the 
introduction of a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy would 
provide another means of redress for unlawful surveillance. The introduction of a civil 
penalties regime for surveillance may result in overlap, excessive complexity and 
regulatory burden if a statutory cause of action were also introduced. 
                                                        
73  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
74  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) Rec 19. 
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Summary 
14.1 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry require the ALRC to make 
recommendations as to other legal remedies to redress serious invasions of privacy and 
innovative ways in which the law may reduce serious invasions of privacy. 
14.2 Many serious invasions of privacy—perhaps some of the most serious—will 
also amount to harassment. Harassment involves a pattern of behaviour or course of 
conduct pursued by an individual designed to intimidate and distress another 
individual. The behaviour must be genuinely oppressive and vexatious and not amount 
to a mere irritation or annoyance. Laws that target harassment will often also serve to 
protect people’s privacy. 
14.3 The ALRC proposes that, if a new tort for serious invasion of privacy is not 
enacted, a Commonwealth harassment Act should be enacted that provides for a new 
tort of harassment. This Act would also consolidate and clarify existing criminal 
offences for harassment, including harassment using the internet. 
14.4 This harassment legislation should be enacted by the Commonwealth. A federal 
Harassment Act will ensure consistent protection across Australia. 
A Commonwealth harassment Act 
Proposal 14–1 A Commonwealth harassment Act should be enacted to 
consolidate and clarify existing criminal offences for harassment and, if a new 
tort for serious invasion of privacy is not enacted, provide for a new statutory 
tort of harassment. Alternatively, the states and territories should adopt uniform 
harassment legislation.  
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14.5 This new Commonwealth harassment Act should consolidate existing federal, 
state and territory criminal offences for harassment. The offences should relate to 
harassment, irrespective of whether it occurred through online or telecommunications 
platforms, or through other physical or personal means. 
14.6 If a new tort for serious invasions of privacy is not enacted, the ALRC proposes 
that this harassment Act should also include a civil action for harassment. This will 
help deter and redress some egregious types of invasion of privacy that are not 
currently the subject of effective legal protection. 
Nexus between harassment and privacy 
14.7 A serious invasion of privacy may often also amount to harassment. Harassment 
involves deliberate conduct. It may be done maliciously, to cause anxiety or distress or 
other harm, or it may be done for other purposes. Regardless of the intention, 
harassment will often cause anxiety or distress. Harassment also restricts the ability of 
an individual to live a free life. 
14.8 The following is a list of examples of conduct that may in some cases amount to 
both a serious invasion of privacy as well as harassment where the conduct is repeated, 
unwanted and intended to distress and demean an individual: 
 following or keeping under surveillance; 
 eavesdropping and wiretapping; 
 reading private letters and other private communication;
1
 
 using surveillance devices to monitor, intimidate or distress someone, for 
example, through the use of cameras outside abortion clinics or aerial 
surveillance of private property using aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles;
2
 
 publishing personal data as a means of harassment, for example in the context of 
failed relationships or bullying or where incidents involving bullying are filmed 
and publicised as a means of further demeaning a victim;
3
 
 pursuing a person in a sustained manner to track their private activities or to 
photograph them in private contexts, without their permission, including 
relentless pursuit by media or other parties; and 
 communicating in a relentless and unwanted manner with an individual, such as 
through persistent telephone calls.
4
 
                                                        
1  Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’ (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, 429. 
2  In Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB) (25 January 2006) a UK court granted an injunction to 
restrain aerial surveillance under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK). This case involved the 
defendant flying banners from private aircraft addressed to and referring to the plaintiff in derogatory 
terms, and dropping leaflets containing information about the plaintiff.  
3  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
4  Some of these are examples of conduct that has been the subject of claims under the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (UK). 
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Harassment Acts in other countries 
14.9 Useful models for a Commonwealth Harassment Act include the UK’s 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and New Zealand’s Harassment Act 1997. 
14.10 The UK’s Protection from Harassment Act 1997 creates criminal offences when 
a person engages in a ‘course of conduct’ that amounts to harassment.
5
 It is an offence 
for a person to pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another and 
which they know or ought to know amounts to harassment.
6
 The Act defines 
harassment as having occurred if ‘a reasonable person in possession of the same 
information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment’.
7
  
14.11 The Act provides for the award of civil remedies, including injunctions and 
damages to victims of harassment. The UK Act also creates the instrument of non-
harassment orders. Where a person is convicted of the offence of harassment, a 
prosecutor may apply to the court to make a non-harassment order against the offender 
requiring them to refrain from ‘such conduct in relation to the victim as specified in the 
order for such periods may be so specified’.
8
 
14.12 New Zealand’s Harassment Act 1997 provides for harassment restraining orders 
and criminal penalties for harassment. The criminal offence of harassment applies 
where a person intends to cause fear to another person.
9
 A person who is prosecuted for 
harassment can face up to two years imprisonment.
10
 Plaintiffs can also apply to a court 
for a civil restraining order to prevent conduct amounting to harassment, breach of 
which will lead to penalties.
11
 The New Zealand Act does not provide for 
compensation for victims. However, the common law has developed a tort of intrusion 
upon seclusion, which has been used to provide compensation for victims of 
harassment.
12
 
14.13 A range of behaviours amounting to harassment have been successfully targeted 
through the UK and NZ harassment frameworks.
13
 
14.14 Other comparable jurisdictions have enacted legislation to specifically target 
cyber-harms and so-called ‘revenge pornography’.
14
 New Zealand’s government is 
currently considering legislation to tackle ‘harmful digital communications’ by way of 
                                                        
5  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) ss 1, 2. The UK Supreme Court recently discussed the 
complexity in interpreting the Act: Hayes (FC) v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17. 
6  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) s 1. 
7  Ibid s 1(2). 
8  Ibid s 11. 
9  Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) s 8. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid s 9. 
12  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012). 
13  For example, cases of workplace harassment: Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] 
UKHL 34; aerial surveillance over private property: Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB); 
restraining media and paparazzi from following individuals: Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2002] EMLR 78. 
14  Eg, New Jersey legislation criminalises the reproduction or disclosure of images of sexual contact without 
consent: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:14-9 (2013). 
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the Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013. If enacted, the legislation would 
prohibit an individual from sending a message to another person—for example by text, 
online publication or email—where the conduct of that message is grossly indecent, 
obscene, menacing or knowingly false, and where the sender intends the message to 
cause emotional distress to the recipient.
15
 This offence would be punishable by up to 
three months imprisonment or a NZ$2,000 fine. 
14.15 Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act 2013 creates a tort of cyber-bullying so that ‘a 
person who subjects another person to cyber-bullying commits a tort against that 
person’.
16 
Cyber-bullying is defined in this Act as using ‘electronic communication 
through the use of technology, including … social networks, text messaging, instant 
messaging, websites and electronic mail … typically repeated or with continuing 
effect, that is intended or ought reasonably to be expected to cause fear, intimidation, 
humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another person’s health, emotional 
well-being, self-esteem or reputation’.
17
 In an action for cyber-bullying, a court may 
award damages including general, special, aggravated and punitive damages.
18
 A court 
may also issue an injunction
19
 or make an order that the court considers ‘just and 
reasonable in the circumstances’.
20
 
Civil remedies  
14.16 The courts in Australia have not recognised a common law cause of action for 
harassment. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to ‘what may be a developing tort of harassment’,
21
 
citing the work of Professor Stephen Todd from New Zealand.
22
 New Zealand has now 
enacted the Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) and the courts have recognised a tort of 
intrusion into seclusion.
23
 
14.17 In Grosse v Purvis
24
 a Queensland District Court judge recognised an actionable 
right to privacy, after a finding that the defendant had persistently and intentionally 
stalked and harassed the plaintiff for six years. Because of his conclusion on the 
actionable right to privacy, there was no need to decide whether a tort of harassment 
should be recognised.  
                                                        
15  Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (NZ) cl 19. 
16  Cyber-Safety Act, SNS 2013, c 2 2013 s 3(b). 
17  Cyber-Safety Act 2013 (SNS) s 3(b). 
18  Ibid s 22(1)(a). 
19  Ibid s 22(1)(b). 
20  Ibid s 22(1)(c). 
21  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [123]. 
22  Stephen Todd, ‘Protection of Privacy’ in Nicholas Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information 
Services, 6th ed, 1997). 
23  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 (24 August 2012). 
24  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003); Des A Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in 
Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 352. Doubt has been expressed about the 
correctness of Grosse v Purvis: see Ch 3. The case was settled before the defendant’s appeal was heard. 
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14.18 Many instances of harassment will involve a serious invasion of privacy and yet 
not give rise to an existing tort. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a significant gap in 
the protection of privacy by the common law.
25
 
14.19 For example, the tort of trespass to land can be used only where there has been 
an unlawful intrusion onto property.
26
 Surveillance or harassment from outside the 
property would not come within the tort. Further, the harassment may occur on 
property where the victim is not the occupier with the required title to sue for 
trespass.
27
 
14.20 The harassment may not involve any physical contact amounting to the tort of 
battery and may not involve a threat of physical contact which is necessary for a tort 
action in assault.
28
 
14.21 The tort of nuisance requires an interference with the lawful occupier’s use and 
enjoyment of land.
29
 Nuisance has been useful in limited cases such as where a CCTV 
camera is erected at a neighbour’s backyard, prohibiting their use and enjoyment of the 
garden.
30
 However, again, a person’s right to sue is limited.
31
 
14.22 The tort of wilful infliction of nervous shock
32
 is an inadequate remedy for 
many instances of harassment as a claimant must prove actual physical or psychiatric 
injury. Harassment, however, will often result only in emotional distress.  
14.23 A new tort for harassment would provide for a targeted avenue for civil redress 
where the conduct is not redressed by existing torts.  
Criminal offences 
14.24 State, territory and federal laws provide a number of criminal offences relating 
to different forms of harassment across. There would be advantages in clarifying, 
consolidating and making uniform the range of criminal offences for harassment across 
Australia. 
14.25 State and territory criminal laws criminalise harassment and stalking conducted 
through online or other forms of electronic communication. However, these offences 
vary considerably depending on the jurisdiction. For instance, legislation in 
Queensland criminalises harassment through all forms of electronic communication in 
the offence of stalking by ‘otherwise contacting the victim’.
33
 In Victoria, the 
definition of stalking extends to a course of conduct committed via ‘electronic 
                                                        
25  See Barbara McDonald, ‘Tort’s Role in Protecting Privacy: Current and Future Directions’ in James 
Edelman, James Goudkamp and Degeling (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
26  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635. 
27  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
28  RP Balkin and JLR Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [3.16]. 
29  Ibid [14.1]. 
30  Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14837. 
31  Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter and Others v London Docklands Corporation [1997] 
UKHL 14. 
32  Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417. 
33  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 395A(7)(b). 
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communications’.
34
 The National Children’s and Youth Law Centre supported the need 
to ‘address the gaps’ in the current legal frameworks for cyber-bullying and 
harassment.
35
 
14.26 The Commonwealth Criminal Code
36
 provides for an offence of ‘using a 
carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence’
37
 and ‘using a carriage service to 
make a threat’.
38
 These would capture conduct amounting to harassment, for example, 
via the internet, including social media, and telephone.
39
 
14.27 There are also laws to protect victims of family violence from harassment, 
including harassment via electronic communications. For example, stalking is included 
in the definition of ‘family violence’ in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
40
 
14.28 The Australian Government Department of Communications is currently 
conducting a review into online safety for children.
41
 The Department has been asked 
to consider simplifying the meaning and application of s 474.17 of the Criminal Code. 
The Department’s Discussion Paper suggested that ‘the existing offence is worded in a 
way that people, particularly minors, would not understand’.
42
 The Department has 
outlined three options for reform. First, to retain the existing provision and implement 
education to raise awareness of its potential application. Secondly, to create a cyber-
bullying offence with a civil penalty regime for minors, and thirdly, to create a take-
down system and accompanying infringement notice scheme to regulate complaints 
about online content. 
A Commonwealth Act or uniform legislation 
14.29 There are a number of suitable constitutional heads of power which may enable 
the Commonwealth to enact legislation on harassment.
43
 A new Commonwealth 
Harassment Act may be supported by the external affairs power.
44
 It may be argued 
that harassment constitutes ‘an arbitrary or unlawful interference with ... privacy, 
                                                        
34  Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A(2)(b). 
35  National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61. 
36  This point was made in: Department of Communications Australian Government, ‘Enhancing Online 
Safety for Children: Public Consultation on Key Election Commitments’ (January 2014). 
37  Criminal Code (Cth) s 474.17. 
38  Ibid s 474.15. 
39  At the Bullying, Young People and the Law Symposium hosted by the Alannah and Madeline Foundation 
in Sydney from July 18-19 2013, delegates recommended that Australian governments introduce a 
specific, and readily understandable, criminal offence of bullying, including cyber-bullying, involving a 
comparatively minor penalty to supplement existing laws which are designed to deal with more serious 
forms of conduct. 
40  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(2)(c). 
41  The Department of Communications released a public discussion paper on 22 January 2014 and was 
awaiting submissions to that discussion paper by 7 March 2014. Australian Government 2014, 
‘Enhancing Online Safety for Children: Public Consultation on Key Election Commitments’, discussion 
paper, Department of Communications. The Government has founded an Online Safety Consultative 
Working Group to provide advice to government on online safety issues. 
42  Ibid. 
43  See also the discussion of constitutional issues in Ch 4. 
44  Australian Constitution s 51(xxix). 
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family, home or correspondence’,
45
 or some other interference with fundamental 
liberties protected by the ICCPR.  
14.30 Alternatively, a new Act may be supported by s 51(v) of the Australian 
Constitution. A court would likely hold that this head of power supports a law 
regulating harassment effected by postal, telegraphic and telephonic services, as well as 
online services. However, the new Act is intended to cover both online and offline 
forms of harassment. It is unlikely that the latter category would be supported by 
s 51(v).   
14.31 By way of comparison, the sexual harassment provisions in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
46
 are supported by numerous heads of power including 
the external affairs power in relation to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Violence against Women.
47
 
14.32 If the Commonwealth does not have the power to enact harassment legislation, 
covering both so-called ‘online’ and ‘offline’ harassment, the ALRC proposes that the 
states and territories adopt uniform harassment legislation. National consistency in 
privacy law is important as inconsistency can lead to fragmentation, poor protection for 
all individuals in Australia and can also burden business.
48
  
14.33 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder submissions on these constitutional issues, in 
addition to comments on the proposal overall. 
                                                        
45  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17(1). 
46  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
47  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1980, 1249 UNTS (entered into force 3 September 1981). 
48  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) 3.13. 
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Summary 
15.1 This chapter sets out proposals and questions about new regulatory mechanisms 
to reduce and redress serious invasions of privacy. The new regulatory powers 
proposed in this chapter are not intended to be an alternative to the new tort. The 
ALRC considers that these powers could operate alongside the new tort. 
15.2 Two regulatory bodies are considered. The first is the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) which has powers relating to the 
broadcast media under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). The second is the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) which has powers relating 
to information privacy under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).  
15.3 In this chapter, the ALRC first proposes that the ACMA be empowered to make 
a determination that a complainant should be compensated where a broadcaster’s 
conduct amounts to a serious invasion of the complainant’s privacy in breach of a 
broadcasting code of practice. The proposed new power of the ACMA would be 
similar to existing powers of the OAIC. 
15.4 Secondly, the ALRC proposes the introduction of a new Australian Privacy 
Principle (APP) which would require APP entities to take reasonable steps to delete 
personal information about an individual on request. The ALRC has also asked a 
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question about a possible take-down system that would empower a regulator to require 
an organisation to remove information about an individual from a website or online 
service, where the publication of that information is a serious invasion of privacy. The 
regulator would be required to have regard to freedom of expression and other public 
interests. This may be a fast, low-cost mechanism to limit the risk, extent, and harm of 
a serious invasion of privacy. 
15.5 Thirdly, the ALRC proposes that the statutory functions of the Australian 
Information Commissioner
1
 be amended to include acting as amicus curiae and 
intervening in appropriate court proceedings, with leave of the court.  
15.6 In this chapter, the ALRC also discusses the small business exemption to the 
Privacy Act and an extended complaints process for the OAIC. 
Expanding the ACMA’s powers 
Proposal 15–1 The ACMA should be empowered, where there has been a 
privacy complaint under a broadcasting code of practice and where the ACMA 
determines that a broadcaster’s act or conduct is a serious invasion of the 
complainant’s privacy, to make a declaration that the complainant is entitled to a 
specified amount of compensation. The ACMA should, in making such a 
determination, have regard to freedom of expression and the public interest. 
Existing powers of the ACMA relating to codes of practice 
15.7 The ACMA has regulatory powers over broadcasting (including radio and 
television) and telecommunications. These powers are granted primarily under the 
Australian Communication and Media Authority Act 2005 (Cth), the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth), the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). Regulatory powers in 
relation to specific privacy issues are also granted to the ACMA under the Spam Act 
2003 (Cth) and the Do Not Call Register Act 2009 (Cth). 
15.8 The ACMA’s powers are primarily exercised by promoting self-regulation (in 
which industry members regulate themselves under industry guidelines, codes or 
standards) and co-regulation (in which industry members develop guidelines, codes or 
standards that are enforceable under legislation).  
15.9 Privacy provisions with public interest exceptions exist in a range of 
broadcasting industry codes of practice. The privacy provisions of the codes relating to 
broadcasters are limited to broadcasts of news and current affairs programs.
2
 
                                                        
1  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) currently confers a number of functions on the Australian Information 
Commissioner. 
2  Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice 2010 cl 4.3.5; Commercial Radio Codes of Practice and 
Guidelines 2011 cl 2.1(d); ABC Code of Practice 2011 cl 6.1; SBS Codes of Practice 2014 cl 1.9. 
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15.10 If a code is breached, the ACMA may: determine an industry standard;
3
 make 
compliance with the code a condition of the broadcaster’s license;
4
 or accept an 
enforceable undertaking from the broadcaster that the broadcaster will comply with the 
code.
5
 Further consequences—including civil penalties, criminal penalties, and 
suspension or cancellation of a broadcaster’s license—exist for a breach of a standard,
6
 
a license condition
7
 or an enforceable undertaking.
8
 
15.11 Distinct powers exist if a complaint is made against the ABC or SBS. In these 
cases, the ACMA may recommend that the broadcaster take action to comply with the 
relevant code, or that the broadcaster take other action including publishing an apology 
or retraction.
9
 
15.12 The ACMA does not have the power to determine that compensation be paid to 
an individual whose privacy has been seriously invaded by a broadcaster. 
An extension of the ACMA’s powers 
15.13 The ALRC’s proposal would grant a new power allowing the ACMA to make a 
declaration that a complainant should be compensated for any loss or damage suffered 
from a serious invasion of privacy by a broadcaster. This would provide the ACMA 
with a power similar to that held by the OAIC under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
10
 
However, the relevant provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply to a media 
organisation acting in a journalistic capacity if the organisation has publicly committed 
to observing privacy standards.
11
 
15.14 Granting this power to the ACMA would help to address the limitation of the 
Broadcasting Services Act that an individual is not entitled to compensation or other 
forms of personal redress when their privacy is invaded in breach of a broadcasting 
code of conduct. Granting this power would also provide consistency between the 
powers of the OAIC and the powers of the ACMA in respect of privacy. 
15.15 Under this proposal, the ACMA would be empowered to make a declaration for 
compensation only in cases where an invasion of privacy was serious. This condition 
would not be met by all invasions of privacy under relevant codes of practice.  
15.16 It is important to note that any determination made by the OAIC under s 52(1A) 
of the Privacy Act must be enforced in the Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court.
12
 A 
                                                        
3  Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 125. 
4  Ibid s 44. 
5  Ibid s 205W. 
6  Ibid pt 9B div 5. 
7  Ibid pt 10 div 3. 
8  Ibid pt 14D. 
9  Ibid ss 150–152. 
10  Under s 52(1A)(d) of the Privacy Act, the Australian Information Commissioner, in response to a 
complaint, may make a determination including a declaration that the respondent pay an amount of 
compensation to the complainant. 
11  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 7B(4). 
12  Ibid s 55A. 
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similar procedure would be required to enforce a declaration made by the ACMA 
under the new power proposed by the ALRC. 
15.17 Strengthening the ACMA’s powers in respect of serious invasions of privacy 
would help deter serious invasions of privacy by broadcasters and provide individuals 
with an alternative to costly litigation. 
15.18 Any expansion of the ACMA’s powers would need to take into account the self-
regulatory nature of the Broadcasting Services Act. One of the objects of the Act is to 
‘[enable] public interest considerations to be addressed in a way that does not impose 
unnecessary financial and administrative burdens on providers of broadcasting 
services’.
13
 The ACMA similarly noted in its submission that: 
The relevant legislative framework therefore requires the ACMA to provide industry 
with the opportunity to develop co and self-regulatory solutions, before other forms of 
intervention are considered.14 
15.19 The power to be exercised under this proposal would only be engaged where 
there has been a failure to comply with a self-regulatory code. The proposed power 
would be arguably less burdensome on media organisations than alternative 
mechanisms for increasing privacy protections, such as removing the media exemption 
to the Privacy Act 1988. 
15.20 Some media organisations submitted that any additional privacy protections 
would impose an excessive regulatory burden on the media and may have a chilling 
effect on responsible journalism.
15
 While the ALRC acknowledges the range of laws 
affecting media organisations, it should be noted that many of these laws protect 
privacy only in an incidental and limited way, and that there are significant gaps and 
deficiencies in the protection of privacy.
16
 It should also be reiterated that the proposed 
extension to the ACMA’s powers would only apply to those complaints which are 
serious and for which there is no overriding public interest justification. 
15.21 There is some evidence that privacy complaints against the media are relatively 
rare. The ACMA’s 2012–13 Annual Report showed that, while there were a total of 
2178 enquiries and written complaints about commercial, national and community 
television broadcasters, there were only two breach findings relating to privacy by 
commercial television broadcasters, and only three non-breach findings.
17
 Rather than 
providing evidence that no further privacy protections are needed, the ALRC suggests 
                                                        
13  Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 4(2). 
14  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52. 
15  SBS, Submission 59; Free TV, Submission 55; The Newspaper Works, Submission 50; Australian 
Subscription Television and Radio Association, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46. The submission 
from Free TV included a list of existing laws affecting media organisations, including laws relating to: 
trespass; nuisance; confidential information; defamation; malicious falsehood; contempt; data protection 
(however, as noted above, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) contains an exemption for media organisations); 
criminal trespass laws; restrictions on reporting matters affecting or involving children, adoption, coronial 
inquiries, sexual offences, jurors, and prisoners; court orders to make orders restricting reporting of court 
proceedings; anti-discrimination; restrictions on reporting certain types of activity under, for example, the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth); family law; and surveillance devices. 
16  See Ch 3 for further analysis of existing laws. 
17  ‘Annual Report 2012-13’ (Australian Communications and Media Authority) app 6. 
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that the ACMA’s figures indicate that the additional power proposed may be rarely 
used. However, the proposed power would provide a means of redress and alternative 
dispute resolution to affected individuals without the high cost for both parties of 
litigation. 
A new privacy principle for deletion of personal information 
Proposal 15–2 A new Australian Privacy Principle should be inserted into 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that would: 
(a) require an APP entity to provide a simple mechanism for an individual to 
request destruction or de-identification of personal information that was 
provided to the entity by the individual; and 
(b) require an APP entity to take reasonable steps in a reasonable time, to 
comply with such a request, subject to suitable exceptions, or provide the 
individual with reasons for its non-compliance. 
Question 15–1 Should the new APP proposed in Proposal 15–2 also require 
an APP entity to take steps with regard to third parties with which it has shared 
the personal information? If so, what steps should be taken? 
The importance of deletion 
15.22 Several submissions to the Issues Paper noted that the harm caused by a serious 
invasion of privacy in the digital era will often increase the longer private information 
remains accessible.
18
 Ensuring that individuals have a means to rapidly remove such 
information is one way to reduce the availability of private information. This proposal, 
if enacted, would provide a mechanism to assist individuals in having certain personal 
information destroyed or de-identified. The risk of that information being misused or 
disclosed in the future would thereby be reduced. 
15.23 This proposal would not provide a mechanism to allow individuals to request the 
deletion of private information posted about them by other individuals or organisations. 
In this respect, the proposal is significantly different from the ‘Right to be Forgotten’, 
which has been considered in the European Union
19
 and which was referred to in the 
Issues Paper.
20
 
                                                        
18  National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61; Google, Submission 54; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; B Arnold, Submission 28. 
19  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation)’ art 17. The right to be forgotten would be subject to 
limitations protecting, among other things, freedom of expression and the public interest in public health 
20  Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era’ (Issues Paper 43, 
2013) 50. 
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Limits of the proposed privacy principle 
15.24 The proposed privacy principle includes two key requirements. First, an APP 
entity (as defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)) would be required to provide a 
mechanism for individuals to request the deletion or de-identification of personal 
information held by that entity. Such a mechanism is already provided by some online 
services, allowing individuals to delete information that they have previously added to 
the service.
21
 
15.25 The second element of the proposal would require an APP entity that receives 
such a request to take reasonable steps to destroy or de-identify the relevant personal 
information in a reasonable time. Such a requirement would be subject to certain 
exceptions including, for example, where the information is required by law to be 
retained.
22
 An organisation which did not destroy or de-identify the information would 
be required to provide the requesting individual with the reason for its decision. 
The context of the Privacy Act 
15.26 The proposed privacy principle would be contained within the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth), along with the thirteen existing Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). The 
existing APPs include similar, but weaker, requirements. First, an APP entity must take 
reasonable steps to correct personal information held about an individual at the 
individual’s request.
23
 Second, an APP entity must destroy or de-identify personal 
information that is no longer required for a specific purpose under the APPs.
24
 The 
proposed privacy principle would complement these existing APPs. First, an individual 
would be empowered not only to request correction of personal information but also to 
request its deletion. Second, deletion would be required not only when the personal 
information is no longer useful but also when the individual requests its deletion. 
15.27 As an APP, the proposed principle would engage the existing complaints and 
enforcement mechanisms of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. In 
particular: 
 an APP entity’s failure to comply with the principle would constitute an 
interference with the privacy of an individual under the Privacy Act;
25
 
 an affected individual could therefore make a complaint about the failure to the 
OAIC;
26
 and 
 a serious or repeated failure to comply with the principle would constitute a 
breach of a civil penalty provision, possibly resulting in pecuniary penalties.
27
 
                                                        
21  Facebook, Submission 65. 
22  For example, limits are placed on the destruction or alteration of Commonwealth records under the 
Archives Act 1983 (Cth) s 24. 
23  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1 cl 13. 
24  Ibid sch 1 cl 11. 
25  Ibid s 13(1). 
26  Ibid ss 36, 40, 52. 
27  Ibid s 13G. 
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Extending the deletion requirement for data-sharers 
15.28 The ALRC has asked whether the proposed privacy principle should also require 
an APP entity to take additional steps where a deletion request is made and the relevant 
information has been shared with third parties. The ALRC has also asked what 
additional steps should be required in such cases. Some possible examples of additional 
steps include: 
 requiring the APP entity who receives the request to provide the requesting 
individual with a list of third parties who have received the information; and 
 requiring the APP entity who receives the request to notify any third parties with 
which it has shared the information that the request has been made. 
15.29 The utility of any such additional requirements would likely depend on the 
extent to which personal information collected by one APP entity is shared with other 
APP entities. However, the ALRC also acknowledges that, depending on the steps 
required, this extension of the proposed privacy principle may introduce additional 
burdens on APP entities. 
Regulator take-down orders 
Question 15–2 Should a regulator be empowered to order an organisation 
to remove private information about an individual, whether provided by that 
individual or a third party, from a website or online service controlled by that 
organisation where: 
(a) the individual makes a request to the regulator to exercise its power; 
(b) the individual has made a request to the organisation and the request has 
been rejected or has not been responded to within a reasonable time; and 
(c) the regulator considers that the posting of the information constitutes a 
serious invasion of privacy, having regard to freedom of expression and 
other public interests? 
15.30 The new Australian Privacy Principal in Proposal 15–2 does not include any 
right for an individual to have personal information deleted or de-identified when that 
information is provided by a third party. There may, however, be merit in introducing a 
take-down mechanism by which an individual could apply to have such information 
removed from websites and other online services. As noted above, the rapid removal of 
privacy information from public websites may help prevent an invasion of privacy. 
Although some online service providers may offer a system for complaining about a 
serious invasion of privacy, others may not.
28
 
                                                        
28  The ALRC previous considered a take-down system in ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy 
Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [11.21]–[11.23]. However, the possibility of a take-down 
mechanism continues to be discussed, and so it has been raised again in this Discussion Paper. 
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15.31 A regulator take-down system may provide a mechanism for limiting the impact 
or serious invasions of privacy. However, there is also a risk that such a system may 
have an undesirably chilling effect on online freedom of expression. The ALRC has 
therefore sought comment on the desirability of a take-down system, but has not 
proposed a take-down system at this stage. Comments are sought on: 
 whether any such take-down system is desirable; 
 which regulator or regulators should be empowered to issue take-down orders; 
 the circumstances in which a take-down order should be issued; and 
 any ways in which negative impacts on free expression could be minimised. 
15.32 If the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is enacted, an 
individual who has suffered a serious invasion of privacy may apply to a court for an 
injunction requiring the removal of private information. 
15.33 However, applying for an injunction may be expensive and time-consuming for 
the affected individual. A take-down system operated by a regulator would potentially 
be a cheaper and quicker alternative. It may also be a more accessible alternative where 
the affected individual is a young person. The OAIC and the ACMA may be well-
suited to exercising a power to order take-downs. 
15.34 The ALRC has suggested a model whereby a take-down order could be issued if 
three conditions are met. First, the regulator must receive a complaint from an 
individual. This would ensure that the regulator could not order a take-down of its own 
motion. Second, the individual must have attempted, without success, to have the 
material removed by the organisation which controls the website or online service. This 
would ensure that individuals had attempted to deal with the matter themselves before 
engaging the regulator. Third, the regulator must consider that the posting of the 
information constitutes a serious invasion of privacy, having regard to freedom of 
expression and other public interests. This would ensure that take-downs would only be 
ordered where an invasion was serious and where there was no countervailing interest 
in freedom of expression or public interest. 
15.35 As noted above, the Department of Communications is currently engaged in an 
inquiry into Online Safety for Children. As part of that inquiry, the Department has 
proposed a Commissioner with the power to issue a notice requiring the removal of 
material that is likely to harm a child. Such a notice could, under the Department’s 
proposal, be directed to either the internet intermediary
29
 or the individual who posted 
the material. 
                                                        
29  See Ch 10 on the meaning of ‘internet intermediaries’. 
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Amicus curiae and intervener roles for the Australian 
Information Commissioner 
Proposal 15–3 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) should be amended to confer 
the following additional functions on the Australian Information Commissioner 
in relation to court proceedings relating to interferences with the privacy of an 
individual: 
(a) assisting the court as amicus curiae, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court; and 
(b) intervening in court proceedings, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court. 
15.36 The ALRC has proposed that the Australian Information Commissioner be given 
new functions to act as amicus curiae or to intervene in legal proceedings relating to 
the information privacy. These functions would be additional to a range of existing 
functions conferred on the Commissioner under ss 27–29 of the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth), including: 
 specific functions under the Privacy Act (such as responding to complaints from 
individuals); 
 guidance related functions (preparing guidance about and promoting 
understanding of the requirements of the Privacy Act); 
 monitoring related functions (ensuring that APP entities are meeting the 
requirements of the Privacy Act and ensuring that any privacy impacts of new 
laws, practices or proposals are minimised); and 
 advice related functions (providing advice about the operation of and  
compliance with the Privacy Act, and any need for legislative action). 
15.37 These additional functions would be similar to functions conferred on other 
administrative bodies, such as the ACCC, ASIC and the Human Rights Commission. 
The role of an amicus curiae 
15.38 The role of an amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) is to assist the court ‘by 
drawing attention to some aspect of the case which might otherwise be overlooked.’
30
 
An amicus curiae may ‘offer the Court a submission on law or relevant fact which will 
assist the Court in a way in which the Court would not otherwise have been assisted’.
31
 
This role does not extend to introducing evidence to the court, although an amicus may 
                                                        
30  Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Wilcox J). On the role of an amicus curiae generally, see 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Beyond the Door-Keeper: Standing to Sue for Public Remedies, 
Report 78 (1996) ch 6. 
31  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 604 (Brennan CJ). 
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be permitted to lead non-controversial evidence in order to ‘complete the evidentiary 
mosaic’.
32
 An amicus curiae is not a party to the proceedings and is not bound by the 
outcome of the proceedings. In Re United States Tobacco Company, Einfeld J noted 
the value of amici curiae, particularly as subjects of increasing complexity are brought 
before the courts: 
The variegated complexity of modern life and technology, increasing materialism and 
the possible risks to the public of otherwise lauded scientific advances, have brought 
consequent significant legal challenges. These have been amplified not minimally by 
the burgeoning of statutory law expressing vague general principles and requiring the 
exercise of broad undefined judicial discretions. For the just resolution of these issues, 
the resultant mix beckons, if not requires, whatever assistance and expertise the 
Courts can reasonably muster.33 
15.39 An example of legislation conferring an amicus curiae function onto an 
administrative body can be found in s 46PV of the Australian Human Rights 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth). This section allows individual Commissioners (‘special-
purpose Commissioners’) within the Commission to act as amici curiae, with the 
court’s leave: 
(1) A special‑purpose Commissioner has the function of assisting the Federal Court 
and the Federal Circuit Court, as amicus curiae, in the following proceedings under 
this Division: 
 (a)  proceedings in which the special‑purpose Commissioner thinks that the 
orders sought, or likely to be sought, may affect to a significant extent the 
human rights of persons who are not parties to the proceedings; 
 (b)  proceedings that, in the opinion of the special‑purpose Commissioner, have 
significant implications for the administration of the relevant Act or Acts; 
 (c)  proceedings that involve special circumstances that satisfy the 
special‑purpose Commissioner that it would be in the public interest for the 
special‑purpose Commissioner to assist the court concerned as amicus 
curiae. 
15.40 Importantly, an amicus curiae does not have a legal interest in the outcome of 
proceedings. A person with a legal interest in proceedings may instead, with the leave 
of the court, intervene in the proceedings. 
The role of an intervener 
15.41 The role of amicus curiae can be distinguished from the role of an intervener. 
While the role of an amicus curiae is to assist the court, the role of an intervener is to 
represent the intervener’s own legal interests in proceedings. 
15.42 An intervener’s legal interests may be affected in a number of ways. First, the 
intervener’s interests may be directly affected by the court’s decision. For example, a 
decision about the property interests of the parties to proceedings might also affect the 
                                                        
32  Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Wilcox J). 
33  Re United States Tobacco Company v the Minister of Consumer Affairs and the Trade Practices 
Commission [1988] FCA 241 (14 July 1988) [68] (Einfeld J). 
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property interests of the intervener. Second, the intervener’s interests may be less 
directly affected. For example, the court’s decision might have an effect on the future 
interpretation of laws affecting the intervener.
34
 Under the ALRC’s proposal, a court 
might, for example, give leave to the Australian Information Commissioner to 
intervene in a case that would have future repercussions for the work of the OAIC. 
15.43 Functions to intervene are conferred upon a number of administrative bodies. 
For example, s 11(1)(o) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) 
confers an intervention function on the Australian Human Rights Commission: 
where the [Australian Human Rights Commission] considers it appropriate to do so, 
with the leave of the court hearing the proceedings and subject to any conditions 
imposed by the court, to intervene in proceedings that involve human rights issues[.]35 
15.44 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has an 
intervention function in relation to proceedings under the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth).
36
 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has an 
intervention function in relation to proceedings about consumer protection in financial 
services.
37
 
Other regulatory reforms 
Small businesses 
15.45 The APPs under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) regulate the handling of personal 
information by APP entities, ie government agencies and organisations.
38
 Notably, 
small businesses with an annual turnover of less than $3 million
39
 are exempt from the 
definition of ‘organisation’ and thus from the ambit of the APPs unless, for instance: 
 the small business trades in personal information; 
 the small business handles health information; or 
 the small business operator notifies the OAIC in writing of its desire to be 
treated as an organisation.
40
 
15.46 In its 2008 report For Your Information, the ALRC recommended that the small 
business exemption be removed from the Privacy Act. Several stakeholders, in 
submissions to the ALRC’s current Inquiry, noted that the exemption remains in the 
Privacy Act, and that the removal of the exemption would have benefits for privacy.
41
 
                                                        
34  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 601–602 (Brennan CJ). 
35  The Australian Human Rights Commission also has intervention functions, see for example, Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 31(j); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 48(1)(gb); Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 20(e); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 67(1)(1); Age 
Discrimination Ac 2004 (Cth) s 53(1)(g). 
36  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CA. 
37  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12GO. 
38  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) (definition of ‘APP entity’). 
39  Ibid ss 6C, 6D. 
40  Ibid ss 6D, 6E, 6EA. 
41  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 39–1. 
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15.47 Ensuring that small businesses handle personal information in an appropriate 
way may be particularly important in the digital era. A small business in the digital era 
can readily collect personal information through, for example, software on mobile 
phones or websites.
42
 Removing the small business exemption may therefore provide 
for better information privacy protections in the digital era. 
15.48 The ALRC acknowledges, however, that removing the small business 
exemption may have compliance costs for small businesses. The ALRC considers that 
the small business exemption should be given further consideration, particularly given 
the growth of digital communications and the digital economy since the 2008 
recommendation. The Productivity Commission, for instance, may be well-placed to 
investigate the likely impacts on small businesses if the small business exemption were 
removed. Such an investigation could give detailed consideration to the application of 
limited data protection models to small businesses in other jurisdictions
43
 as well as 
other options for improving the protection of personal information held by small 
business.
44
 
An extended complaints process for the OAIC 
15.49 In its submission to Issues Paper 43, the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner outlined a proposal for a new ‘complaints model’. The OAIC suggested 
that this model could provide an alternative to the statutory cause of action for serious 
invasions of privacy. A core element of the OAIC’s proposal would be a new power 
granted to the Australian Information Commissioner to receive complaints from 
individuals about intrusions into seclusion. This new power would extend the existing 
powers of the Commissioner to hear complaints about breaches of the APPs. 
15.50 An intrusion into seclusion would, under the OAIC’s proposal, constitute an 
‘interference with the privacy of an individual’.
45
 This would allow the individual to 
bring a complaint to the Commissioner,
46
 or for the Commissioner to undertake an own 
motion investigation.
47
 In the event that the Commissioner determined that an intrusion 
into seclusion had occurred, the existing powers of the Commissioner would allow for 
                                                        
42  ‘Mobile Apps’ (Occasional paper 1, Australian Communications and Media Authority, May 2013); ‘The 
Cloud—services, Computing and Digital Data’ (Occasional paper 3, Australian Communications and 
Media Authority, June 2013); ‘Mobile Privacy: A Better Practice Guide for Mobile App Developers’ 
(Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, September 2013). 
43  Data Protection Act 1998 (UK). 
44  For example, the small business exemption could be limited so that small businesses handling sensitive 
information would not be exempt. Sensitive information includes personal information about an 
individual’s racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, membership of political associations, religious 
beliefs or affiliations, philosophical beliefs, professional or union membership, sexual orientation or 
practices or criminal record, as well as health information, genetic information, and certain types of 
biometric information: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) (definition of ‘sensitive information’). 
45  Ibid s 6(1) (definition of ‘interference with the privacy of an individual’). 
46  Ibid s 36. 
47  Ibid s 40. 
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a range of declarations to be made.
48
 A determination of the Commissioner would then 
be enforceable through the Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court.
49
 
15.51 In the event that the intrusion into seclusion was serious or repeated, the 
intrusion would be a contravention of a civil penalty provision. The Commissioner 
would then be empowered to apply to the Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court for an 
order that the respondent pay a civil penalty.
50
 
15.52 The ALRC acknowledges that the OAIC’s proposed complaints model may 
offer several advantages over other methods of dealing with privacy disputes, in 
particular through litigation. Most significantly, the complaints model may be cheaper 
and faster than litigation, and may be less taxing on parties to a dispute. The complaints 
model would also take advantage of the OAIC’s existing powers and expertise in 
handling complaints about information privacy. 
15.53 However, the OAIC’s proposed complaints model would face several 
challenges. First, as noted by the OAIC in its submission, the model would require 
substantial additional OAIC resourcing, particularly if the complaints process were to 
be readily available across the country. Second, also as noted by the OAIC, the 
respondents to complaints under the existing Privacy Act are typically government 
agencies and large businesses. Although it may be possible to extend the Privacy Act to 
include complaints against individuals more generally, such an extension may have 
significant consequences which would need detailed consideration. Third, the Privacy 
Act contains a range of exemptions, such as the small business exemption noted above. 
While these exemptions remain in place, a complaints process based on the Privacy Act 
would have significant limitations. 
15.54 For these reasons, the ALRC has not proposed extending the Privacy Act or the 
powers of the Australian Information Commissioner in the way proposed in the OAIC 
submission. However, the ALRC notes that further consideration of the complaints 
model may be appropriate in the future. 
                                                        
48  These declarations could include: that the complainant is entitled to an amount of compensation; that the 
respondent should perform specific actions to ensure that the intrusion does not occur again; or that the 
respondent should perform specific actions to redress any loss or damage suffered by the complainant: 
Ibid s 52. 
49  Ibid s 55A. 
50  Ibid ss 13G, 80U, 80W, 80X. 
  
